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Foreword
The study that is before the readers presents a continuation of the 
research of corruption in Serbia which the Center for Liberal-
Democratic Studies has been conducting for years. The first study in 
the series was Corruption in Serbia (2001), which received the 
International Memorial Award Sir Anthony Fisher for 2002. This 
study was considered by many to be the first real research of corruption 
in our country and brought a comprehensive and coherent proposal of 
anti-corruption strategy, which was later included in the government 
arsenal. It was followed by the books entitled Corruption in the Customs 
(2002) and Corruption in the Judiciary (2004), which analyzed, in the 
same spirit, the level, mechanisms and consequences of corruption in 
these areas greatly threatened by corruption and proposed a set of anti-
corruption measures.
This study contains an analysis of the changes in the corruption level 
and effects of government policies during the five years of transition in 
Serbia, i.e. after the October changes. Hence, the idea was to look at the 
dynamics of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in this period and 
assess the successfulness of the measures undertaken. The study has 
shown that corruption was reduced significantly in 2006 relative to 
2001, but also that the positive change is not at the level of expectations 
among the people and political promises. Corruption is still a wide-
spread and dangerous phenomenon in Serbia. The study has also shown 
that that the government anti-corruption activities were mostly nor-
mative, i.e. legislative, with weaker practical work of the government 
bodies. For that reason, in the following period the focus of anti-cor-
ruption efforts should be shifted to the strengthening of anti-corrup-
tion mechanisms in the police, prosecutor’s offices and courts, as its 
main operative proponents.
The authors of individual chapters are as follows: the author of the 
first is Bosko Mijatović, the second Mirjana Vasović, the third Slobodan 
Vuković, the fourth Boris Begović, Jovan Jovanović and Marko 
Paunović, the fifth Marko Paunović, the sixth Boris Begović and the 
seventh Bosko Mijatović.
11 September 2007
Bo ris Be go vić
Boš ko Mi ja to vić
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9I  Politics and Corruption in Serbia
There is no doubt that corruption is widespread in the modern world, 
in particular in the undeveloped and developing countries. There is no 
doubt either that is exists in Serbia as well, to a significant degree, as 
demonstrated both by numerous studies and occasional arrests. 
This corruption had its dynamics in Serbia, with roots in the 1990s 
and arduous, not particularly successful struggle during the 2000s. This 
introductory section will deal with the global characteristics of the atti-
tude of government towards corruption.
CIRCUMSTANCES dURINg ThE 1990s
The foundations of present corruption in Serbia were places in the 
1990s. That was the time of the crumbling of the old communist regime, 
in which corruption was still a rare phenomenon and of creation of a 
new one, in which old moral values were disappearing and new ones 
were arising. 
Namely, until the early 1990s fairly rigid communist morals pre-
vailed, under which amassing wealth was not an accepted policy, so even 
the communist leaders did not possess any significant property, living 
instead on their wages, residing in government flats and houses and 
driving government cars. The year 1990 brought a change: introduction 
of the multiparty system and legalization of the private sector led to a 
change in the mindset of the political-economic elite. Now power has 
ceased to be a permanent privilege, becoming instead dependent on 
election results; then, amassing wealth became a permitted and desir-
able goal of the individual, even the one in power. Thus, the race for 
wealth began, with the abuse of the state as an important element. 
A good illustration of the state of mind at that time is related to the 
economic sanctions against the FR Yugoslavia in 1992. Allegedly because 
of the responsibility of the FR Yugoslavia for the war for Yugoslav heri-
tage, economic sanctions were imposed against the FRY (SC Resolution 
757), which were to sever foreign trade and financial flows with the 
world, thus forcing the then regime to yield. And what was the reaction 
of the authorities? Instead of opting for a completely liberalized imports 
regime, in order to foster imports of all types of goods and alleviate the 
effects of the sanctions, the authorities introduced a system of imports 
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licenses and quotas, which brought enormous wealth to those fortunate 
enough to get the imports licenses. Needless to say, it was practically 
only the members of the ruling regime who were granted the licenses. 
The overall effect: lower imports, implying lower production and sup-
ply of the market with consumer goods, with greater profit for the 
favorites of the regime.
Such a derogation of all and not only communist moral norms was 
not exclusively a consequence of internal political transition towards 
democracy and private property, but also of economic and political cri-
sis that arose in Serbia. Namely, the breakup of the SFRY led to wars, 
the already mentioned sanctions, decrease in wages and production, 
inadequate market supply levels, flourishing of the gray economy, crim-
inalization of economic life and society as a whole and similar. The for-
mal sector of the economy was falling apart, while the government tol-
erated any form of coping, both with regard to all population strata and 
the economy itself. 
It would not be incorrect to say that a complete legal anomy, i.e. law-
lessness, prevailed in Serbia at that time, so chaos in all areas of life was 
the expected consequence. Practically no one obeyed the laws, partly 
because they were unimplementable and because an attempt to enforce 
them would have brought the economic and social life to a halt, and 
partly because in such a way individuals from the ruling regime were 
privileged at the expense of all others. This resulted in a situation in 
which nothing was safe, in which any type of coping with the situation 
was the only principle. All moral breaks disappeared and taxes were not 
paid, contracts were not honored (including non-payment of debts), 
the government was used as an instrument for amassing wealth, many 
people did not live from their work and entrepreneurship, but as para-
sites, at the expense of someone else. Corruption also presented an ele-
ment of the situation at that time which fit in well with the others. 
The population became accustomed to a large degree to the state of 
affairs and began to perceive the criminal phenomena of the time as 
natural, as those that were not subjected to moral condemnation 
because it was the only way to cope. Corruption was also predominant-
ly seen as a practical method to get a job done in a desirable manner in 
all that chaos, and not as a phenomenon to be condemned. Naturally, 
corruption became very much widespread.1
ENThUSIASM AFTER OCTOBER 5
After the political reversal of October 5, 2000, democratic forces came 
into power, having criticized the corruption of the Milošević's regime 
and promising its eradication. Thus, the new Prime Minister Zoran 
Đinđić mentioned in his inaugural speech in the Serbian Assembly in 
1 See in more detail: Corruption in Serbia, CLDS, 2001
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January 2001 determined fight against corruption as one of the priori-
ties of his government. 
It was, indeed, a favorable moment for proper anti-corruption efforts, 
since there was practically no opposition. Large participants in corrupt 
activities did not present danger at that time: those that had become 
rich in the previous period no longer had political backing and could 
have been tried so that they could serve as an example to all others, 
while among the new authorities there were still no major beneficiaries 
of government privileges. Even more importantly, after coming into 
power, the revolutionary morals were prevalent in the ruling DOS, i.e. 
desire to rule honestly for the benefit of the people, without abusing the 
state for private ends. Any anti-corruption measure would have then 
been adopted by the assembly, because there was no one to oppose it. 
So the Government of Prime Minister Đinđić started building the 
anti-corruption structure in Serbia. Mobile anti-corruption teams were 
established, the Anti-corruption Council was formed, the improvement 
of legislation in the anti-corruption direction was initiated… However, 
an important mistake was made, which, in retrospect, significantly 
undermined the initial efforts. It is the extra profit tax law. 
A question that the new authorities faced was what to do with those 
who had made a fortune during the 1990s, mostly by abusing the state, 
i.e. through corruption. The taxation concept was selected, rejecting the 
alternative concept – the one with individual investigations of legality of 
business operations of well-known tycoons. The latter can partially be 
justified by the fact that a good portion of their earnings was formally 
legal – obtaining from the government the right to purchase cheap for-
eign currency, loans with negative real interest rate or imports licenses – 
as well as the lack of confidence in the ability of the police and judiciary at 
the time to conduct fair investigations, since their ranks had not been 
cleansed. In any case, in 2001 the so-called extra profit tax was intro-
duced, making actual, if not formal peace between the business commu-
nity from the time of the previous regime and the new government. The 
DOS authorities presented this tax as a moral move aimed at achieving 
social justice, since it was to be paid by those who had abused their ties 
with the previous regime and become rich in a dishonest manner. There 
were significant difficulties in the course of implementation, which is 
inevitable in such a tax, so many avoided its effects to a greater or lesser 
degree. Even more importantly, the extra profit tax practically legalized 
riches acquired through corruption during the previous decade, because 
– when a tax is paid on suspicious earnings, then such earnings can no 
longer be considered doubtful or suspicious, nor can proceedings be 
reinitiated against their owner. Indeed, there were no further investiga-
tions of the (il)legality of wealth acquisition from the 1990s.2 Therefore, 
2 Things might be changing: in June 2007 a group headed by a big tycoon (Cane 
Subotić) was arrested, having allegedly smuggled cigarettes into Serbia with partial 
cooperation of the government during the 1990s. 
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the extra profit tax practically laundered suspicious money in Serbia at 
a stroke, sending quite an undesirable signal to all potential participants 
in corrupt practices that the new authorities are not as tough as they 
claim to be. 
Apart from the legislative measures, the Government of Zoran Đinđić 
initiated a broad reform of the economic system: from a grotesque mar-
ket system with a domination of administrative-command levers in the 
hands of the cleptocratic state from the 1990s to standard capitalist sys-
tem. Numerous laws and mechanisms abolishing the market and bring-
ing fortune to some were done away with. The 2001 legalization and 
normalization of the market for foreign currency, cigarettes and petrol 
are also worth mentioning at this point. Until then these markets were 
dominated by street sales, with enormous profits for the main suppliers 
and losses for the coffers of both the government and consumers. 
Foreign trade liberalization should also be mentioned, abolishing a 
number of administrative imports restrictions, whose only purpose was 
to be a tool for increasing wealth of the persons with ties to the author-
ities. Namely, the previous system was mostly based on the system of 
licenses and quotas obtained, often by splitting profits with the bene-
factors, by the businessmen of the ruling regime. 
Generally speaking, economic reform aimed at strengthening the 
influence of the market as an impersonal mechanism of economic activ-
ity coordination, rooted out corruption through a significant reduction 
of activities that required discretionary approval of government and 
similar officials. Simply put, the role of the state in economic life was 
significantly reduced and is still being reduced, so there is reduced cor-
ruption potential in the economic sphere.
BRAkES
The development of political circumstances in Serbia during the past 
years certainly did not facilitate the fight against corruption. Serbia was 
all the time burdened with different substantive problems, even related 
to pure survival, which took up a significant portion of political energy, 
weakening the efforts towards the fight against corruption.
The first element in terms of importance is the fierce political fight 
raging almost all the time in the political scene of Serbia. The first 
period from 2001 to 2003 was marked by the conflict between the two 
democratic block leaders – the then Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran 
Đinđić, and the then President of the FR Yugoslavia, Vojislav 
Kostunica. The conflict escalated to such a degree that in 2002 the 
Đinđić's majority expelled from the Serbian Assembly all DSS depu-
ties, but the Assembly did not continue its activities, awaiting instead 
the (negative) decision of the Constitutional Court. However, this 
waiting was protracted, so the Assembly did not work for almost a 
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year, which certainly implied a suspension of legislative activities, 
inter alia, related to the corruption issue.
Similarly, another year that was practically lost was 2003, when Prime 
Minister Đinđić was assassinated, several months of state of emergency 
organized, ending in the government falling in the Assembly. Although 
the so-called Action Sabre was organized in a spectacular manner, as an 
alleged attempt to deal with crime in Serbia, in the end it came to nothing 
and, except for rare exceptions, thousands of those arrested were released. 
The Assembly was not in session, except towards the end of the year when 
the government no longer had the parliamentary majority. 
The next problem constantly destabilizing the political scene in Serbia 
and making the normal operation of the government more difficult was 
the issue of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. Soon after the estab-
lishment of the democratic regime at the beginning of 2001, requests 
started arriving from the Hague Tribunal, supported by the leading 
Western countries, to start extraditing the indictees for crimes during 
the previous wars. Prime Minister Đinđić bravely delivered Slobodan 
Milošević, but that was just the beginning. Since the Hague Tribunal is 
a very unpopular institution in Serbia, as the majority of citizens do not 
believe in its impartiality, cooperation (i.e. delivery of the indictees) is 
not easy for any of the Serbian governments, because each government 
must and does think about the consequences of cooperation with the 
Hague Tribunal on its own political rating and prospects in the next 
elections. For that reasons this process has been very lengthy, passing 
the entire time through cycles – alternate pressure increases and decreas-
es, on the one hand, and delivery and delivery suspensions, on the other. 
The key figures – Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic – are still at large, 
which means that the game continues. 
In the entire period under observation Serbia was also burdened by 
the problem of state borders. Namely, since the October changes, in 
fact even earlier, until today there has been an issue of the state we live 
in: is it Yugoslavia and, if so, what kind, or is it Serbia and, if so, with 
which borders? Both governments of Serbia were engaged in this con-
tinued struggle for the Yugoslav heritage, this time in the territories 
deemed Serbian. Đinđić, although more flexible than Kostunica, came 
on the verge of conflict with the Western diplomacy with regard to 
Kosovo and Metohia, whereas regarding the Montenegrin issue he was 
still positively disposed towards the Montenegrin President Đukanović. 
Kostunica was in the end left with both of these issues, which signifi-
cantly affected his engagement as the Prime Minister: in fact, he consid-
ered those two state issues to be the key issues, so he dedicated most of 
his attention to them. 
Apart from these urgent issues from the realm of high-level politics, 
the government authorities all the time faced the obligation to imple-
ment deep socioeconomic reforms within transition, which put addi-
tional strain on the government capacities.
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The fact that the state leadership was burdened with important polit-
ical and reform activities would certainly not have to interfere with 
anti-corruption efforts, but could develop in parallel. However, the 
government administration in Serbia has fairly limited capacities, which 
is caused by several reasons: departure of part of capable civil servants 
after the fall of the Milošević's regime; very low salaries in the 2001-
2004 period, so again many capable people went to the private sector; 
changing of high officials (usually deputy ministers and department 
heads) after each change of the government, etc. Similar thing hap-
pened with the police, reducing its efficiency.
ELECTORAL SYSTEM, COALITION gOVERNMENT MOdEL ANd 
CORRUPTION
So far we have considered current changes in the political situation in 
Serbia and tried to identify their effects on corruption and fight against 
corruption. Further in the text we shall attempt to examine certain 
characteristics of the country's political system and their effect on 
corruption.
Let us begin with the electoral system. In Serbia the proportionate 
electoral system is in force, with the parliamentary mandates distribut-
ed to the party lists according to the number of votes in the Republic. 
There are certainly reasons justifying the existence of this system, since, 
inter alia, it enables better parliamentary representation of small parties 
and political, social, ethnic and other minorities. Naturally, it has its 
weaknesses as well, one of the most important being the fact that it leads 
to the fragmentation of the Assembly to a large or larger number of par-
ties. This advantage and this disadvantage of the proportionate system 
are in fact two sides of the same coin: good representation of minority 
opinions signifies a larger number of small parties in the Assembly rela-
tive to the competing, majority system. 
This segmentation of the Assembly presents a barrier to the cre-
ation of a homogeneous, efficient government. The existence of a 
number of small or medium-sized parties inevitably leads to the 
necessity of creation of broader coalitions in the course of govern-
ment formation, which can hardly be efficient since their interests and 
ideologies, when they have them, are different, making successful 
cooperation more difficult. 
That was the case in Serbia as well. The first governments of both 
Đinđić and Kostunica were coalition governments, with very diversi-
fied composition. When it was formed, the Đinđić's government con-
sisted of as many as eighteen parties, admittedly joined at first by com-
mon revolutionary zeal. However, conflicts soon followed, so 18 came 
down to 17 (DSS left), with cracks appearing between the remaining 
parties as well. The problem was also aggravated by the fact that the 
smaller coalition parties realized that they could tip the scale and that 
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without their votes the government could not have a majority, so they 
started putting pressure of the Prime Minister and other coalition par-
ties, occasionally giving proper ultimatums in order to vote for the gov-
ernment proposals. One of such disputes – SDP vs. Prime Minister 
Živković – caused the government to fall at the end of 2003, because 
SPD had already found a new coalition partner. 
Such a situation, when practically each coalition member has casting 
votes, i.e. when the survival of the government in the Assembly depends 
on each coalition member, is certainly not conducive to anti-corrup-
tion efforts. What is easily resolved and performed in a homogenous, 
one-party government – dismissal of a suspicious minister – proves to 
be impossible or difficult in broad coalitions, since a party usually sides 
with its member and defends him with all its might, until the issue 
becomes quite clear and public. Such a fairly protected position not 
only of ministers, but also of other senior government officials, not only 
makes the fight against corruption more difficult, but it also directly 
encourages all those occupying public positions to take part in it. 
Namely, when a corrupt individual is to a significant extent protected 
by a political shield, than it is certain that, in line with the Becker's cal-
culation about the ratio between the corruption benefits and potential 
penalty, he is much more motivated to engage in illicit activities. 
It was not different at the time of the first Kostunica's government 
in 2004-2007. It was even a minority government, depending on the 
external support of SPS in the Assembly, so again each of the four par-
ties of the ruling coalition had a right of effective veto. As in other 
similar situations, it could be heard from the reliable sources that the 
Prime Minister had thick files on the leading ministers from the coali-
tion parties and that he used them rationally in intergovernmental 
bargaining, but none of it come out in the public or reached the law 
enforcement bodies.
Therefore, the electoral system affects the level of corruption and 
ability of the executive power to face it. From the point of view of cor-
ruption reduction it would be better to transfer to the majority elec-
toral system and in time reach a two- or three-party system, which most 
commonly provides homogeneous governments, capable of fighting 
corruption within the executive power. 
Apart from the weaknesses stemming from the coalition character of 
the governments, it is also necessary to analyze an apparently technical 
issue, but which has impact on corruption and fight against it. Namely, 
when each of the previously mentioned governments was formed, the 
following question was asked: will each party-coalition partner take over 
a certain number of ministries (or public enterprises, institutions, etc.) 
and manage them by itself (minister, deputy and assistants from the same 
party) or will each ministry be under the joint administration of several 
parties (minister from one party, deputy minister from another, etc.)? 
On the one hand, the model of complete control is usually justified 
by its advocates as more favorable for efficient management of affairs, 
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on the basis of single ideology and facilitated mutual communication 
and cooperation within the management team since they all come from 
the same party. On the other hand, it is claimed that the model of joint 
administration may lead to difficulties in the operation of ministries 
due to discrepant conceptual issues, mutual competitive relations 
between the leading persons, etc.
From the point of view of corruption, however, the two previously 
mentioned models look different. The model of complete control 
enables the management of affairs completely in the interest of the party 
or group, where one group of mutually connected people (coming from 
one political party) is directly monitored by no one.3 Therefore, this 
group can freely engage in corruption in personal or party interest, 
without much fear from internal supervision by coalition partners. 
Indeed, the division of ministries among parties according to the com-
plete control principle seems in advance like a division of spoils between 
the ruling coalition parties and such a coalition agreement whose pur-
pose is precisely the non-interference of one party into the affairs of 
other parties. 
On the other hand, the model of joint administration at least par-
tially makes corruption more difficult, because the ministry (or public 
enterprise, etc.) is led at the beginning by a diverse team, coming from 
different parties and having different political interests, whose mem-
bers usually do not know each other or are mere acquaintances. So there 
is less likelihood of corruption conspiracy between the leading persons 
in this model than in the model of complete control. Admittedly, it is 
not impossible, as demonstrated by limited anecdotal evidence. 
In Serbia the model of joint administration was implemented during 
the Đinđić's government, whereas the model of complete control was 
dominant during the first Kostunica's government. 
IMPETUS TO FIghT AgAINST CORRUPTION
Despite aggravating circumstances, mentioned in the previous sec-
tions, fight against corruption in Serbia was not completely neglected in 
the previous years either. When the original zeal of political leaders 
waned, other factors provided impetus – those from the political envi-
ronment. The attitude towards corruption among politicians certainly 
belongs to their public sphere of activity and they are not indifferent to 
how the electorate and other political factors perceive them.
Two basic factors that the politicians paid particular attention to 
since 2001 are the public opinion and external pressure. Both needed to 
be satisfied, since they asked for action and results. The domestic public 
certainly directed the disposition to the electorate and the government 
3 Naturally, the public and law enforcement bodies are there to provide final 
supervision, but their efficiency in Serbia, at least so far, has been insufficient. 
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was interested in its disposition, trying to present its actions in the best 
possible light. Moreover, the integration of Serbia into the world flows 
after October 5 also implied anti-corruption activities, since this topic 
is very popular in the modern world and a broad anti-corruption cam-
paign is waged at the global level, led by the most developed countries 
and numerous political and financial international organizations. 
The three main directions of activity of political circles in the fight 
against corruption during the previous years in Serbia were the follow-
ing: legislative reform, adoption of the national anti-corruption strategy 
and certain concrete activities.
The legislative reform was to set up a favorable legal framework for 
hampering corruption and facilitating fight against it. In the previous 
period corruption practically completely fell under the general legisla-
tion, whereas during the 2000s an orientation towards the specification 
of corrupt act incrimination and development of specific legislation 
dealing with it was adopted. As part of such a policy, several special laws 
were passed and certain existing general laws were amended. In such a 
way the legislative reform was almost completed and a base created for 
more successful fight against corruption, although certain weaknesses 
soon became evident in the course of implementation, requiring new 
legislative efforts towards the improvement of regulations. 
Within the legislative reform several most important changes will be 
mentioned:
The Law on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest was adopted in 
2004, aiming to make corruption significantly more difficult from the 
aspect of its supply; expectations from this law were large, but the 
results of its implementation so far are to a significant extent unsatis-
factory; the procedural-administrative and penal part of the law 
proved to be inadequately regulated, so its implementation was not 
executed as planned;
The Law on the Financing of Political Parties was adopted in 2003; it 
is relatively well designed, but there are problems in its implementa-
tion: for example, political parties' reports on the financing of the pre-
election campaign from January 2007 are mostly incomplete and unsat-
isfactory, but without any particular consequences for those that sub-
mitted them, 
The Law on Public Procurement was adopted in 2002, with significant 
amendments in 2004; the purpose of this law was to introduce transpar-
ency and competition in public procurement, which is certainly one of 
the most important potential areas of corruption; this aim has been 
achieved to a large degree, but procedural weaknesses have arisen: great 
complexity of the procedure, insufficient role of the Public Procurement 
Agency and Commission for the Protection of Rights, etc.,
Law on Civil Servants was adopted in 2005, aiming at the profes-
sionalization and depoliticization of the government administration, 
so civil servants' position relative to the previous provisions has been 
reinforced; the question is whether this reinforcement will reduce 
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corruption incentives or intensify them, since civil servants will feel 
more protected before their bosses and all others;
The Law on Government Auditing Institution was adopted in 2005, 
and was still not in force by mid-2007; one of the reasons, probably the 
main one, was the failure to find a competent candidate for the position 
of the President, since the planned salary is far below the auditor's sal-
ary in the private sector;
The Law on Ombudsman was adopted in 2005 and was to provide 
greater protection of the citizens' freedoms and rights before govern-
ment officials, including corruption cases; the law was not in force by 
mid-2007, because only then was an ombudsman elected in the Serbian 
Assembly;
The new Criminal Code was adopted in 2005 and the new Law on 
Criminal Proceedings in 2006, which should, inter alia, assist in the 
fight against corruption; the Criminal Code provides for the criminal 
acts of giving and receiving bribes as an act against official duty of gov-
ernment officials.
A preliminary conclusion could be that the new legislation is concep-
tually mostly well regulated, but there are shortcomings in the proce-
dural provisions, leading to pronounced weaknesses in their implemen-
tation. Among the planned anti-corruption laws, the law on anti-cor-
ruption agency, which is supposed to lead operationally the fight against 
corruption, has still not been adopted. There is a draft law, but it has 
not been adopted yet, although the agency is provided for in the Anti-
corruption Strategy.
In the autumn of 2005 the Serbian Assembly adopted the National 
Anti-corruption Strategy. Its adoption resulted from significant efforts 
of foreign factors, i.e. international organizations, based on the belief 
that it would bring about a reversal in the fight against corruption. 
Experience has shown that the domestic public believes that for any 
important social issue it is good to adopt a strategy, which is certainly a 
disputable concept. In any case, the strategy has been adopted and in 
that way the Government met the expectations of two important politi-
cal groups. And it remains to be seen how things will proceed from 
there. The likelihood of problems in implementation is demonstrated 
by the fact that the Government has not adopted the Action Plan for 
Strategy Implementation so far (July 2007), which it was obliged to do 
according to the Strategy. 
There were fewer concrete anti-corruption actions than there 
should have been. In the following chapters we shall examine what 
has been done and whether that was a result of a lack of commitment 
on the part of the government, of certain political obligations towards 
the party (SPS) which supported the majority government or of some 
other reason.
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 2001–2006: Period Effect
INTROdUCTION
Corruption is not an excessively dynamic social phenomenon; its social 
specificities change slowly. There are several explanations for that. In 
stable societies, it is frequently a systemic phenomenon, integrated with 
the operation of the existing institutions. Sometimes it presents an inte-
gral part of moral folklore of a society, i.e. generally agreed norms of 
behavior; because of that neither its participants, nor external observers 
can easily distinguish it from customs and recognize it as social pathol-
ogy. Since corruption is rooted in the very foundations of the culture 
and society, its tradition, changes in its scale (prevalence among the 
population), level and forms occur slowly, sometimes only with the 
changes of cultural patterns.
It makes sense to expect the periods of deep changes in the socio-
economic system, such as the period of transition in the post-com-
munist countries, to lead inevitably to changes in the characteristics 
of corruption existing in the society. Since transition, by definition, 
implies primarily reforms of the old system institutions, they would 
be expected to cause a reduction of its scale as well. However, institu-
tional changes are a relatively slow process. Moreover, since transi-
tion reforms imply rapid privatization, they themselves can become 
the sources of some new forms of corruption. Apart from that, these 
times of upheaval are usually accompanied by a breakup of the pre-
vailing value system and confrontation of old and new customs and 
moral systems, directing the behavior of the people. This state of 
anomy affects not only the degree of acceptance of moral norms, but 
also changes the advocated type of morality. This means that this is 
not just an issue of the change in moral standards (what is good and 
what is evil), but also of normative interpretation of individual and 
group behavior (what it means to be honest). Because of all this, 
efforts towards the establishment of democracy, rule of law and mar-
ket economy in the transition postcommunist societies face, at the 
same time, institutional barriers and resistance creating an anomic 
society. Members of these societies, disorientated in terms of their 
values and morals, on the one hand, become more tolerant of previ-
ously proscribed forms of conduct, while, on the other, becoming 
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more inventive in finding new activities that could be useful in coping 
in the existing institutional and value vacuum. Corruption is one the 
highly practical methods they use to cope with the transition chaos, 
which is why it legally self-reproduces under such circumstances. 
Any attempt to compare the perceptions and opinions of the 
Serbian public on corruption after only five years – in order to be 
able, at least indirectly, to draw conclusions on the current state of 
corruption in the society – must take into account the previously 
mentioned circumstances. Namely, such a study must proceed from 
quite moderate assumptions on the scope of changes that could have 
occurred in the meantime. Perceptions that people have on corrup-
tion are much more susceptible to fluctuations depending on the 
influence of the period, i.e. given social, economic and political situa-
tion, than the phenomenon itself. Since the concept of corruption is 
mostly related to the disfunctionality of the state and government, the 
picture the public has of it mostly depends on how the current politi-
cal processes and their participants are perceived and assessed. 
Sometimes the general belief that the government is dishonest and 
corrupt presents one of the methods to express general dissatisfaction 
with the political and economic situation in the country, which is a 
regular phenomenon in transition. These perceptions, which are nat-
urally subjective, can be additionally “colored” by various political 
animosities and resentments amidst general politicization of the soci-
ety and general political segregation. It is in that light that uncritical 
assessments on the state of corruption in Serbia (characteristic not 
only of the period of the Milošević’s regime, but also the period after 
the democratic changes) should be interpreted, often overestimating 
its scale and intensity, i.e. exaggerating the situation. Not only does 
Serbia rank among the countries with the highest degree of corrup-
tion in the world, but it is also claimed that it has infected the entire 
society, that all politicians are corrupt, etc. Depending on which social 
structures they originate from, these exaggerations present nothing 
but a product of disappointment in the new democratic government, 
pressure on the existing regime, or the manner to express resistance 
to changes of the political and economic system in general. 
Taking all this into account, in an attempt to compare the percep-
tions and positions on corruption in Serbia in two different periods – 
directly after the political upheaval and five years later – the researchers 
could start from but a few general and limited hypotheses. One of them 
is that the changes in the degree of corruption prevalence in the society, 
and consequently corruption perceptions, in this period, can only be 
moderate. Also, that any changes in corruption perception are to a sig-
nificant degree connected with some forms of group membership, 
affected themselves not only by socioeconomic position, but also by the 
dominant political affiliations of their members. Furthermore, that 
subjective assessments on corruption prevalence (thus the changes that 
can be determined) are more clearly crystallized when it comes to the 
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areas in which the reforms went furthest, precisely because they pre-
sented neuralgic spots of the previous and the present system as well. It 
can also be assumed that those social groups that exhibit a more critical 
attitude towards the system in general (in particular transition losers) 
will be inclined to overestimate the corruption scale and attribute it pri-
marily to the political representatives of the new system; that the oppo-
sition-supporting groups will also be more inclined to overestimate the 
corruption scale relative to the previous period, with the supporters of 
the regime (ruling coalition) being more likely to overestimate the scale 
of positive changes. Finally, that the generations which were, in their 
formative years, socialized on the basis of solid moral standards, within 
a stable society, will demonstrate greater lack of tolerance towards cor-
ruption, and less moral cynicism than the generations that grew up 
amidst social anomy.
These general assumptions can be complemented by some more 
specific ones, which refer to the phenomenon of corruption in any 
society, or are special characteristics of all postcommunist societies. 
The most important ones include the impact of education level on the 
perception of changes in the corruption level: the more educated 
members of the society are able to perceive the complex forms of this 
phenomenon, its causes and subtle changes.1 Besides, it is worth men-
tioning the significant impact of expectations from the changes of the 
system and regime (i.e. the feeling of relative deprivation) as a general 
factor affecting the assessments on the corruption dynamics in the 
society: great expectations from the reforms increase the “impatience” 
of all or some members of the society, thus affecting the level of their 
critical attitude (i.e. the underestimation of progress in the fight 
against this negative social phenomenon). Finally, the factors charac-
teristic of all postcommunist societies, which can be of importance in 
this respect, are the insufficient transparency of institutions and pro-
cesses, causing insufficient information, inherited lack of citizens’ 
trust in the government, severe political polarization of the society 
leading to decreased rationality, as well as the prevalence of percep-
tions on social reality that are often “distorted” by the existing preju-
dice and stereotypes.
 In a study that is primarily focused on comparisons it was not pos-
sible to test all these hypotheses. Therefore, the following study report is 
a description rather than an attempt to interpret the observed changes 
in the perception the Serbian public has on the state of corruption in 
the society in the two periods under observation. 
1 Although this does not mean that those with more education are always the most 
objective in their assessments, since the factor of their dominant political affiliation 
“interferes” here as well.
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PERCEPTION OF ThE PhENOMENON OF CORRUPTION
Is corruption perceived as an important social problem?
The problem of corruption in Serbia has been in the focus of public 
attention for a decade and a half. In transition periods, which are usu-
ally accompanied by sudden and deep social stratification, the focus of 
the people on the cases of (unjustified) wealth increase increases. The 
higher sensitivity of the general population to the breaches of moral 
norms, in particular by the political elite, is also characteristic of the 
periods of upheaval, precisely because they symbolically mark the entry 
into a new, better and more just order. For that reason, in this kind of 
social situation people often perceive the problem of corruption as one 
of the key social problems and frequently identify it with their personal 
problems. Today, just like five years ago, the citizens of Serbia rank the 
problem of corruption among the most important problems the society 
is facing. Around 1/4 of responses (i.e. 24%) identifying the most 
important social problems of Serbia refer precisely to the problem of 
corruption (the problem is mentioned as the first or the second 
response).2 In the overall ranking of responses related to the most 
important social problems, corruption ranks behind the problems 
related to financial position such as poverty (mentioned by 47% of peo-
ple) and unemployment (45%); corruption is also behind the problem 
of operation and survival of the political system – i.e. the problem of 
political instability (34% of the total responses given). 
Even when observing only the responses in which one of the prob-
lems is pointed out as indisputably the most serious (it is put in the 
first position on the list of the important and serious problems the 
present Serbia faces), corruption occupies the prominent fourth posi-
tion. This means that 1/10 of the population identifies precisely cor-
ruption as the first and the foremost social problem – which is two 
and a half times less frequent than the problem of poverty and twice 
les frequent than unemployment and political instability, but it is 
ahead of the problem of crime, bad business operation, bad health 
care, etc. (Figure 1).
A comparison of the two periods, i.e. 2001 and 2006, points to the 
fact that the share of people who perceive corruption as one of the very 
important social problems went down by only one percent (10:11), 
which could mean that the awareness of the population of its impor-
tance did not change much. Something similar can be said for the per-
ception of other social problems, which mostly remained unchanged, 
in particular with regard to poverty and political instability. Changes 
are the largest when it comes to “crime” (the problem stressed by almost 
2 The respondent was able to mark two problems he considers to be the most 
important (multiple responses) Data in brackets denote the percentage of 
respondents mentioning one of the stated problems.
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50% fewer citizens than in the past – in the past 9%, now 15%) and 
“bad interethnic relations” (66% fewer – in the past 2%, now 6%). 
When comparing the findings of these two studies (2001 and 2006) it 
can also be seen that today (unlike the previous period) corruption is 
attributed greater importance than crime, although the citizens’ atten-
tion directed to that problem remains practically the same. People obvi-
ously believe that the new government dealt with the problem of crime 
more successfully (although it still exists) than with the problem of cor-
ruption. It is also possible that during the previous period, with the 
acceleration of the privatization process, corruption inevitably became 
a socially more prominent phenomenon than crime. It is probable that 
the importance of this problem in the people’s perception would be 
even greater if it had not been overshadowed by a new problem of social 
pathology, also inextricably connected with the process of economic 
restructuring, which is the problem of unemployment. Five years ago 
“unemployment” was denoted as a key social problem by only 5% peo-
ple in Serbia, and today by as many as 24%. Furthermore, the figure 
shows that while the percentage of citizens that set greatest store by 
crime is decreasing, their concern about the situation in the education 
and health care system is on the (slight) rise. At the same time, as already 
said, the areas that are perceived today as significantly better, or which 
are not considered as important as in the past, are “bad business opera-
tion” and “bad interethnic relations”, as well as “pollution”. 
Although, generally speaking, the problem of corruption ranks rel-
atively high, it does not attract the same attention of all social groups. 
In the context of the general social turbulence, this question is most 
Figure 1  The most serious problems Serbia faces – first-ranked response 
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frequently raised by the generation between 35 and 45 years of age 
(which, in general, show in this study a more critical attitude towards 
the pace of social reforms), as well as the better educated and wealth-
ier categories of the people. The problem of corruption attracts sig-
nificantly less attention of the respondents with lower education level 
who are clearly preoccupied with the problems of poverty and unem-
ployment (Figure 2). To a certain degree, this problem is also disre-
garded by the oldest, non-working citizens. The comparison between 
the Serbian regions shows that the citizens of Belgrade show signifi-
cantly higher and of Vojvodina somewhat lower concern about cor-
ruption than the average citizens of Serbia. 
Is corruption perceived as an important personal problem as well? 
Corruption is perceived somewhat more frequently as a serious social issue 
than as an important personal problem. Among personal problems, it 
ranks fifth (both in the overall structure of responses and among the 
first-ranked problems). Personal problems that are more important to 
the citizens are poverty and low standard of living, unemployment, 
political instability and bad health care (Table 1). Since it is mentioned 
Figure 2  The most serious problem the society faces (the percentage of citizens 
mentioning the problem as the first, or the second choice) according to the 
education level
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with double the frequency as a social rather than a priority personal 
problem, corruption is clearly treated similar to political instability and 
crime. On the other hand, poverty or bad health care is considered a per-
sonal problem to a greater degree than a social problem. When it comes 
to the problem of unemployment, although it is mentioned somewhat 
more frequently as the most important personal problem, the differ-
ence in the number of those who perceive it as a social and personal 
problem is smaller; this means that unemployment is generally per-
ceived as threatening and detrimental both to the society as a whole and 
individuals. 
Table 1 The most important social and personal problem in 2006 (percentage of 
first-ranked responses)
Pro blem Social Personal
Poverty, low standard of living 26.8 37.1
Unemployment 23.9 27.4
Political instability 20.3 11.0
Corruption 9.8 05.4
Crime 8.7 03.7
Bad business operation 3.9  3.3
Bad health care 2.6 07.5
Bad interethnic relations 2.1 01.6
Problems in education 0.9 01.4
Pollution 0.2 01.0
Other 0.2 00.0
Does not know / Refuses to answer 0.6 00.6
The perception of corruption as the primary personal problem is 
particularly characteristic of the people between 30 and 45 years of 
age (i.e. the generations born between 1960 and 1975), of the highly-
educated, employed in private firms and those who are better off. This 
could be a problem that younger private entrepreneurs perceive as 
particularly threatening, since they see corruption as more of a hin-
drance than as support to better business operation and faster eco-
nomic progress.
When comparing data from the two periods, it can be seen that the 
number of those who see corruption as the main personal problem 
remained at the level of 5%, which may also have impact on the assess-
ment of its present prevalence. At the same time the number of people 
personally affected by poverty went down by one tenth (from 48% to 
37%), the number of those affected by the problem of crime went 
down by half (from 9% to 4%), only a third of the previous number 
of citizens personally concerned about bad business operation (from 
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9% to 3%), and pollution (from 3% to 1%) remained. In contrast, the 
feeling of personal frustration caused by the problem of unemploy-
ment spread to a great degree – from 9% in the past to 27% of the 
population (Figure 3).
Is corruption perceived as a social evil?
The previous research (from 2001) pointed to the conclusion that in 
the Serbian society there is, at least partial, adaptation to some cor-
rupt practices, with some of its segments treating this phenomenon 
with greater resignation than some others. The latest data (from 2006) 
determine more closely the groups for which it can be said that they 
show signs of adaptation to this socially pathogenous phenomenon 
and point to some conclusions on the motives underlying this toler-
ance. The findings show that in the period between two studies the 
number of citizens exhibiting a negative attitude towards corruption 
posted a slight increase, which means that tolerance towards corrup-
tion in the society also partially went down. In 2001 just over 60% and 
today 66% of people take an unyielding position expressed in the 
form of claim that corruption is “something that is a phenomenon 
highly detrimental to the society, which should be fought against in 
every way”. Furthermore, a somewhat lower number of citizens 
(approximately 24%, relative to the 29% previously) expresses a fatal-
istic position according to which corruption is an “inevitable” and 
“everlasting” phenomenon in every society. Approximately 7% of 
Figure 3  The most important social problem perceived as the most important 
personal problem in the two periods under observation (2001 and 2006)
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respondents believe that corruption is a “necessary evil” which can be 
useful as well, while 3% believe that it is even necessary for the society 
so that problems can be resolved faster.
In the poorest category there is a significantly larger number of those 
expressing an unyielding attitude towards corruption (77%) than in 
other population categories. The poor and unemployed are also much 
less than others resigned to the inevitability of the existence of corrup-
tion in the society (Figure 4). Transition losers obviously become more 
sensitive to social circumstances contributing to increasing economic 
stratification of the society and perceive corruption as one of the obsta-
cles preventing them from improving their unfavorable financial posi-
tion. In contrast, more educated groups exhibit a more realistic 
approach, with a position that corruption is inherent to each society 
(34%). There are also indicative differences in the perception of cor-
ruption as a social evil between the youngest and the oldest groups, sug-
gesting that the youngest categories of the society (18-29 years of age) are 
characterized by moral cynicism. These differences will become evident 
not only with regard to the understanding of what corruption repre-
sents, but also the degree in which such a phenomenon is condemned 
and rejected. 
Figure 4  Opinions on what corruption represents, according to the financial 
position of respondents
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What is classified under corruption (operationalization of corrupt 
activities)?
The position towards corruption, either positive or negative, is obvi-
ously connected with its clear definition, i.e. with the awareness of 
which actions and practices can be connected with it. In Serbia there 
are fewer and fewer doubts in that respect. Not only do they concur to 
a significant degree in the operationalization of corrupt practices 
(between 63% and 92% respondents agree about the type of practices 
that should be included in corruption) but, in the meantime, the list 
of these practices has increased. Today a larger number of people than 
in the previous period recognize corruption in the practices such as 
“subsequent services to the lawyer”, “giving money to the traffic offi-
cer in order to avoid a fine”, “disclosing business information for per-
sonal gain”, “giving presents to a doctor”, “giving pre-election dona-
tions to political parties”, “pulling strings in order to find a job for a 
relative”, etc. (Table 2)
Table 2  Which of the following is corruption? (operationalization of corrupt 
actions in the two time periods – 2001 and 2006) 
Practices
2006 2001
%
Giving money to a civil servant for the purpose of tax 
reduction 92.1 89.8
Offering money to a traffic officer so that he does not take 
away your driving license 90.7 84.9
Abusing the official position to provide gain for your private 
company 87.7 83.9
Disclosing business information to other people for personal 
gain 83.8 79.1
Pulling strings to release someone close from military service 76.4 73.5
Intervening with a high official to employ your relative 75.1 64.3
Additional fee to a lawyer for assistance to a defendant in court 70.3 50.0
Giving a present to a doctor so that he takes special care of you 68.9 59.3
Giving pre-election donations to political parties 68.4 43.9
Offering counter service in order to get a leave from work 66.9 63.1
Personally contacting a councilor in order to obtain a 
construction permit 62.8 53.0
These changes can indicate a weakening of the influence of customary 
norms (primarily, the reciprocity norm) on the appearance of corrup-
tion, i.e. they can point to the establishment of some new rules of behav-
ior that can have positive effect on its elimination. The awareness of the 
people of the fact that some activities are prohibited has been raised, 
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even if they are not subject to legal sanctions, which means that a clear-
er concept of corruption is crystallizing. Such crystallization is probably 
a consequence of intentional or unintentional education of citizens on 
corruption, which is conducted through the mass media, government 
campaigns, or civil sector activities, and which intensified significantly 
after 2000.
Opinions about the basic causes of corruption
Opinions on the basic causes of corruption in Serbia have partially 
changed compared to the previous period, although not substantively. 
Judging by the frequency of some answers,3 it is becoming obvious that 
the citizens of Serbia now, as five years ago, believe that there are three 
main causes of corruption in the society: moral crisis of the society (stim-
ulating dishonesty of its individual members), general poverty (which for 
some people implies a necessity and justification of breaching moral 
standards), and insufficient development of the rule of law (causing a gen-
eral climate of lawlessness). What changed partially is just the frequency 
with which each of these basic causes is mentioned. If the moral crisis is 
considered the most frequent cause of corruption in Serbia, a somewhat 
larger number of people than previously also interprets it as a conse-
quence of general poverty, and a somewhat smaller number perceives it 
as a consequence of the lack of rule of law and of the rule of lawlessness. 
The impression is that such changes in the understanding of corruption 
causes are a part of a more general process in which the attention of the 
public is directed more towards economic than legal-political origins of 
social problems (Table 3).
The interpretation of corruption causes (i.e. frequency of certain 
answers) is connected, at least partially, with sociodemographic charac-
teristics of the respondents. Reference to moral crisis is more frequent 
among the highly-educated, urban population as a whole, in particular 
among the citizens of Belgrade. The same answer is much less frequent-
ly found among people of the lower education level and among rural 
population. General poverty is most frequently mentioned by the least 
educated, rural population and the oldest citizens. All those groups that 
still live within the boundaries of traditional morality and, due to a lack 
of education, interpret in a simplified way the complex social reality, 
understand corruption only as a reaction of the people to dire financial 
circumstances. The lack of rule of law as a source of corruption is most 
frequently cited by students and the youngest respondents, while insuf-
ficient efficiency of the court system is mentioned by the people with 
higher education levels. Such an interpretation of corruption fits into 
the generally critical attitude towards the society and government that 
is characteristic of these groups. 
3 It was possible to give up to three answers. Table 3 gives an overview of distribution 
of the stated reasons (cumulatively).
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Table 3  Basic causes of corruption in our society (cumulatively % of the total 
answers given)
Causes of corruption %
Lack of morals and dishonesty. moral crisis 52.0
General poverty 51.0
Lawlessness, lack of rule of law 39.6
Inefficiency of the court system 25.9
Political system 20.9
Bad legislation 19.0
War and sanctions 15.5
Human nature, people are like that 13.6
Low wages of civil servants 11.0
Heritage of the previous communist system 9.4
Economic system 6.2
Lack of clear administrative control 5.1
Interference of the government in economic flows 3.4
Does not know / Refuses to answer 0.8
The most important cause of corruption
A somewhat clearer picture of what the public thinks about the basic 
causes of corruption in the country is obtained on the basis of ranking 
the most important among them. On the whole, general poverty (25% of 
responses), moral crisis (24%) and lack of the rule of law (16%) still 
arise as priority interpretations. However, certain social groups put for-
ward different causes, which depends primarily on the education level, 
type of settlement and region. General poverty is the primary cause of 
corruption for one third of the people with primary school degree, one 
fifth of those with secondary school degree and only one tenth of those 
with university degrees. When in comes to moral crisis as the main 
cause, the order is reverse: this cause is pointed out by 19% of the least 
educated, 26% of those with secondary school degree and 33% of the 
respondents with university degrees (Figure 5). An above-average num-
ber of respondents from the oldest generations (over 60 years of age), 
students and respondents from rural areas point out poverty as the 
most important cause of corruption; the same answer was given by a 
below-average number of respondents from urban areas, citizens of 
Belgrade, the wealthiest, employees in state-owned companies and 
members of the younger middle-aged generation (between 30 and 45 
years of age). 
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There is a common denominator (i.e. criterion) that may lie in the 
basis of such an obvious division of citizens causing the interpretation 
of causality of the corruption phenomenon: it is reflected through the 
question whether the responsibility for corruption is attributed primar-
ily to subjective factors (lack of morals, dishonesty) or objective, external 
factors (general poverty that is socially generated). The division refers, 
in fact, to the factors individuals can or cannot influence, which are a 
matter of their nature and character, or are caused by external circum-
stances beyond their control. In brief, the existing interpretations of the 
main causes of corruption in our society reflect different views on social 
and political events which left their mark on this period and which we 
recognize in the multitude of other political positions as well. For some 
of these interpretations it is characteristic that the responsibility for all 
negative social events is transferred to the members of the society (their 
“mentality” or “national character); the others attribute the responsi-
bility to external circumstances or influence of objective, political and 
economic factors (“economic crisis”, “negative role of the international 
community”, existing political and economic system, etc.). Thus, those 
are different attributions of responsibility, arising from more general 
social representations, perceptions of social reality characteristic of cer-
tain social strata.
As regards the third most important cause of corruption that is stated 
– i.e. lack of the rule of law and lawlessness – in this political context this 
is indubitably a matter of a critical attitude of a part of the public 
towards the current political regime (ruling coalition). Despite the fact 
that this cause, seen separately, is less present among the population 
than the previous two, the impact of this interpretation on public opin-
ion can be further-reaching. Namely, there are several other answers 
that have the same import (“inefficiency of the court system”, “bad leg-
islation in this area”, “lack of clear administrative control”, “interfer-
ence of the state in economic flows”, “low wages of civil servants”) and 
can be classified in this same category of explanations within which the 
sources of corruption are seen to be actions or non-actions of the given 
regime. Although there are differences among certain social categories 
regarding other stated causes of corruption as well, they are not system-
atic and consistent enough to be attributed greater importance. 
When the data from the two studies and periods are compared, it 
appears that today general poverty is mentioned much more frequently 
(25%:17%) among the causes of corruption, with “lack of morals and 
dishonesty” (24%:20%) and “political system” (7%: 4%) being men-
tioned somewhat more frequently. On the other hand, the following 
causes are mentioned less frequently: “lack of rule of law” (16%:23%), 
“low wages of civil servants” (2%:4%) and “non-existence of adminis-
trative control” (1%:2%). It seems that people today see the state as 
better regulated (legally), but the society as poorer and slightly more 
anomic (Figure 6). When the two periods are compared according to 
the categories of attributed responsibility for corruption (whether the 
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focus is on objective, subjective or systemic causes) the following hypo-
thetical conclusion can be drawn: five years ago the systemic causes 
dominated (i.e. people saw the causes of corruption mostly in the weak-
nesses of the political system and regime), probably under the influence 
of serious politicization of the society and general anti-regime senti-
ment; today the public distributes in a relatively balanced manner 
(meaning more objectively) the “responsibility” for corruption among 
different types of social factors and subjects. The more objective identifi-
cation of corruption causes is, however, the first precondition for its suc-
cessful combating. 
Figure 5  The most important cause of corruption in Serbia according to the 
education level 
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PREVALENCE ANd INTENSITY OF CORRUPTION IN SERBIA
Assessment of corruption prevalence in the two periods
It is very difficult to compare and interpret the psychological meaning 
of the assessments given by the Serbian public opinion about the scale 
and intensity of corruption when a question is posed to them in time 
perspective (i.e. a period covering the previous ten and the following 
ten years). In principle, the reference points of the assessment of cor-
ruption prevalence differ, not only from one individual to another, but 
also within different social groups, depending on their “transition” 
experiences, position in the social structure and general political orien-
tations. However, the assumption also contained in the logic of the 
question posed – is that the people will assess the scale and intensity of 
corruption primarily according to the political regime that was in power 
at a certain moment. Thus, the terms “ten years ago”, “five years ago” 
and “today” mark, in fact, the periods of socialist rule, DOS govern-
ment (immediately after the upheaval on October 5) and current 
minority, coalition government. Proceeding from this assumption, it is 
expected in advance that assessments will be affected not only by differ-
ent social, individual and group experiences, but also political, pro-re-
gime or anti-regime position of the respondents. However, while in the 
period of Milošević’s rule this division was relatively simple (for and 
against its regime) the present political life of Serbia is many times more 
complex; in particular due to the fact that it is a minority government, 
Figure 6. The most important causes of corruption – comparison between 2001 and 
2006
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i.e. because of the constant tension between the political positions of 
the people occupying two key state functions.4 All this could cause even 
greater subjectivity of assessments registered by this subjective indica-
tor of corruption presence in the society.
Taking into account these reservations, the distribution of subjective 
assessments on corruption prevalence as a whole gives the following 
picture (Table 4):
Table 4  Subjective assessments of corruption prevalence in our society in the time 
perspective from the two periods5
Pe riod
Average rating (1-5)
2006 2001
Ten years ago 3.6 -
Five years ago 3.8 4.1
Today 4.2 4.1
In five years 3.8 2.9
In ten years 3.3 -
If the obtained data are viewed as a whole, there do not seem to be sta-
tistically significant differences in the assessments of corruption preva-
lence from the two periods. However, the problem lies in the fact that 
the level of statistical significance of this difference could not be tested.6 
In other words, no unambiguous conclusion can be reached on whether 
the difference is statistically significant or not, although in this case 
according to the assessments of the public, corruption apparently 
remained at the same level. However, when the average assessments 
given by the members of certain social groups are observed, there are 
differences in perceptions confirming the previously presented assump-
tion that assessments on corruption depend to a great extent on general 
political positions of the respondents (i.e. positive or negative attitude 
to the present or the previous regime). Namely, the same groups that 
already expressed a less critical attitude towards the period of Milošević’s 
rule (older generations, pensioners, the less educated, the less well-off, 
population of rural areas and Central Serbia, as well as women)7, are 
4 At the time when the study was conducted the President of the country belonged 
to a party which was not part of the ruling coalition then. Another problem is 
what the respondents understood under the society as a whole, in view of the fact 
that the study was conducted before the referendum in Montenegro, i.e. separation 
of Serbia and Montenegro.
5 Because of the difference in the form of the question asked there are no data 
referring to the ten-year period from 2001.
6 Since the data base on the basis of which the 2001 assessments were made could 
not be reconstructed, it was not possible to assess the statistical significance of the 
difference between any rating of public opinion of Serbia for 2001 and 2006. 
7  Which can be concluded on the basis of findings of other studies, in particular 
their choices in the elections.
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inclined to assess more favorably the previous state of corruption (in 
the period ten years ago). On the other hand, younger generations, 
the better educated, employees of state-owned companies, the wealth-
ier, inhabitants of Belgrade and the cities, as well as Vojvodina – typi-
cally assess more severely this (Milošević’s) period. The division is not 
so clear when looking at the time directly after the upheaval on 
October 5 from the present-day perspective: some perceive it as a sud-
den reversal in the society in every, including the moral sense, while 
others see it as a continuation of old, or multiplication of new forms 
of social pathology (so assessments are also inconsistent). However, it 
is quite clear that the assessments of the present state of corruption in 
the society given by pensioners, respondents without primary school 
degree, the poorest and unemployed, living at the same time in urban 
areas – in brief, urban paupers – are considerably stricter. Transition 
losers believe that the society is more corrupt than the other members 
of the society assess. More favorable assessments on corruption prev-
alence are given primarily by university students, the youngest respon-
dents, rural inhabitants, and partly private businessmen and better-
off citizens. As regards the projection of movement of corruption 
scale in the following period, similar to what could be observed in the 
previous study, the public is exhibiting optimism, i.e. supporting the 
belief that it will gradually decrease. However, in the past five years 
the optimism from October 5 has deflated to a significant extent, so 
the expected improvement in the situation in this area is quite moder-
ate. The data from Table 4 show that five years ago people were great-
er optimists, i.e. that they expected the corruption scale to go down 
more significantly (expressed in average ratings from 1 to 5, from 4.1 
to 2.9). Today, citizens expect that in the following period the corrup-
tion scale will be reduced insignificantly – from 4.2 to 3.8. The largest 
pessimism regarding the possibility of corruption scale reduction in 
the future is expressed by the unemployed, citizens of Belgrade, as 
well as men somewhat more than women. 
Areas in which corruption is most widespread
Table 5 shows the average assessments on corruption prevalence in 
certain areas given by the citizens of Serbia in these two periods under 
observation. It points to two regularities. Firstly, that corruption is 
assessed as a very common phenomenon in almost all areas; this 
means that there are still relatively small differences in the average 
assessments of corruption prevalence (on the scale from 1 to 5, the 
average ratings range from 2.9 to 4.2). Secondly, that in the period of 
five years there have been minor changes in the given assessments (aver-
age ratings), although it remains unclear whether those changes are 
statistically significant. 
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Table 5  Assessments of the degree of corruption prevalence in certain areas of 
social life (scale from 1 to 5)
2006 2001
Judiciary 4.1 4.2
Customs 4.0 4.7
Political parties 4.0 3.8
Top government officials 4.0 3.8
Police 3.8 4.1
Health care 3.7 4.0
Republic administration 3.7 3.8
City administration 3.7 3.8
Municipal administration 3.6 3.8
Socially (state)-owned companie 3.6 4.0
Public enterprises (EPS, PTT, …) 3.3 3.8
Private companies 3.2 3.7
Education 2.9 3.2
Judging by the average assessments of corruption prevalence, this phe-
nomenon is most frequently attributed to the judiciary, customs service, 
political parties and top government officials. Five years ago the order was 
somewhat different: citizens perceived corruption as widespread, primar-
ily in the customs service, then the judiciary, police, health care and state-
owned companies. Although the assessments citizens give to all these 
areas are somewhat more moderate, with the obtained differences in 
average ratings from the two periods not being statistically significant, 
certain changes can be observed. For example, the first four institutions 
that are believed to be highly corrupt (average rating 4 or more) now 
include political parties and top government officials, which was previ-
ously not the case. Also, the police, health care and state-owned compa-
nies have been left out from the category of the most corrupt (they move 
to the category of the medium corrupt, average rating 3-4). Education is 
still maintaining the lowest average corruption rating (below 3). 
When reviewing the average ratings on corruption prevalence given by 
certain social groups, it is possible to observe certain differences, depending 
on the area being assessed. It is difficult to give an unambiguous explana-
tion for these differences, since the assessment is influenced by various 
interacting factors: interests related to certain areas, current and formative 
experiences, political inclinations, as well as the resulting position of the 
group in transition flows (transition winners or losers). Therefore, only the 
most typical differences will be described here. For example, corruption in 
the judiciary is pointed out in particular by the employees in state-owned 
companies and citizens of Belgrade; corruption in the customs service by 
university graduates, employees of state-owned companies, respondents 
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from urban settlements and Belgrade; corruption in the health care system 
– the poorer, employees in state-owned companies, citizens of Belgrade, 
women more than men; corruption in political parties – the poorer, respon-
dents from Vojvodina, urban population, and considerably fewer respon-
dents who are among the youngest, most educated, students, inhabitants of 
the central Serbia; and finally, corruption among top government officials 
– is most frequently pointed out by the generations between 30 and 45 
years of age, those without sufficient means, from the central Serbia, and 
considerably less by the citizens of Belgrade. 
When reviewing the assessments of the state of corruption in Serbia 
given by various socioeconomic groups it can be noted that some cat-
egories of people consistently show more or less critical attitude. The 
following are particularly critical (meaning that they give above-aver-
age ratings of corruption prevalence for more than seven to nine 
areas): the generations between 30 and 45 (those whose generation is 
characterized by passing, in their formative years, through anti-sys-
temic and anti-regime socialization); university graduates (the best 
informed), employees in state-owned companies (who are known to 
be going through the stage of accelerated privatization) and citizens 
of Belgrade. Less critical attitude is particularly characteristic of rural 
population, the least educated and homemakers (which can be inter-
preted as a combination of the factors of education and insufficient 
information level).
The average ratings cannot give the true picture of perceptions that 
the citizens of Serbia have of corruption in Serbia. It is necessary to 
present additional data on the percentage of people that believe that in 
certain areas of social life corruption is “very much present”, and the 
number of those who believe that in some areas this phenomenon is 
“completely non-existent”. These percentages of responses are present-
ed in the following figure (Figure 7). 
Presented in this way, the findings show that the education system is the 
only area of social life in which citizens who believe corruption no longer 
exists are more numerous than those who believe that it exists (more citi-
zens denying than accepting its existence). When observing only those areas 
of social life which are more frequently said to exhibit corruption, the first 
five areas remain the same as previously, although the order is somewhat 
different. The largest portion of population (2/3 and more) denote the 
judiciary (72.7), top government officials (67.2), political parties (65.5), 
customs (65.0) and police (62.1) as the areas with the highest level of cor-
ruption; while private companies (35.3) and education system (24.7) are at 
the bottom of the corruption ladder (1/3 and less). The differences in the 
level of critical attitude between various categories of citizens are smaller 
when the answers are grouped in this manner than when the average rat-
ings they give are observed. The impression is now that these differences are 
more situation-related than systemic. This means that they are a result of 
accumulated sporadic experiences rather than a characteristic of socioeco-
nomic position (position in the social structure).
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Comparison of the findings from the two periods under observation, 
2001 and 2006, points to significant changes in the perceptions of corrup-
tion prevalence in certain areas of social life and within certain institutions. 
However, interpretations of these differences should certainly not be over-
simplified. Namely, it is worth reminding again that, according to the aver-
age ratings of corruption prevalence, there are no statistically significant 
differences between 2001 and 2006. When a comparison is also done 
according to the percentages of those who believe corruption is significant-
ly prevalent in certain areas, it can, in fact, be concluded that the situation 
in many areas is assessed as better than in the past (i.e. it is believed that 
today there is less corruption than previously). It is worth noting that the 
judiciary again ranks the highest according to the degree of assessed cor-
ruption, while the ratings of corruption scale in this area remained approx-
imately the same. However, there has been a pronounced reduction in the 
number of citizens who believe that corruption is present in the customs service 
(from 84% to 65%), in the police (from 76% to 62%), health care (74% to 
58%), private, state-owned and public companies and, to a certain extent, in 
municipal administration. Judging by the answers, the attitude of the public 
towards the government and political authorities has become much more criti-
cal. The differences are particularly visible in the ratings of corruption 
among top government officials (previously 54%, now 67%), and political 
parties (previously 51%, now 66% (Figure 8). Since criticism is directed not 
only towards the highest government authorities, but also towards political 
parties – it can be assumed that criticism in this respect refers to all promi-
nent political subjects and the area of politics in general. 
Figure 7  Percentage of citizens who believe that corruption is widespread in the 
given areas (affirmative answer), or is non-existent (negative answer)
Judiciary
Top government officials
Political parties
Customs
Police
Health care
Republic administration
City administration
Municipal administration
Socially (state)-owned companie
Public enterprises (EPS, PTT, …)
Private companies
Education
 percentage of negative answers percentage of positive answers
	 5	 73
	 7	 67
	 7	 66
	 5	 65
	 8	 62
	 11	 58
	 7	 54
	 9	 54
	 11	 52
	 13	 50
	 19	 40
	 26	 35
	 32	 25
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We can offer two possible explanations of the less favorable percep-
tion of citizens of corruption among the top Serbian government offi-
cials and politicians. One explanation is that the differences in ratings 
are pronounced because in the five-year period the victorious euphoria 
of October 5 has subsided, after excessive expectations were tied both to 
the changes and their actors and, as such, could not be met. Today citi-
zens express their disappointment by blaming the political actors of the 
new system for corruption. Just like on October 5 many members of the 
society were satisfied just by the change of the persons at the highest 
positions, now these personalized authorities (not institutions or neces-
sities of the transition process) are considered personally responsible for 
dashed hopes. The second explanation refers to the fact that with the 
arrival of new authorities numerous corruption-related scandals “at the 
top” were uncovered, after being hidden from the public for a long 
time. Since the corruption-related proceedings and mechanisms have 
now become more transparent and citizens better informed about them 
– a perception is formed that there is more corruption and that it is 
mostly related to those in power. This finding seems paradoxical pri-
marily because it is contrary to the citizens’ assessments that progress 
has been made in institution building and establishment of the rule of 
law in Serbia, which are given in this study. It is also evident that three 
key areas that corruption used to be tied to are now rated more favor-
ably – the customs service, police and health care system. The public is 
obviously aware of serious reform efforts in these concrete areas, which 
in itself can be sufficient for the state of corruption to be seen in more 
favorable light. The same can be said for the assessments of corruption 
existence in state-owned and public companies. Finally, the fact that 
Figure 8  Percentage of citizens who believe that corruption in present in the given 
areas (affirmative answer) in the two periods
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most of the citizens believe that there is also less corruption in private 
companies can be a consequence of the belief that some necessary 
reforms have been implemented in this area of economic life as well 
(tax reforms), all within the construction of the legally regulated state. 
Institutions in which corruption is considerably widespread
In which institutions is there corruption?
An extended list of institutions offered to the respondents with a task to 
assess whether there is any corruption in them, and which corruption 
level is characteristic of them, gives a more precise picture of the per-
ception of these institutions in the public and also says something about 
the overall corruption level in the society as a whole. The shares of those 
who believe that corruption is widespread in those institutions and that 
there is no corruption at all give the following picture (Figure 9 )8:
8 The percentages of answers to the question whether there is any corruption at all 
(regardless of the degree of intensity) or there is no corruption at all in the given 
institution are given.
Figure 9  Is corruption widespread in the following institutions (% of answers 
stating “widespread”)?
Judiciary
Customs
Tax Administration
Privatization Agency
Republican Government
Police
National Assembly of Serbia
Federal Government
Ministry of Economy
S&M Assembly
S&M President and his services
National Bank
President of Serbia and his services
Electric Power Industry
Chamber of Commerce
Armed Forces
Payment Operations Office
Postal Service
Statistical Office
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	 62
	 62
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	 60
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	 42
	 39
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	 34
	 34
	 29
	 27
	 14
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The answers show that there is a widespread belief that there is cor-
ruption in all the key institutions of our society. The largest percentage of 
affirmative answers on corruption existence is given for the judiciary 
(74%), and the smallest for the Statistical Office (14%).
The comparison of two periods (2001-2006) shows that there was a 
significant increase in the percentage of citizens believing that corruption 
is present in: the Privatization Agency (from 43% to 62%), Republican 
Government (from 30% to 60%), National Assembly of Serbia (from 
29% to 59%), former Federal Government (from 28% to 58%), Ministry 
of Economy (from 39% to 55%), former S&M Assembly (from 27% to 
52%), former S&M Presidency (from 19% to 45%), the National Bank 
(from 28% to 42%), significantly less in the Armed Forces (from 24% 
to 34%) and, to a certain extent, in the judiciary (from 68% to 74%); it 
reduced significantly as regards the customs service (from 76% to 67%), 
the police (867% to 50%), Electric Power Industry (from 47% to 36%), 
Postal Service (from 43% to 27%) and to a certain extent the President 
of Serbia and his services (from 46% to 39%) (Figure 10). 
Figure 10  how much has the picture of corruption existence in the following 
institutions changed in the two periods (% of affirmative answers – “widespread”)
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When observing the changes in percentages of the answers that cor-
ruption is not widespread at all (i.e. the answers that deny existence of 
corruption in the given institutions) a complementary picture is 
obtained: the largest decrease in the number of those not believing that 
corruption is present exists in case of the Armed Forces (from 41% to 
28%), S&M President (from 48% to 17%), National Bank (from 28% 
to 17%) and the S&M Assembly (from 28% to 11%), Federal 
Government (from 29% to 10%), National Assembly of Serbia (from 
28% to 9%) and the Republican Government (from 28% to 9 %). The 
perception is more favorable when it comes to the customs service, 
Statistical Office, Postal Service, Electric Power Industry, Payment 
Operations Office, the President of Serbia and his services, Chamber of 
Commerce and the Tax Administration, while it remains unchanged 
regarding the judiciary and the Privatization Agency (only more signifi-
cant changes are mentioned).
Average ratings of the level of corruption prevalence in the given 
institutions
The average ratings that express the citizens’ opinion about the scale of 
corruption in the given institutions (on the 1-5 scale) change to a cer-
tain extent their order on the corruption level ranking list. Five years 
ago, corruption was most frequently associated with the institutions 
such as the customs, Tax Administration, the judiciary and the police. 
The Presidency of former FRY, the Statistical Office and the Armed 
Forces were designated as institutions in which the level of corruption 
was the lowest. Today, the judiciary, the customs service and the Tax 
Administration are still at the top of the list, but the Privatization 
Agency has found its way into this group – from the fifth, it went up 
to the third place on the ranking list. The Armed Forces, the Postal 
Service and the Statistical Office remain at the bottom of the corrup-
tion level ranking list. It is interesting to see which institutions changed 
their ranking more significantly compared to the previous period, 
although this comparison may serve as illustration only, since there 
are no statistically significant differences in average ratings of the cor-
ruption level in the two periods (2001 and 2006). The Republican 
Assembly, the Federal Government and the Republican Government 
changed their respective corruption rating significantly: they went up 
from the 11th – 13th place to the 5th – 8th place. The S&M Presidency 
moved from the 18th to the 11th – 12th place, and the S&M Assembly 
from the 14th – 15th to the 11th – 12th place. A significantly lower 
ranking was obtained by the Chamber of Commerce, the President of 
Serbia and his services, Electric Power Industry, Payment Operations 
Office and the Postal Service; the other institutions did not change 
their rankings significantly (Table 6)
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Table 6  Ranking list of institutions according to average ratings of corruption 
prevalence in the two periods
2001 2006
Rang Rang
Judiciary 4.1 1 4.1 2-4
Customs 4.0 2 4.3 1
Privatization Agency 4.0 3 3.8 5
Tax Administration 3.9 4 4.1 2-4
Republican Government 3.8 5-8 3.1 11-13
National Assembly of Serbia 3.8 5-8 3.1 11-13
Federal Government 3.8 5-8 3.1 11-13
Police 3.8 5-8 4.1 2-4
Ministry of Economy 3.7 9-10 3.5 8-9
S&M Assembly 3.7 9-10 3.0 14-15
S&M President 3.5 11-12 2.4 18
National Bank 3.5 11-12 3.0 14-15
Chamber of Commerce 3.3 13-14 3.5 8-9
President of Serbia 3.3 13-14 3.6 6-7
Electric Power Industry 3.2 15 3.6 6-7
Payment Operations Office 3.1 16-17 3.4 10
Armed Forces 3.1 16-17 2.7 16
Postal Service 3.0 18 3.5 8-9
Statistical Office 2.5 19 2.6 17
In which institution is corruption most prevalent?
If we wish to get an even more precise picture about the perceptions relat-
ing to particular institutions, we may compare the percentages of people 
who believe that corruption is most prevalent precisely in a specific insti-
tution, or observe these ratings in time perspective (Figure 11)
This chart shows that in 2006 a significantly higher percentage of people 
than in 2001 designates the following institutions as most corrupt: the judi-
ciary (from 12% to 22%), Privatization Agency (from 4% to 14%), 
Republican Government (from 2% to 7%), National Bank and the Federal 
Government (double the percentage). The largest decrease in the percent-
age of those “stigmatizing” them as a hotbed of corruption is recorded for 
the customs service (from 31% to 14%), but there are also significant dif-
ferences as regards the police, Ministry of Economy and the Electric Power 
Industry. It should be said that the increase in criticism regarding the situa-
tion in the judiciary, the Privatization Agency and the Republican 
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Government may be connected with the accelerated privatization process, 
and above all with several scandals that attracted most attention of the 
media, and then the public, during the past period (“Knjaz Miloš”, 
“Novosti” etc.). Moreover, the media attention was focused on some of the 
“processes of the century” and corruption scandals in which the entire 
judiciary was exposed to the judgment (and condemnation) of the public. 
When the respondents are asked in which institution corruption is 
least present, institutions such as the Statistical Office (29% of the 
answers), Armed Forces (16%), Postal Service (10%) and the President 
of Serbia and his services (7%) stand out. The number of those who 
believe that corruption is least present in some other of the mentioned 
institutions is almost negligible (below 5%)
Figure 11  In which institution is corruption most prevalent? (% of answers in the 
two periods)
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Which administrative and political authorities are the “proponents” of 
corruption?
Today, like five years ago, most people in Serbia assess that a predomi-
nant part of public officials, administration officers and politicians, at 
the local as well as the republican level of government, is involved in 
corrupt activities. It is estimated that there is somewhat more corruption 
at the republican level than at the local level, as well as that the govern-
ment officials are less corrupt than politicians. All in all, approximately 
3/4 of citizens assess that the officials of the republican administration 
are involved in corruption to a different extent, and 2/3 of the citizens 
believe the same as regards officials at the local administration level (the 
community they live in). The predominant mode of answers in both 
cases is that “most of them are involved”.
Table 7  Estimates of corruption prevalence among the government officials at the 
republican and local administration levels
Republican 
administration
Local 
administration
Almost all are involved 21.7 16.9
Most of them are involved 49.8 46.0
Only some of them are involved 24.2 31.7
Almost none of them are involved 0.1 0.5
Does not know/Refuses to answer 4.1 4.9
There are no great differences in assessments among different social 
categories, which leads to the conclusion that the estimates were given 
as an expression of generally increased criticism towards the (policy of) 
administrative authority rather than as a reflection of frustration in the 
realization of specific group interests. Although the fact that the assess-
ments are generalized does not have to mean that they are unfounded, 
it should be borne in mind that the attitude towards the government 
administration is often influenced by political preference and identifi-
cation, which seems not to be the case here. The judgments expressed 
by the public in unison, in this case, may mean that the overall perfor-
mance of the administrative authorities is assessed, rather than only the 
scale of corruption in particular domains. Such an undifferentiated 
attribution of corruptibility to “most of” the government officials 
reflects, we believe, a general and generalized distrust of the govern-
ment administration, which is a match to former predominant statist 
conscience from the era of self-management socialism. Since many 
other indicators point to still strong footholds of statist conscience 
among the people, especially a nostalgia for former paternalistic role of 
the state in providing for an individual, these findings may be a confir-
mation of a basically ambivalent attitude of the Serbian society towards 
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government administration, which is a consequence of its ineffective-
ness. Still insufficiently reformed, cumbersome and inefficient admin-
istration at the republican and local level – incapable of realizing or 
protecting the rights of citizens – is perceived as corrupt, which means 
that the awareness of systemic deficiency is replaced by moral discredit.
There are no great differences between the two periods in terms of 
assessments on corruption of the republican and local administration. 
The estimate on the corruption of civil servants at the local level is 
slightly moderated, when judging by the average rating. Also, today half 
as many people refuse to answer such questions, which indicates either 
a greater openness of the people (less fear?) or greater transparency of 
institutions (or both). 
Table 8 Estimates of corruption prevalence among politicians at the republican and 
local authority levels
Republican 
administration
Local 
administration
Almost all are involved 23.5 18 .9
Most of them are involved 48.2 45.4
Only some of them are involved 24.0 30.4
Almost none of them are involved 0.1 0.4
Does not know/Refuses to answer 4.2 4.8
A very similar distribution of answers is obtained when the same 
question is asked regarding the corruption of politicians in the republi-
can and local authorities. In this case as well there is greater criticism 
towards the republican level of government then the local, in the pro-
portion of 3/4 vs. 2/3 of those thinking that all or most of the politicians 
are corrupt. Many people (especially the less educated), we assume, do 
not distinguish sufficiently between the government administration 
and political authorities, which may account for the similarity of given 
estimates of corruption of their members. Assuming that the govern-
ment authority, at the subjective level, is equated with political author-
ity, we may apply all the previously given interpretations of thus gener-
alized critical assessments of government authorities and political 
authorities (i.e. the widespread perception of a high degree of their cor-
ruption) that exist in the public. 
Which groups and professions are the “proponents” of corruption?
According to the predominant idea of corruption the public in our 
country has, public officials of all professions are prone to corruption, 
although not all of them to the same extent. The percentage of answers 
confirming a possibility that some of the professions stated on the list 
are prone to corruption ranges between 17% when it comes to teachers 
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to 66% when it comes to customs officers. Compared to the opinions 
about the same matter in 2001, there are certain similarities, but also 
noticeable differences – in the order of the professions as well as in the 
assessment of their susceptibility to corruption. These percentages are 
shown in Figure 12 for each profession separately for the two time peri-
ods in which the study was conducted. 
As shown by these data, corruption is least associated with teachers 
(17% of the answers), and most associated with customs officers (66%), 
managers of socially-owned companies and judges (65%, respectively). 
Lawyers, top government officials, political party leaders, doctors, 
police officers, municipal inspectors, party officials and local politi-
cians are also classified among those who are believed by the majority 
of citizens to be connected with corruption (over 50% of the answers). 
Although the order of professions that are at the very top and bottom 
of the “corruption hierarchy” remained the same as in 2001, it may 
nevertheless be said that there were significant changes compared to 
the perception of the basic “proponents” of corruption prevailing in 
the previous period. Today, corruption is considerably more often 
Figure 12 Estimates of the probability that the following professions are involved 
in corruption in the two time periods (2001 and 2006)
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associated with top government officials (the share of answers 
increased from 42% to 61%), party leaders (from 42% to 59%) and 
party officials and local political activists (from 42% to 55%), i.e. 
political elite on the whole. This finding – that corruption is associated 
with political elite to a considerably larger extent than five years ago – 
reflects, in essence, the disappointment of the public in all October 5 
political actors. Such a disappointment is an unavoidable consequence 
of former massive, uncritical support to the new authorities and pres-
ents simply the other side of former unjustified hopes invested in the 
future, in the context of mass post-October euphoria. Namely, the 
public saw in the new political elite not only the proponents of chang-
es that were to bring social and economic progress to the society, but 
also the guarantors of moral cleansing of the society. Indiscriminate 
and unjustified generalization of negative judgments about general 
corruption among politicians point to a conclusion that the present 
beliefs are essentially one of the manners in which the public resolves 
the frustrations that are unavoidably caused in the transition period 
by reform actions and accelerated privatization. The spreading of such 
stereotypes was also contributed to by several major corruption scan-
dals uncovered in the meantime and, above all, their frequent use as 
an instrument for the purposes of disgracing and discrediting oppo-
nents (in the media) in mutual political fights.
Nevertheless, the public did not remain blind to the attempts to 
reform particular areas of social life that used to be infamous as highly 
corrupt. Although still considered to be the proponents of corruption, 
customs officers, managers of socially-owned companies, private entre-
preneurs, staff of public utility companies, salespersons in stores carry-
ing goods in short supply, bank staff, and to a certain extent police offi-
cers are mentioned in this context to a considerably smaller extent. We 
may conclude that the majority of citizens still assess that corruption is 
less pronounced in the areas where reforms have been initiated or com-
pleted; or, in other words, that the reforming of some areas is seen as a 
successful barrier against corruption. 
Perception of corruption in public procurement activities
The present research has confirmed the assumption that corruption is 
associated most frequently with public procurement activities (ten-
ders), i.e. that it is considered to be their unavoidable accompanying 
phenomenon, especially in the transition period. Although the new 
authorities have done a lot in the legal sense to make the public pro-
curement procedures transparent, judging by the average ratings on 
corruption prevalence in these activities it is still largely present in all 
areas – most in government administration and in organization of pub-
lic works (3.9), and least in education (3.2). (Table 9) 
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Table 9  Corruption prevalence in public procurement activities in particular areas 
(average ratings)
2006 2001
Government administration 3.9 3.9
Public works (country reconstruction) 3.9 4.2
Health care 3.8 4.1
Police 3.8 4.0
Public companies 3.7 3.8
Armed Forces 3.4 3.2
Education 3.2 3.3
Employees in state-owned companies, urban population and the cit-
izens of Belgrade display greater skepticism when it comes to corrup-
tion during public procurement in all mentioned areas.
A somewhat clearer picture of the views of the respondents may be 
obtained by analyzing the data on the percentage of those who believe 
that corruption exists, or does not exist, during conducting tender proce-
dures in each of the mentioned areas. Around two thirds of the people 
think that corruption is still present in the organization of public pro-
curement in government administration, public works, health care ser-
vice and in the police; about half of them are of the opinion that corrup-
tion has an impact on the results of the tender procedures conducted by 
public companies; a somewhat smaller number of them assess that it 
exists in the Armed Forces, while the smallest number of them believe 
that it also exists in the sphere of education (one third). Compared to the 
previous period, the number of those who are of the opinion that corrup-
tion exists among the top government officials increased somewhat (from 
56% previously to 62%), while there was a decrease in the number of 
those who believe the same about the health care service (from 71% to 
59%) and the police (from 67% to 58%) (Figure 13)
Figure 13  Corruption prevalence in public procurement activities in certain areas 
(% of affirmative answers)
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 When the data are presented in another manner, i.e. when it is judged 
by the percentage of those answers rejecting the possibility of corruption 
existence during public procurement procedures, we come to the conclu-
sion that the public, in fact, perceives a significant improvement of the 
situation in all areas compared to 2001 (Figure 14). 
The most common forms of corruption and their social consequences
Although the sources of corruption, especially in the transition coun-
tries, are many-sided, its destructiveness (from the aspect of function-
ing of social institutions as well of the entire society) is significantly 
intensified then when it acquires its legal foothold as well. If corruption 
is inherent to the characteristics of the legal system not only does a 
much wider space open for its action but such a practice, covered up by 
“legalization” is also considerably harder to discover. The public in 
Serbia seems to show a sufficient sensitivity regarding this connection 
between legal norms and corrupt behavior. Our study has determined 
that approximately one half (45%) of the citizens believe that corrup-
tion in the society is most frequently used for the purpose of evading 
obligations prescribed by the law; this indirectly speaks about a wide-
spread opinion that there are certain weaknesses, or “errors”, of the 
legal system that make something like that possible. If it is to be judged 
by the obtained answers, nothing important changed in this respect 
compared to the earlier period. However, the citizens also share the 
conviction that the judicial system reform process itself hides in itself 
the danger of influence of corruption: namely, there is a concern 
expressed earlier spreading in the society that corruption could have a 
significant impact on adopting new laws and amending old laws; in other 
words, that the legislative bodies may be susceptible to corruption (pre-
viously 24%, now 32% of the answers). The effect of corruption on law 
adoption is considered by the citizens as potentially the most danger-
ous, since injustice is legalized in that way, in accordance with the rule 
“There is no worse tyranny than bad laws”. 
Figure 14  Corruption prevalence in public procurement activities in certain areas 
– percentage of negative answers (“no corruption”).
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Corruption that is carried out for the purpose of circumventing or 
evading laws is emphasized more frequently in Belgrade than in other 
regions of Serbia (59%), and the corruption whose goal is the change of 
the existing legal norms is emphasized above average in Vojvodina 
(38%) (Figure 15). 
It is interesting that a smaller part of the public (about 1/5), now as 
well as five years ago, pays attention to the danger of corruption that is 
used for the purpose of exercising their legally guaranteed rights. An 
assumption could be derived from this that the society tolerates this 
form of corruption more than other forms. A possible explanation is 
that individuals often use the fact that a certain civil right of theirs has 
been violated as a subjective excuse and justification for their own vio-
lation of moral norms, i.e. resorting to corrupt practices, which repre-
sents yet another confirmation of the assumption that the system’s dys-
functionality itself generates corruption. It is understandable that this 
form of corruption, by which exercise of civil rights guaranteed by the 
law is prevented, affects those whose basic problem is unemployment 
more than others.
When the answers are observed as a whole, the impression is that 
there is, nevertheless, a gradual decrease in the society’s tolerance of cor-
ruption: in earlier years 75%, and now 87% of members of the society 
think that none of the forms of (or motives for) corruption may be justified 
or “useful” (while as few as 8% think there are forms of corruption that 
are useful to the society). That means that today a noticeably smaller 
number of people than five years ago deny harmfulness of corruption, 
justify it or even consider it to be useful. 
Figure 15  “Which of the following forms of corruption is most present in our 
society”, by region
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The citizens of Belgrade (93%) and the population of Central 
Serbia (88%) show a (statistically significant) higher sensitivity to 
all forms of corruption than the citizens of Vojvodina (80%). The 
citizens of Vojvodina, more educated and better off citizens, express 
a (statistically significant) higher moral cynicism, expressed through 
the belief that corruption, under particular conditions, may be use-
ful to the society.
Further analysis of the respondents’ answers shows that the individu-
als who believe that some of the forms of corruption may be useful to 
the society (and the total of such persons is 8%) most often refer to the 
fact that it may have a role of an aid in exercising the rights guaranteed 
by the law; this finding, in fact, confirms the previously stated interpre-
tation according to which the alleged “rights under threat” represent 
psychologically the strongest justification of violation of moral norms. 
In this context, it is rarely stated that the corruption that is the means of 
circumventing the law can be useful. Besides, rural population (89%), 
more often than urban population (66%), rejects the idea that this form 
of corruption may be of use. Adherence to the traditional morals, which 
is more pronounced in rural population, probably presents the basic 
mediating factor that determines the level of tolerance of corruption 
the aim of which is violation of the law.
All in all, the finding that the number of people who believe that there 
are no useful forms of corruption increased significantly in the past peri-
od (from 75% to 92%), regardless of how much we consider this expres-
sion of opinion to be declarative, presents an indication of a moral 
recovery of the society.
Figure 16  high level of intolerance of corruption: Can corruption be useful? 
No form can be useful 
87%
Does not know /
Refuses to answer
5%It can8%
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What are the assessments on corruption prevalence based on?
Over and over again, the analysis of public attitudes towards corruption 
raises the question of what may be concluded about the real state of cor-
ruption in the society on the basis of these subjective assessments, i.e. to 
what extent these estimates correspond to the reality. One of the ways of 
checking their objectivity, at least partially, is getting to know their empir-
ical basis; this means determining how these assessments are formed, i.e. 
what social experiences or social mediators play the most important role 
in their formation. In fact, not until we identify all of the factors that have 
an impact on the citizens’ perception of corruption in the society shall we 
be able to understand what function it may have from the viewpoint of 
spreading or preventing this phenomenon in the reality. 
In the past period, the public of Serbia was mostly informed about 
corruption in two basic ways: by means of the media (31%) and from 
conversations with the people from their immediate social environ-
ment, with relatives and acquaintances (29%). The other two, equally 
present, sources of information on corruption were personal knowl-
edge about (unjustifiably high) standard of living of civil servants (19%) 
and personal experiences of citizens with corrupt practice (18%). 
Figure 17  Which form of corruption may be of use, depending on the settlement type
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Figure 18  What is your assessment of corruption prevalence based on?
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Regarding the information base on the basis of which opinions on 
corruption are formed, there are some noticeable differences between 
particular social groups. The most significant differences are associated 
with the profession of the respondent. 
For example, employees in private companies base their assessments 
on personal experience more frequently than the others. Unemployed 
respondents are rather informed by observing the standard of living of 
civil servants, which means that they are more sensitive to noticeable 
social differences than the other categories. Students rely more fre-
quently on the stories of their relatives and acquaintances.
When the findings of 2001 and 2006 are compared, it can be noticed 
that today 1/3 of the people, compared to former 1/5, learn about corrup-
tion primarily from the media, i.e. public channels of information on cor-
ruption are used more than private channels. Five years ago, the proportion 
between these two sources of information was quite the opposite: private 
information channels were used more frequently than public channels. 
Figure 19  Estimates on corruption prevalence by profession 
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This data reflects the fact that today the media deal with corruption more 
frequently, i.e. that the society has become more transparent in this respect. 
An important data is also the fact that today a somewhat smaller number 
of people learn about corruption on the basis of personal experience (i.e. 
their own involvement in corruption practice), although the differences 
are not (statistically) significant.
ATTITUdES OF CITIzENS TOWARdS CORRUPTION 
Is corruption a justified means of achieving the goal?
The previous analysis of the data about the perception the Serbian pub-
lic about corruption indicates that the attitude towards corruption has 
changed to some extent as well, i.e. that tolerance has decreased. The 
prevailing – principled – attitude of citizens towards corruption con-
firms the correctness of the above mentioned assumption. Although 
the principled attitude that “corruption presents social evil” prevailed 
in the population earlier as well (and we know that it was not always in 
accordance with the behavior), now there are quite clear indications 
that there is an increase not only in the number of citizens who accept 
this attitude declaratively, but also the level of conviction with which 
they express their opinion. A direct question “Is corruption, at least 
sometimes, a justified means for a man to achieve his goal” gives the 
following distribution of answers: 
This distribution differs in several elements from the previous 
that was obtained in 2001: a. the number of the people clearly declar-
ing that corruption “is never justified” has increased; b. the number 
of those thinking that it is most often not justified has decreased; c. 
the number of the undecided has decreased as well. This means that 
the negative attitude towards corruption in the previous period has 
crystallized further, i.e. that the citizens are more convinced of the 
Figure 20 do you think that corruption is, at least sometimes, a justified means for 
a man to achieve his goal?
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correctness of such an attitude, while their ambivalence and moral 
disorientation has decreased.
There is, however, a clear division into two social groups that are 
characterized by different corruption tolerance level. Older people, 
pensioners and those who are worse off, i.e. who do not have enough 
money – show an uncompromising attitude in this respect, while the 
younger (especially the youngest generations) or the wealthier are more 
inclined to compromise when it comes to corruption. We may inter-
pret such differences in the corruption tolerance level primarily as the 
consequences of the historical period and social climate in which 
younger generations grew up: erosion of (traditional) morality and 
marked social anomy was indeed characteristic of the period that is 
decisive in the socialization of the young, i.e. their formative years. On 
the other hand, the older generations were socialized in some other, 
more stable time, under the influence of the norms of traditional moral-
ity that are harder to change and relativize, even in turbulent social 
periods. Apart from that, different corruption tolerance level of partic-
ular social groups is also caused by interest, as well: the groups that see 
corruption as a relatively efficient lever of their (political, economic) 
progress are more inclined to tolerate it; those prevented by their own 
financial position from successful involvement in corrupt practices (the 
unemployed, the poor) – are inclined to rationalize their corruption 
inefficiency by adopting more negative attitudes towards corruption. 
Is corruption acceptable in principle?
It is possible to illustrate the attitude of Serbian public towards corrup-
tion and changes in this attitude in the five-year period by presenting the 
levels (percentages) and average values of agreement or disagreement of 
citizens (on a 1-5 scale) with three characteristic descriptive assertions 
about corruption, which are heard frequently in everyday life (Table 10).
Table 10  Percentage of people agreeing with assertions that express a positive 
attitude towards corruption 
Assertions expressing a positive attitude 
towards corruption
2006 2001
% Average % Average
In order to solve a problem a man should 
offer a bribe 8 1.7 11 1.8
It is acceptable for MPs and Government 
members to receive money, gifts or favors 5 1.5 9 1.7
It is acceptable for staff in ministries and 
municipal authorities to receive money, gifts 
or favors
4 1.4 7 1.5
The findings show that the average level of agreement with these asser-
tions in the two periods under observation remained relatively the same 
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or decreased slightly, but the share (percentage) of people in the popula-
tion who strongly support corrupt behavior (declare that they accept “to a 
great extent” each of these general positive attitudes towards corruption) 
decreased significantly. This, in another way, confirms the previously 
derived conclusion that the degree of prevalence of positive attitude 
towards corruption (which has never exceeded 10%) has not changed so 
much, but that the intensity of its acceptance decreased significantly.
Is there moral discomfort when it comes to corruption (the 
strength of the norm)?
The attitude of an individual towards corruption may be assessed not 
only based on whether this phenomenon is condemned in principle, 
but also whether there is an accompanying feeling of moral discomfort 
that would show that the social norm by which such a behavior is pro-
hibited is completely interiorized. One of the ways to examine whether 
there is a widely established consensus in the society that corruption is 
something shameful and morally inadmissible is to observe the reaction 
of people to the violation of that norm. Judging by the answers obtained 
to the projective question about how a man feels who has just bribed an 
official in order to get what he wanted, Serbian citizens react to this 
situation most often with anger (1/3 of the answers), then with satisfac-
tion (1/4) and finally with shame (1/5 of the answers). Compared to 
2001, today corruption causes considerably more anger among the citizens, 
but also somewhat more satisfaction and less shame, while the percentage 
of the indifferent remained the same. Although these findings may be 
interpreted in different ways, our opinion is that they indicate strength-
ening of the norm by which corruption is stigmatized as a prohibited and 
shameful phenomenon. Such interpretation is lent additional credibility 
by the fact that, in the meantime, the share of the people having no 
developed attitude towards this question (i.e. those refusing to express 
openly their view on corruption) decreased by half. 
Figure 21  “how does, most probably, a citizen feel after giving money or a gift to 
an official and getting what he wanted?” 
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When it comes to feelings, today the smallest number of morally 
indifferent and the largest number of ashamed due to corruption is 
among the oldest citizens, or pensioners. The youngest generations, as 
also shown in the analysis of the previous data, show greater moral cyni-
cism than the other categories – which is manifested through the lack of 
the feeling of shame and excess indifference. Also, university graduates 
show certain ambivalence towards corruption, because they feel satis-
fied and ashamed to an approximately equal extent in such a situa-
tion. We may similarly conclude that, in this respect, there is a clear 
division between wealthy citizens – whose prevailing mood in such a 
situation is satisfaction and to a considerably lesser extent shame – 
and the poorest citizens who express anger due to corruption in an 
above-average number. Also, the social norm that prohibits corrup-
tion seems to have a stronger effect within Central Serbia, in which 
the traditional morals are more prevalent, than in the developed 
regions such as Belgrade and Vojvodina.
SCALE ANd MANNERS OF INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPTION (LEVEL 
OF BEhAVIOR)
Readiness to engage in corruption (projective question)
The attitude towards corruption is not the same thing as behavior in a 
real situation. However, the study proceeds from the assumption that 
subjectively expressed readiness to engage in corrupt activities presents 
not only an indicator of norm acceptance, but also a relatively good 
basis for forecasting future behavior. Whether this readiness will be 
realized in reality depends on many factors, the most important of 
which, at the group level, being the assessment of the society members 
that corruption in a given social context is an efficient problem-solving 
tool. Thus, there is a close connection between the general perception of 
society and this type of motivation for corruption. 
The survey conducted in 2006, as well as the previous one of 2001, 
shows that in Serbia there is widespread awareness of significant potential 
of corruption as an instrument in a given social context, which causes an 
increased readiness of people to engage in corrupt activities. Readiness to 
engage in corruption (in a hypothetical situation) is expressed by about 
80% of the respondents, regarding giving money, gifts or favors to a 
government official for the purpose of successful solution of a problem. 
About one half of the sample express a lower level of conviction that 
something like that may happen (“probably”), while about a fifth of 
them express a higher level (“very probably”). Female part of the popu-
lation, older people and pensioners express less readiness to engage in 
corruption, while the middle generations, respondents with high school 
degrees and the citizens of Belgrade express more readiness. The wealth-
iest citizens give ambiguous and inconsistent answers which is a usual 
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indicator of insufficient sincerity and hiding of their real attitude. The 
comparison of the two periods shows that the share of those people in the 
society who would probably resort to corruption in the form of giving 
money, gifts and doing favors to a government official for the purpose of 
solving their problems increased slightly, but this readiness for corruption 
is expressed at a more moderate level (Table 11). 
Table 11  Are people likely to do some of the following things in order to solve their 
problem? (percentages of affirmative and negative answers) 9
2006 2001
Likely Not likely Likely Not likely
To offer cash to an 
official 78 18 75 18
To give a gift to an 
official 82 14 81 12
To do a favor to an 
official 81 15 81 11
This finding, which again supports the assumption about a decrease 
in the level of readiness to engage in corruption, is also confirmed indi-
rectly by the answers to the following, directly asked, question: “If an 
official requests money in order to solve my problem, I would pay him”. 
The percentage of people answering affirmatively to this question 
decreased from 13% to 9% (statistically significant), while the average 
rating of the probability of paying a bribe decreased from 2.1 to 1.9. It 
also becomes obvious that the percentage of people who are ready to 
agree to bribery in a situation of exposure to intense corruption pres-
sure decreased, which means that the resistance to corruption pressure is 
increasing.10 The data show that a smaller number of respondents today 
than five years ago express unambiguous readiness to comply with a 
corrupt request (formerly 2.2%, now 2.9%), while more of them express 
readiness to resist such pressures more decisively (formerly 19%, now 
29%); there are also differences in the percentage of those who would 
pay a bribe only conditionally (i.e., they would not pay if some other 
possibility for solving their problem appeared). In other words, the 
number of those who would definitively pay a bribe if they were asked 
to do so is lower in statistically significant terms, while the number of 
those who would never pay is significantly higher. The percentage of 
people who would not pay only if they found some other way of solv-
ing the problem (or they would pay if there were no other way) 
decreased significantly as well. On the whole, once the readiness to 
9 “Likely” includes the “very likely” and “likely” answers; “Not likely” includes the 
“rather unlikely” and “not likely at all” answers.
10 The answers of the respondents to the question “What would you do if you 
had a serious problem, and an official openly asked you for money?”
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yield to corruption pressure was expressed by 3/4, and now by just over 
2/3 of the citizens of Serbia.
Resistance to corruption pressure is not equally distributed within 
the population. It is higher among the oldest, pensioners, citizens of 
Vojvodina and, due to circumstances, among the poorest, while it is 
lower among the youngest generations, students, employees of private 
companies, the citizens of Belgrade and the wealthiest.
 For what favors would you be ready to pay a bribe? 
Despite the principled attitudes or the level of readiness to engage in 
corruption, only the concrete circumstances show how likely it is to 
appear in real behavior. There are circumstances that, due to their 
importance to an individual’s financial situation, present a challenge 
which may force most people to compromise their principles. An anal-
ysis of such situations points to the problems the solving of which the 
members of the society are specially interested in and, at the same time, 
to critical points of corrupt practices. The answers of the respondents 
show that the people are most prepared to pay a bribe in the following 
situations: in order to get better medical service and in order to find 
employment. (Figure 23).
Compared to 2001, the citizens’ readiness to pay a bribe in order to 
evade the customs duty, tax payment and to win lawsuits decreased 
Figure 22  Resistance to corruption pressure by profession: “What would you do if 
you had a serious problem, and an official openly asked you for money?” 
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significantly. The increased awareness about the necessity of observ-
ing civil obligations in these domains may be associated with a higher 
degree of propaganda relating to the observance of civil discipline, as 
well as with the initial reform steps made in these institutions. The 
highest degree of civil discipline in almost all domains is shown by 
those over 60 years of age, pensioners and citizens of Vojvodina. The 
wealthiest citizens, employees in private companies and respondents 
from Central Serbia, judging by the answers, show a somewhat higher 
inclination to corruption as regards most of the mentioned situations 
(five and more areas). 
When observing the percentages of those rejecting the idea that they 
might pay a bribe in any of the mentioned situations (negative answers), 
a significant improvement compared to 2001 is observed. The percent-
age of refusal is higher in all of the mentioned situations, which means that 
the people show a significantly lower readiness to engage in corruption. 
The comparison of the percentage of affirmative vs. negative answers 
shows that the provision of better medical services is the only area in 
which more citizens accept than reject the idea of getting involved in 
corruption. This finding is in line with not only what is indicated by 
everyday experience, but also with the findings of the research that show 
that health, in addition to the family, presents one of the highest values 
in our culture. The second critical area that the higher readiness of citi-
zens to engage in corruption is associated with is the currently pressing 
problem of unemployment. To get employment for oneself of for some 
close person also presents a strong motive to offer a bribe (41% affir-
mative vs. 50% negative answers).
Figure 23  In what situations would you give a bribe (corruption motives)?
	2001	 2006
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	 50.9	 50.3
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In order not to pay customs duty at the border
In order to obtain a utility service
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In order to pay a lower tax
In order for your child to get a better grade at school 
(pass an exam)
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Readiness to accept a bribe
In the general trend of decrease in the readiness of citizens to engage in 
corruption, not only does the readiness to offer a bribe decrease, but 
also to accept it. In an imaginary situation in which a respondent sees 
himself/herself in the role of an underpaid official who is offered money, 
a gift or a favor by someone for the purpose of solving their problem, 
the absolute majority of people reject the idea of corruption (53%); this 
presents a significant increase compared to the period five years ago 
(44%). At the same time, the percentage of people showing readiness to 
accept a bribe went down by half (4% compared to 8%).
On average, the motives lying in the foundation of corruption rejec-
tion are predominantly related to principles (“I do not approve of such 
acts”), and not merely a product of fear from legal sanction (“I would 
not accept it if it implies breaking the law”). In other words, in the 
foundation of rejecting the idea of accepting a bribe is an autonomous 
rather than heteronymous morality. However, there are noticeable dif-
ferences between generations in this respect. The generations between 
18 and 29 years of age are markedly heteronymous and mostly reject 
corruption under the pressure of legal standards. The number of those 
who reject accepting a bribe for reasons of principle (40%) is signifi-
cantly smaller, while 11% accept such acts if there is a good justifica-
tion. Unlike these generations, 2/3 of members of the oldest generation 
(over 60 years of age) and pensioners stick primarily to their firmly 
adopted moral principles – the norm of honesty – which is incompati-
ble with corrupt activities. When it comes to accepting a bribe, students 
and the wealthiest citizens refer to reasons of principle somewhat less 
than the rest of the population. On the other hand, those belonging to 
the category of unemployed find excuses more frequently than the oth-
ers for such a practice in the need to embrace in a conformist manner 
something that “everyone does”. 
Figure 24  Would you accept money, a gift or a return favor for solving a problem 
for someone?
	2001	 2006
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ExPERIENCE WITh CORRUPTION 
Mutual corruption pressure
Only minority of the respondents report today about their real experi-
ences relating to the existence and intensity of the corruption pressure 
(expectation to offer or accept a bribe), as was also the case five years 
ago.11 Most of them assess that the corruption pressure is implicit rath-
er than open: officials do not ask for money openly, but the respondent 
interprets their behavior as an expectation to be offered a bribe. When 
observing only the percentage of affirmative answers to the question 
whether it has happened in the contact with public officials in the last 
twelve months, that they asked for a bribe (the “always” and “in most 
cases” answers; the rest are the “never” and “I do not know” answers), a 
following pictur is obtaind: 
It shows that only 8% give a positive answer to the assertion that in 
the last twelve months the officials have openly asked them for money, 
a gift or a favor; 24% of them agreed with the assertion that they do 
not ask openly for a bribe but show that they expect it; while 10% of 
them “admit” that they themselves have indicated that such an agree-
ment is possible. The comparison of the answers given by the mem-
bers of different social groups suggests the (already generally known) 
psychological rule that the attitudes or preferences guide the percep-
tion: an above-average number of the youngest categories of respon-
dents state that they have been asked for money, as well as that they 
have noticed that the officers expected to be offered a bribe – i.e. that 
they have been exposed to corruption pressure (32%). Also above the 
average in this respect were the respondents with secondary school 
degrees, as well as the citizens of Belgrade. The oldest citizens and 
11 In such a case it is never easy to determine with certainty if it is because such 
experiences are rare or because the respondents hesitate to talk about them 
openly.
Figure 25  how frequently has the following happened to you in the contact with 
public officers in the past twelve months? – percentage of affirmative answers  
2001-2006
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64 Corruption in Serbia Five Years Later
pensioners and the citizens of Vojvodina report the fewest experiences 
of this kind, and most frequently deny that they have been exposed to 
corruption pressure. Similar differences among the groups are also 
recorded regarding the respondents themselves being in a situation to 
offer a bribe, i.e. exert corruption pressure on civil servants to do 
them a favor. In the past year, the youngest and middle-aged genera-
tions, private entrepreneurs, respondents with average means and (to 
a certain extent) the unemployed, have found themselves more fre-
quently that the others in a situation to offer a bribe, while the oldest 
citizens have had the fewest opportunities for this. Moreover, the 
respondents from Belgrade state considerably more frequently than 
those coming from Vojvodina that they have had an opportunity to 
exert corruption pressure on officers.
When observing the percentages of affirmative or negative answers 
from the two examined periods, a conclusion can be drawn that there is 
a noticeable decrease in the scale of mutual corruption pressure in the 
five-year period. Namely, on the one hand, the number of those report-
ing that officers have asked them for a bribe or that it seemed to them 
that officers expected something like that, or that they have been ready 
to offer it themselves decreased significantly (Figure 26); on the other 
hand, the number of citizens who completely deny such experiences 
increased.12 
Exposure to unilateral corruption pressure (Who asked for 
money?)
Although the majority of citizens deny the experience of exposure to 
corruption pressure13 (unilateral corruption pressure), those who con-
firm its existence attribute it most frequently to doctors or medical staff 
(19%), and then to policemen (10%), municipal officer (7%) and cus-
toms officers (6%) (Table 12).
The answers show that the so-called small-scale corruption is still 
most present in the health care service and traffic police (traffic viola-
tions), and probably also in the operations related to the work of 
municipal inspection services. The structure of those complaining the 
most about particular professions indirectly confirms such conclusions: 
corruptibility of policemen is emphasized primarily by the young 
respondents and employees in private companies, while corruptibility 
of municipal officers is emphasized by the wealthiest.
Corruption pressure decreased in 2006 compared to 2001 in case of 
all categories of officers, which is seen from the following survey:
12 Thus the percentage of the respondents denying that they have been asked for 
money increased in five years from 70% to 84%, while the percentage of those 
denying that they themselves have been ready to offer it increased from 66% to 
82%.
13 Between 58% and 74% of them deny that they have been in a situation to be 
exposed to corruption pressure by the mentioned professions.
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Table 12  have you been asked for a bribe (money, gift, favor) in the last twelve 
months by…?
Corruptors % of answers
Doctor or medical staff 19
Policeman 10
Municipal officer 7
Customs officer 6
Tax collector or inspector 4
Judge or court officer 4
Officer of public utility company 4
Private entrepreneur 3
University professor 3
Activist of a political party in power in my municipality 2
Sales staff 2
Teacher 2
Ministry officer 2
MP or party leader 1
Bank officer 1
Figure 26  have you been asked for a bribe (money, gift, favor) in the last twelve 
months by…? – percentage of “Yes” answers 
Doctor or medical staff
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Activist of a political party in power 
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MP or party leader
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Specific experiences in connection with corruption practices
Has the citizen obtained the favor that he paid the bribe for?
From the answers of the respondents it may be concluded not only that 
the number of situations in which it is necessary to give a bribe decreased 
by also that corruption is a less efficient lever for solving problems today 
than it was five years ago. 
Previously 65%, and today 77% of the respondents claim that in the 
last twelve months they have not been in a situation to give a bribe. Of 
the 23% of the respondents admitting that they have been in such a 
position to offer a bribe, only 16% (formerly 27%) state that they have 
obtained the favor they had paid for. The most efficient in realizing 
their goals by means of corruption were the employees in private com-
panies, the wealthiest and those with secondary school degree: this 
means that an above-average number of the members of these catego-
ries (between 20% and 27%) state that bribing has had a satisfactory 
effect, while a somewhat below-average number of them claim that they 
have not been in a situation to offer a bribe at all (for example, 64% of 
private entrepreneurs give such an answer compared to 77%, which is 
the average). 
Is the payment made at one or more places?
The citizens’ experiences with corruption show that, when a bribe is 
paid, it is usually paid at one place only (14%), and less frequently at 
two (2%) or more places (2%).14 The necessity of paying at more than 
one place (two places) was emphasized by the youngest, private entre-
preneurs, respondents with secondary school degree and the citizens 
of Belgrade. In the situation of multiple bribing, the officials are more 
14 The rest of the answers to 100% consist of those who have not been in a situation 
to pay a bribe (77%), or who refused to answer the question (5%).
Figure 27  have you actually obtained the favor if, in the last twelve months, you 
were forced to give a bribe to a public official (of if he asked for it)
I have received it
I have not received it
I have not been in a position to offer a bribe
Does not know / Refuses to answer
	 16%
	 2%
	 77%
	 5%
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frequently (in 3/4 of the cases) of a different rank (for example, oper-
atives and their managers) than of the same rank – which presents the 
trend also recorded five years ago. Also, there are not many changes 
regarding the fact that the “rate” is known in advance in giving a bribe, 
i.e. that there is an established norm about the value of each corrupt 
transaction. In some regions of Serbia such a norm is more “rooted” 
than in the others: for example, more respondents in Belgrade (18%) 
than in Vojvodina and Central Serbia (12%) report the existence of 
such a predefined rate. 
As seen from the data, the employed and highly educated respon-
dents are better informed about the existing “rates” than the others. 
About 6% of the respondents state that the “rate” was communicated 
to them in a direct conversation, while 5% of them state that they them-
selves had to ask how much they had to give.
The comparison with the answers from the previous period shows 
that, in this respect, something has nevertheless changed, in the sense 
that the predefined amount of bribe (“rate”) is less known in the public 
today than before. The meaning of this finding may be in the fact that 
corruption is carried out more covertly today, i.e. that the corruptors are 
less open in exerting corruption pressure. The other side of this conclu-
sion is that, gradually, with establishment of new legal regulations in 
the fight against corruption, new moral standards are being established 
that make its spreading more difficult.
Figure 28  If you were once forced to pay a bribe, how did you know what sum of 
money you had to pay? 
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ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES
Possibility of combating corruption in Serbia
The perceptions of corruption the public in Serbia has are “colored” to 
a significant extent by political orientations of the members of different 
social groups. High politicization of the society contributes to increased 
subjectivity (i.e. lack of objectivity) in attributing the responsibility for 
spreading as well as combating corruption. The data about what the 
citizens think about the measures that are being implemented (or 
should be implemented) in the fight against corruption indeed confirm 
the assumption that the attitudes of the public are insufficiently consis-
tent. Although the previous analysis so far points to a conclusion that 
the public more or less shares the belief that corruption in Serbia is 
decreasing, the assessments relating to the possibility to combat it further 
indicate an increased pessimism (Figure 29).
Generally speaking, today, like five years ago, the citizens are rela-
tively divided regarding the question whether, and to what extent, it is 
possible to combat corruption in this society. The percentage of the 
citizens who believe that corruption can be reduced only “to a certain 
extent” remained the same (40%), as well as of those who believe that 
corruption in Serbia can be completely eradicated (4%-5%). However, 
the number of those who think that it is possible to a “significant” extent 
decreased somewhat (from 40% to 30%), while the number of the people 
who think that corruption in our society “cannot be combated at all” 
increased significantly (from 9% previously to 17%). Although there are 
small differences among different social groups in the estimates of the 
possibility of combating corruption in our country, the poorest strata 
show the largest pessimism (Figure 30).
Figure 29   “When it comes to corruption in our society, which of the following 
opinions is the closest to yours?” 
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pletely eradicated
Does not know/Refuses to answer
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government efficiency in combating corruption
To the direct question: “Has enough been done regarding corruption 
combating in Serbia in the past five years?”, half of the respondents 
answer that “little” has been done in this respect, one fourth of them – 
“nothing at all”, while one fifth of them are of the opinion that the 
efforts have been of an “average” intensity. As few as 1% of the citizens 
estimate that “a lot” has been done in combating corruption in the past 
five years. These assessments indicate a general dissatisfaction of the 
citizens with the performance of the new authorities, and a disappoint-
ment that is, in our opinion, an unavoidable consequence of former, 
excessive, expectations from social and political changes. The direct 
criticism the citizens direct to the new authorities is significantly more 
severe than it could be assumed on the basis of their indirect assess-
ments about the level of corruption before and after the change of gov-
ernment of October 5. Therefore we believe that these assessments 
speak more about the attitude towards the authorities than about the 
attitude towards the problem of combating corruption. As shown by 
the Figure below, the citizens of Vojvodina show a greater dissatisfac-
tion in this respect, which may also be interpreted as their more critical 
attitude towards the authorities in their province. (Figure 31)
Figure 30  “When it comes to corruption in our society, which of the following 
opinions is the closest to yours?” 
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However, when the assessments from the two periods are compared, 
there is no doubt that the performance of the democratic authorities in 
the fight against corruption is seen in a considerably more favorable light 
compared to the Milošević’s period. However, the citizens’ enthusiasm 
towards the new authorities, i.e. their confidence in this respect was sig-
nificantly higher in the period immediately after the upheaval than it is 
today. Thus, eight to ten times as many people believe that the former 
government of Đinđić and Živković did enough in combating corrup-
tion compared to the previous Milošević’s period, while only five times 
as many of them think that the present, Kostunica’s government is put-
ting enough efforts in this sense. Significant differences in the assess-
ments of performance of the two democratic governments in the fight 
against corruption may largely be attributed to the fact that the citizens 
use different frame of reference for their comparisons: namely, the per-
formance is assessed as significantly higher when the comparison is 
made in relation to the period of Milošević’s rule (Figure 32). 
Figure 31  has enough been done regarding combating corruption in Serbia in the 
past five years? 
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Figure 32  Is the present government investing enough efforts in eradicating 
corruption among…? – percentage of affirmative answers
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The performance of the present government in the fight against cor-
ruption is assessed as better when it comes to combating corruption 
among influential businessmen and high government officials, and 
somewhat worse when it comes to lower officers who are in contact 
with “common people”. This means that the efficiency of the authorities 
in combating large-scale corruption is assessed as better than in case of 
“small-scale” corruption. On the whole, the number of the people who 
think that the new authorities still have not done enough to combat 
corruption slightly prevails. The citizens of Belgrade and poorer citi-
zens stand out in terms of the criticism they direct to the new demo-
cratic authorities, whereas a significantly lower criticism is shown by 
the youngest generations (18-29 years of age) and relatively wealthier 
members of the society (Figure 33)
Figure 33  Is the present government investing enough efforts in eradicating 
corruption among…? – negative answers by age 151
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Figure 34  What structures represent the main obstacle to successful fight against 
corruption?
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Within the criticism directed to the present democratic authorities, a 
certain number of citizens see the greatest obstacle to combating cor-
ruption precisely in their structures. In this sense, most frequently men-
tioned are the following: executive authorities (35% of the answers), 
political parties (17%) and judicial bodies (15%). When it comes to the 
judiciary as the centre of fight against corruption, significant changes 
are observed in the assessments of the respondents compared to the 
previous study. On the one hand, it is assessed somewhat more fre-
quently today than before that the judiciary is available “to a sufficient 
extent” to every citizen (35%:29%), and there are no changes in the 
opinions on its capability of enforcing its decisions. On the other hand, 
however, the judiciary is assessed more unfavorably in those aspects 
that relate to its fairness (20%:28%), incorruptibility (17%:23%) and 
efficiency (10%:15%). The citizens appear to consider the numerous 
corruption scandals that have come to light within the judiciary in the 
past period as the tip of the iceberg only, so they express their lack con-
fidence by generalizing negative assessments to the entire judicial sys-
tem (Figure 35).
Insufficient confidence of citizens in the efforts of the new authori-
ties to cope with the problem of corruption is also reflected in a rela-
tively critical attitude towards the work of the Anti-corruption Council, 
which is considered to be satisfactory by only a tenth of them. Namely, 
unfavorable assessments are expressed, although most of the citizens 
are not informed about the work of this Council at all.
Figure 35  how often do you associate the following terms and assessments with 
the judiciary? – percentage of affirmative answers in the two periods
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CONCLUSION
The expectations of the public in Serbia regarding the fight against cor-
ruption that appeared with the change of government in October 2000 
and formation of the new, first democratic government of Serbia since 
the period of World War II were enormous. Without getting deeper 
into the discussion about to what extent these expectations were justi-
fied, or based on some realistic grounds, a question arises: to what 
extent have these expectations been fulfilled? How does the Serbian 
public in 2006 assess the changes that have occurred in the sphere of 
corruption prevalence, or fight against it? 
The basic methodological problem with the results of this study, 
which makes it impossible to give an unambiguous answer to the men-
tioned questions, lies in the fact that the statistical significance of the 
difference in the frequency of answers could not be tested where it 
appeared. Because of that, it may be said that these are more a matter of 
conjecture than empirically supported conclusions. However, it appears, 
according to the public perception, that corruption prevalence has 
decreased in Serbia in the last five years. It may also be concluded that 
the public tolerance of corruption has decreased, as well as that the cor-
ruption based on extortion has decreased and that the citizens must 
commit bribery for the purpose of realizing their own rights.   
All this, with a reservation regarding the statistical significance of 
changes, indicates that Serbia is on the path of transition from a coun-
try with widespread corruption to a country in which corruption has 
been transformed into a not-so-prevalent phenomenon, while corrup-
tion transactions have been transformed into transactions of higher 
value, with collusion of both interested parties, i.e. with violation of 
rules. Although the recorded levels of corruption, or of its perception, 
are still far above the desirable, it is obvious that in the past five years 
advances have been made in the right direction.  
Figure 36  how would you assess the previous work of the Anti-corruption 
Council?
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III  Corruption in Serbia 2001–2006:  
 From the Perspective of Enterpreneurs
INTROdUCTION
In this section of the paper, corruption is seen as an indicator of com-
pliance with the law, both by the government, and by the citizens, 
namely as an indicator of the rule of law in the societies in transition, as 
illustrated by the example of the Serbian society. For the empirical anal-
ysis of how much it is present, on the one hand, and how the right is 
exercised and law applied, on the other, we will here give a brief presen-
tation of the thesis we have more thoroughly described elsewhere.1 
Subject to the way the law is applied, violated and developed, there are 
three main types of corruption. 
First, there is the corruption to exercise a right (or speed up the pro-
cess) to which a citizen or a business entity is entitled pursuant to a law 
or bylaw (without a bribe, a public employee refuses to act upon the 
application regardless of his obligation to do so). 
Second, there is corruption to violate the law, namely to exercise a 
right to which a citizen or business entity is not entitled pursuant to any 
law or bylaw so that such right is exercised with the help of corruption 
(for a bribe, a public employee breaks the law even though he is under 
obligation to act upon it). 
Third, there is bribery to change the law or bylaw to suit the interests 
of the corrupter, namely in order to acquire some new right or extend 
the existing one (for a bribe, the legislative or administrative authority 
adjusts the law or bylaw to suit the interests of the briber). 
The first type of corruption generates petty, and the other two types 
generate grand corruption (where large sums of money are at play). 
The first type of corruption is more widely spread, and the other two 
types are more injurious to the political system of a society. The first is 
more common with lower ranking officers, and the other two types 
with higher ranking officials, that is, public employees and members of 
government (particularly those with discretionary decision making 
powers with regard to goods and services). The first type of corruption 
is more easily “caught” in empiric research, and the other two types are 
almost impossible to catch. The first and second type of corruption are 
1 See more: Corruption in Serbia (2001), CLDS, Belgrade.
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typical for the societies in transition where the rule of law is weak or at 
a low level, and the third type of corruption is typical for developed 
Western societies where the compliance with the law is at a much high-
er level. In the societies with flourishing third type of corruption (cor-
ruption to change the law), it is a sure sign that the first two types are 
declining and that the rule of law, more or less, is setting its foot on the 
social and political scene. At the same time, this does not mean that the 
rule of law is deeply rooted – only that businesses and the public behave 
rationally preparing for the “new” times. And, finally, the second and 
third type of corruption are shrouded in a veil of secrecy or given anoth-
er terminological indication to conceal their true nature. 
In the case of our country, the first two types of corruption, those 
meant to exercise a right or to violate a law, are of key importance. This 
is particularly true if we take into account that the corruption in the 
exercise of a right reveals arbitrary narrowing, misinterpretation, or 
stalling in the exercise of the right by the persons (public employees) 
who are under obligation to fully respect such right, and the corruption 
intended for the violation of a law reveals, in the first place, the disinte-
gration of the rule of law and massive violation of the law by those 
whose duty is to respect and enforce it. And, thirdly, corruption to 
change the law is present in some developed countries as well. Namely, 
where it is more difficult to change the laws or where they are strictly 
adhered to, it is more widely spread since the corrupters seek to extend 
their existing rights or to adjust them to suit their interests. In Serbia, 
according to the survey conducted in 2006 (which will be described in 
more detail elsewhere), this type of corruption stagnates. Contrary to 
this, the first type of corruption, the one intended for the exercise of a 
right, is showing a considerable decline (petty corruption is predomi-
nant here), whereas the corruption to infringe a right is declining, but 
not sufficiently to change the image that was already created. 
SAMPLE
Two empirical surveys were used for the comparative analysis of cor-
ruption in the period 2001 – 2006. In both instances, a combination of 
stratified and quota sample was used. These are the main survey data:
The first survey about corruption was conducted in the first half of 
February 2001 on a sample of 327 sole proprietorships and companies 
in the territory of Serbia without Kosovo and Metohia. The survey cov-
ered 21% production and 43% non-production sole proprietorships, 
and 12% production and 21% non-production companies. The struc-
ture of the interviewed owners of companies/proprietors was as follows: 
one shareholder – 83%, two shareholders – 12%, and 3 or more share-
holders – 3%. The size of companies, according to the number of full-
time employees, was the following: 5 or less employees – 70%, between 
5 and 20 employees – 25%, and more than 21 employees – 5%. 
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The second survey was conducted in April 2006 on a sample of 301 
sole proprietorships and companies in the territory of Serbia without 
Kosovo and Metohia. The sample structure according to the type of 
business was as follows: 50% sole proprietorships and 50% compa-
nies; according to the business activity: production 27%, trade 37%, 
and other 36%. The ownership status of surveyed sole proprietor-
ships/companies was as follows: private, unlimited liability, single 
owner – 30%, sole proprietorship-crafts (SZR) – 24%, sole propri-
etorship-retail (STR) 19%, limited liability company, one owner – 
8%, private partnership – 6%, limited liability company, more than 
one owner – 5%, and joint-stock company, mixed company, and 
other – 1%. Regional representation of the sample was as follows: 
Belgrade 32%, Central Serbia 44%, and Vojvodina 24%. The size of 
company, according to the number of full-time employees, was the 
following: up to 2 employees – 37%, 3 to 5 employees – 29%, and 6 or 
more employees – 34%. The ownership structure was as follows: sin-
gle shareholder – 85%, two shareholders – 12%, and three or more 
shareholders – 3%. The persons interviewed included: the owner – in 
66% of all interviews, finance officer/accountant – in 9%, general 
manager/chairman – 9%, partner – 7%, manager – 5%, and the direc-
tor/division director – in 5%. 
WhAT CAUSES CORRUPTION
It is a well-known fact that the spread of corruption in every society, 
Serbian society included, depends on a number of different factors. 
These primarily include a functioning legal system and the efficacy of 
the penal mechanisms, the scope and quality of government regula-
tion, interference of the government in the economy, and the scope of 
transactions controlled by the government or governmental agencies. 
Then, it depends on the cultural and historical milieu, social and his-
torical circumstances, social values, material aspects of the society, 
namely poverty and other less important factors which are sometimes 
hard to identify. Two things are of primary interest for us here: first, 
what the entrepreneurs think about the factors affecting the existence 
of corruption and, second, whether there have been any changes in 
the period of last five years and, if yes, which. 
It may be noted in the very beginning that those changes were not 
great: statistically significant are only the changes in respect of the sala-
ries in the public sector and characteristics of the national culture. In 
the 2001 survey, the entrepreneurs saw the main cause of corruption in 
the low salaries of public employees (59%), crisis of morals in the peri-
od of transition (43%), inappropriate legislation (39%), interference of 
legal interests with official duties (26%), etc. The last ranked are the 
problems arising as a result of the communist past (17%). This can be 
seen on the graph. 
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Table 1.  Factors affecting the existence of corruption (%) (multiple options)
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
Low salaries of public employees 59 44
Crisis of morals in the transition period 43 49
Ambition of those in power to get rich quickly 39 46
Inappropriate legislation 43 39
Interference of personal interests with official duties 26 31
Judicial inefficiency 26 24
Absence of strict administrative control 22 26
Specific feature of our national culture 21 13
Problems arising as a result of the communist past 17 16
No answer / Don’t know 00
Five years later, in 2006, the first ranked as the cause of corruption, 
according to the opinion of the entrepreneurs, became the crisis of 
morals (49%), followed by the ambition of people in power to get rich 
quickly (46%), low salaries of public employees (44%), inappropriate 
Figure 1  The most important factors affecting the existence of corruption 
(multiple options)
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legislation (39%), interference of personal interest in official duties 
(31%), and so on. The last ranked was the specific features of our 
national culture (13%).
We should underline that now, compared with the period of five 
years ago, the entrepreneurs less often indicate low salaries of public 
employees and specific features of our national culture as causes for 
corruption. Also, the businesses from Belgrade, to a somewhat greater 
extent than the businesses from other regions, indicated the low salaries 
of public employees as the cause of corruption. At the same time, larger 
businesses (companies), in contrast with the smaller ones (sole propri-
etorships) saw the crises of morals as the cause of corruption.
In general, compared with the period of five years before, the key fac-
tors affecting the existence of corruption remained, more or less, the 
same. There were some shifts that could have been caused by the real 
changes taking place in the society on the one hand, and different sam-
ples, on the other. These changes were not great enough to speak of the 
changing trends.
ThE jUdICIARY ANd CORRUPTION
Bearing in mind our thesis presented above, our first task was to see 
what is going on in the Serbian judicial system. The trust has been one 
of its key problems for a long time now. The trust in the judiciary (the 
same as in the case of people in power) depends on a number of differ-
ent factors, including, inter alia, its performance. And the assessment of 
its performance, as we will describe in more detail below, depends on 
what it does in practice, that is, on the assessment of its fairness, hon-
esty, speed, accessibility/affordability, reliability, and ability relating 
specific court decisions. It is based on these decisions that they will be 
later assessed by the citizens and businesses. These assessments have so 
far been mainly unfavourable. Accordingly, it is well known that the 
Serbian judicial system has been for a long time facing a grave crisis of 
trust.2 And this crisis of trust is a result of its acts and omissions over a 
long period of time.
Almost all previous public polls unambiguously showed a very bad 
image of the judiciary as seen by the general public and businesses. This 
is evident in the survey findings shown below (Table 2). This image, 
except for certain oscillations, has not changed for quite some time. A 
slight increase of trust was noted in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, only 
to go back to its previous level. The oscillations in the the respondent’s 
attitudes, apart from the differences arising from the sample, may be 
attributed to the expectations of the public (that the judiciary will be 
more just, honest and efficient) after the political changes in 2000 and 
2 S. Vuković (2003), Corruption and Rule of Law, IDN – Draganić, Belgrade; 
Corruption in Judiciary (2004), CLDS, Belgrade
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the present decisions of the court(s), particularly those attracting public 
attention. If we compare the data for 2001 with those for 2006, we will 
see that in these five years the judiciary became somewhat more just 
(fair and impartial), more honest and free of corruption, quicker, more 
accessible/affordable, reliable and able to enforce its decisions (indices 
are somewhat lower). Although it is true that these changes are not 
great, they could be encouraging. This tells us that the judiciary does, 
even though slowly, adjust to modern trends, which means being a reli-
able actor in any dispute, regardless of the parties involved.
Table 2  Assessment of the judicial system; the judiciary is: (Indices 1-5)3
just honest Quick Accessible/ 
Affordable
Reliable Capable
General public 
in 2001
3.59 3.72 3.96 3.57 3.8 1 3 .56
Private 
entrepreneurs in 
2001
3.60 3.79 4.10 3.51 3.80 3.56
Entrepreneurs in 
socially-owned 
companies, in 
2002 
3.19 3.64 3.97 2.63 3.52 3.23
Entrepreneurs in 
private 
companies, in 
2002
3.26 3.34 4.04 3.40 3.66 3.57
Entrepreneurs in 
socially-owned, 
mixed, and 
private 
companies, in 
2004.
3 . 13 3.20 3.85 2.86 3.27 3.17
Private 
entrepreneurs in 
2006
3.48 3 . 62  3. 95 3.18 3.57 3.31
The relationship between the legal system and businesses is wrought 
with controversy. Regardless of the fact that the previously presented 
data revealed that businesses now have a somewhat better opinion of 
the judiciary, the following data immediately relativise that. Namely, 
the findings of our 2001 survey showed that the citizens and businesses 
expected the new, democratic government to make radical changes at 
all levels, including, inter alia, the radical changes in the judiciary sys-
tem. However, these findings did not correlate with what their state-
ments about the level of corruption at the time. This is clear from the 
3 Where “1” denotes means just, fair, …, and “5” denotes unjust, unfair.
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comparative data below. Almost two thirds (65%) of all businesses in 
2001 were of the opinion that the legal system of the country at the time 
(after the changes) would uphold (“fully”, “in most cases”, and “tend to 
agree”) their contracts or property rights in commercial disputes, even 
though they said at the time that the judiciary is one of the most cor-
rupted institutions in Serbia. In contrast, slightly more than one fifth 
(22%) said that they would not uphold (“never”, “in most cases”, and 
“tend to disagree”). 
Table 3  Assessment of the court system in 2006; the judiciary is:
 Always Frequ-
ently
Some-
times
Seldom Never don’t 
know 
/n.a.
Index Rang 
Fair and 
impartial  2.3 1 2.6 28.6 32.2 14.3 10. 0 3 .48  4
Honest and 
free of 
corruption
 1.7  9.3 25.6 36.2 17.3 10 .0 3.62 2
Quick   0.7  7.3 19.6 32.9 31.6  7.9 3.95 1
Accessible to 
/Affordable 
by all
 8.6 16.3 24.3 30.2 10.0 10.6 3.18 6
Reliable  2.3  9. 0 28.6 35.2 14.6 10.3 3.57 3
Able to 
enforce its 
decisions
 4. 7 14 .0 30.2 29.6 10.6 11.0 3.31 5
Five years later, the entrepreneurs “cooled down”, that is, the differ-
ence between their expectations from the judicial system and their per-
ception of its corruptibility is smaller (Table 3). Now they state in 40 % 
of cases that the legal system would uphold (to a greater or lesser degree) 
their contract and property rights in commercial disputes and, in con-
trast, 52% do not agree with this statement to a greater or lesser extent. 
And that is far closer to their assessment of the judiciary. With regard to 
their attitude towards the past (in the survey conducted in 2001), for 
instance, three years before, the situation, in their opinion, was quite 
the reverse; namely, only 15.3% stated that at that time, to a greater or 
lesser extent, they would have been supported by the legal system while 
almost three fourths of them (73%) stated that such support would 
have been missing. Five years later (the survey 2006), this attitude 
towards the past (of five years before) was largely toned down and 
brought to the right measure. This means that here they stated only in 
28% cases that their contract and property rights in commercial dis-
putes would have been more or less protected. In contrast, 61% of busi-
nesses stated that their contracts would not have been protected even 
then. That was in line with what they said about the corruption in the 
judiciary at that time.
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EFFICACY OF PUBLIC SERVICES ANd CORRUPTION
The efficacy of a society may be measured based on its legal orderliness, 
compliance with the law (the gap between the promulgated laws and their 
empirical implementation), and functioning of the system’s institutions 
as such. That is why the analysis of how well they are functioning is at the 
same time the analysis of how well the state is functioning. The quality 
and efficacy of their work is at the same time the measure of how well the 
system’s institutions are functioning on the one hand, and how well the 
political authorities are functioning, on the other hand. For many of 
them, in addition to the efficacy and timeliness, quality also implies 
impartiality. Organised and regulated institutions provide for political 
stability, i.e. they neutralise, or regulate inevitable social conflicts. Public 
services understood in this way constitute, as it is said nowadays, the 
logistic support to all businesses. Without their support modern business 
is almost impossible. They should facilitate, rather than impede (as often 
happens in our country) entrepreneurial activity, that is, they should cre-
ate the most favourable and transparent environment for these activities. 
Besides, the quality of public services, to a greater or lesser extent, has 
impact not only on the level and quality of investment activity, but also 
on competitiveness of the economy they are servicing. 
Comparative findings of the surveys, namely the average value and 
ranking of each of these services according to the assessments made by 
private entrepreneurs, are shown in Table 4.
The above findings of the survey clearly show that private entrepre-
neurs have absolutely negatively assessed the quality and efficacy of 
public services. At first sight it might be surprising that this time (in the 
survey conducted in 2006 compared with the one conducted in 2001) 
entrepreneurs assessed the quality and efficacy of services much more 
negatively (the difference is statistically significant in all cases except for 
the National Bank and the military). In the comparison of median val-
ues, they fared worse that five years before: maintenance of roads, cus-
toms, EPS (electricity company), health care, police, education, inspec-
tion, tax service, courts and the judiciary, local authorities, and national 
assembly. In contrast, compared with the period of five years before, 
the entrepreneurs assessed more positively only the following services: 
heating plants, telecom, postal service, and water supply. In the last sur-
vey, the least positively assessed were local authorities, tax service, court 
and the judiciary, and the Serbian National Assembly. There are no sta-
tistically significant differences between the assessments given by sole 
proprietorships and companies, or between the sole proprietorships/
companies involved in different business activities. 
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Table 4  Assessment of the quality and efficacy of services4
Year
2001 2006
N 324 298
Customs 4.4 3.5
Maintenance of roads 5.2 2.5
EPS-electricity 4.1 3.6
Health care 4.5 3.2
Heating plants 3.7 4.0
Police 4.2 3.4
Education 4.1 3.5
Inspection 4.3 3.2
Telecom 3.4 4.1
Tax service 4.4 3.1
Courts and judiciary 4.7 2.7
Postal services 3.3 4.0
National Bank 3.6 3.6
Water supply 3.5 3.8
Local authorities 3.9 3.1
Military 3.3 3.5
National Assembly 4.5 2.3
The citizens’ and businesses’ assessment of the quality of work of the 
above institutions and services brings to light how much they trust 
them. What was unexpected is that after five years the distrust in most 
public services increased. 
Aware that the attitude towards the institutions is, for these purposes, 
polarised, in Table 5 we have presented the percent of positive and neg-
ative marks in both surveys.
The Above findings suggest the following: 
First, that in 2006, compared to 2001, in most cases a statistically sig-
nificant drop was noted in the percent of extremely negative assessments 
(“very poor” and “poor”) of the operation of individual services. In the 
case of customs, for instance, the drop is from 36% to 15%; for the 
police from 43% to 23%; for the military from 40% to 21%; and simi-
lar. This is not true for the National Assembly where we now have 49% 
negative marks, compared with 38% five years ago. 
 
4 Average (1 – very poor, 6 – very good)
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Table 5  Positive and negative marks of the following institutions (%)
Percent of negative marks 
(1 and 21)
Percent of positive marks 
(5 and 62)
2001 2006 2001 2006
N  327    301  327  301
Customs 36 15  5 15
Maintenance 
of roads 74 53  1  9
EPS-electricity 42 22 12 27
Health care 51 31  7 16
Heating plants 19  8 13 26
Police 43 23 11 19
Education 39 17 13 21
Inspection 46 30 12 19
Telecom 21 10 26 43
Tax service 47 35 10 17
Courts and the 
judiciary 52 41  3  7
Postal services 20 12 27 40
National Bank 24 16 19 23
Water supply 25 17 38 32
Local 
authorities 36 33 17 15
Military 40 21 28 20
National 
Assembly 38 49  5  3
Second, at the same time the percent of extremely positive assess-
ments significantly rises, depending on the service. Thus, for instance, 
the percentage for the customs increased from 5% to 15%; for the police 
from 11% to 19%, and so on. However, in the case of the military, the 
percent of positive marks fell from 28% to 20%. 
The above interpreted survey findings may be attributed to the fol-
lowing causes. Firstly, disappointed expectations of citizens in the 
transition period 2001 – 2006, which were founded on unrealistic 
promises given by the then opposition; moreover, the preceding five-
year period was fraught with scandals, suspicious privatisations, and 
evident social disintegration. This social disintegration was, primarily, 
caused by the suspicious business deals with the government, those 
aided by classic crime, or tax evasion. Many of these deals were 
weighed down by the corruptive practices of their main players. Key 
players in these business “arrangements” were the members of politi-
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cal establishment, or persons close to it. For that they are now “pun-
ished”. The second cause may be sought in the fact that the tax system 
was being established at that time and many small businessmen (and 
there are plenty of them in the sample) took it badly and gave negative 
marks to most governmental services. Thirdly, in the situation where 
many of this small businesses and companies crumbled every day a 
little bit more, the government did nothing to protect them. Moreover, 
regardless of the successful privatisation of the banking sector, accord-
ing to what they said, the banking loans were inaccessible and overly 
expensive. 
SPREAd OF CORRUPTION
It was found in our earlier surveys that corruption has become a com-
ponent of the Serbian system, i.e. that it has permeated all the pores of 
society. On the pages below we will see what the situation is now, five 
years after the change of government in Serbia.
how common is corruption?
Although for many private entrepreneurs in Serbia corruption is an 
integral part of their daily business, it seems to be lessening recently. 
However, for the vast majority (73%) of entrepreneurs, bribe giving is 
still nothing out of the ordinary (Table 6). Contrary to the year 2001 
when almost two fifths of all private entrepreneurs (39%) said that it is 
common (“always”, “mostly”, or “frequently”) for the companies and 
sole proprietorships involved in “this line of business” to pay extra to 
“get some things done”, now, in 2006 their number fell below one 
fourth (24%). Namely, in 2001 the number of the respondents saying 
that is not really common (“never”, “seldom”, or “sometimes”) was 
53%, and in 2006 it was 70%. What is particularly striking is that there 
is a growing number (from 9% to 22%) of those who say that it never 
happens that they must give a bribe to receive some additional services. 
This means that almost eight tenths (82%) of private entrepreneurs, 
according to what they said in the 2001 survey, at least once in their 
business life gave bribe to a public servant and that, contrary to this, 
their number now is 73%. If the percents are translated into a common 
denominator, it is absolutely clear that the degree of corruptibility of 
public servants is lowering (in 2001 the index was 3.2, and in 2006 it 
was 2.8), which is, in respect of the deeply rooted corruption in most 
societies, a considerable drop.
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Table 6  how common is it for a company to give some irregular payments in order 
to “get things done”?
Year 
2001 2006
N  327  301
sig 0.00
Never 9 22
Seldom 22 17
Sometimes 22 32
Sum - 53 70
Sum + 39 24
Frequently 27 14
In most cases 9  7
Always 3  4
No answer / Don’t know 8  5
To tal 100%
Average 3.2 2.8
It may be concluded based on the above data that bribe giving to 
public servants is still one of the necessities of doing business. It is still 
so widely spread that it may be regarded as a general phenomenon. 
In our last survey, public servants fared somewhat better than five 
years before. When these findings are expressed by one synthetic indi-
cator, it is clear that corruptibility, as measured by this indicator, is 
declining (in 2001 the index was 3.2, and in 2006 it was 2.8) and that 
this change is statistically significant. 
direct and indirect bribing 
The inevitable question is whether the public servants solicit money 
from their “clients” for their corruptive practices in a direct or indirect 
manner. This in turn reveals how much they fear the threatened sanc-
tions and how seriously they take the prescribed rules of the game and, 
consequently, the system of sanctions of the society. According to the 
2001survey, they did this directly – having no fear of the sanctions, spe-
cifically: “always” in 38%, and “in most cases” 45% of the time. 
Five years later this situation is completely changed. Namely, two 
thirds (66%) say that they have never at all been solicited money or 
favour by a public servant in order to have something done. At the same 
time, in 27% of the cases that happened in individual cases. One of the 
problems with this survey is that it did not cover the “big fish”, those 
which, as Xenofont said a long time ago, tear the net. This also means: 
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first, that they fear the threatened sanctions, and, second, that even 
though money or favours are not directly solicited the corruption sur-
vives but its mechanisms are growing more complex (stalling the pro-
ceedings, inappropriate solutions to problems, and similar – in the case 
of corruption to exercise a right), and third, in such a situation it is 
inevitable that the corruption should decline (which will be seen later 
on in more detail).
Table 7  how often did the public servants directly solicit money, a gift, or a favour? 
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
Sig 0.00
Never 1 66
In individual cases 7 27
Sum - 8 93
Sum + 83 2
Mostly 45 2
Always 38
No Answer / Don’t know 09 05
To tal 100%
Average 3.3 1.3
Certainly, corruption is also present when public servants solicit 
money in an indirect manner, or expect to receive it. This takes place in 
many different ways, from asking to borrow some money, through the 
obstruction (in the case of a service to which the citizen is entitled). In 
the case of corruption when it is necessary to break the law, the situa-
tion is similar (“I must break the law.”; “I am taking the risk.”). Findings 
of this part of survey are shown in Table 8. 
The findings also suggest that in the 2001 survey, those entrepre-
neurs who said that public servants “always” or “mostly” expect to 
receive money, a gift or a favour, made up almost a half (49%) of all 
the respondents. In contrast to this, five years later (in 2006), they 
were fewer than one fourth (23%). At the same time, in 2001 only 
12% said that public servants “never” showed that they expect to 
receive money, a gift or a favour while five years later, there were 
three times as many (35%) such answers. 
All in all, the results of the surveys presented in the above two tables 
also suggest that, in many cases, the corruption in Serbia is declining. 
Moreover, direct solicitation of bribe is much rarer than indirect solici-
tation.
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Table 8  how often did the public servants show that they expect to receive money, 
a gift, or a favour?
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
sig 0.00
Never 12 35
In individual cases 31 39
Sum - 43 74
Sum + 49 23
Mostly 38 20
Always 11 3
No answer / Don’t know 8 3
To tal 100%
Average 2.5 1.9
Multiple payments
In the regulated bureaucratised societies it is extremely rare for another 
public employee to take an extra bribe for the same service. In our 
country the situation is quite the opposite. Here we have an irresponsi-
ble and unprofessional bureaucracy. The bureaucracy that provides ser-
vices in this manner acquires all characteristics of cleptocracy. The 
above presented data confirm this notion. However, the situation has 
somewhat improved in the last five years. The findings of the survey 
confirm that bribe giving does not guarantee that the “agreed” service 
will be provided. Namely, in the 2001 survey almost every third (32%) 
entrepreneur was forced, according to them, to repeat the payment for 
one and the same “service” (“always”, “usually”, or “frequently”), while 
in 2006, not even a fifth (19%) of all entrepreneurs had to do it (“always” 
or “frequently”). This also means that, according to the 2001 survey, 
almost two thirds (65%) of entrepreneurs were forced to, at least once 
in their business life, pay at least twice for one and the same service. 
Contrary to this, according to the 2006 survey, their numbers slightly 
declined, to 54%. 
It arises from the above that the expansion of the public service appa-
ratus is accompanied with the expansion of corruption, namely that 
transaction costs rise with the increasing number of employees that 
need to be bribed. That is why it often happens that for some specific 
service we have to pay two or more times. A particularly big problem 
arises when the briber, despite having paid for a service, does not receive 
that service. Then we have in place the inefficacious corruption and 
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extremely irresponsible bureaucracy. The empirical data below will 
show how much has changed in the last five years. Thus, for example, in 
the 2001 survey, even after the “extra payment” was made, the agreed 
service was received: “always” in 8% of the cases, “usually” in 40% of 
the cases, “frequently” in 15%, and “sometimes” in 12%, “seldom” in 
3%, and “never” in 1% of the cases. There were 20% of those who did 
not know or did not answer the question asked. The index value is 2.1. 
Contrary to this, according to the 2006 survey, the bureaucracy became 
increasingly inefficacious and unprofessional. After making the “extra 
payment”, the agreed service is received “always” in 11% of the cases, 
“frequently” in 23% of the cases, “sometimes” in 21%, “seldom” in 8%, 
and “never” in 8% of the cases. Twenty nine percent of entrepreneurs 
refused to answer or did not know. The index value is 3.3. The briber 
does not have the absolute power but rather only a relative assurance 
that he will receive the service for which he paid. Failure of public 
employees to provide the service regardless of the fact that they were 
“paid extra” to do it is caused by the increase of bureaucracy and also 
because many of them promise what, although “quite willing”, they 
cannot do. A second cause may be sought in the fact that the criminal 
code sanctions both the bribe taking and the bribe giving. Accordingly, 
despite the fact that he did not receive the service he paid for, the cor-
ruptor is forced to keep silent. The third cause may lie in the fact that 
people get positions in public services based on “moral and political 
appropriateness” or loyalty to a political party, theirs or their parents’. 
For this reason they believe that the position they are occupying is their 
“historical right” and, therefore, their attitude is that of a person who 
nobody can touch.
The amount of bribe
One of the questions posed to businesses was: how much do the private 
entrepreneurs set aside from their annual revenues to bribe public ser-
vants? This part of our survey is shown in Table 9. Through this ques-
tion, contrary to a large number of other questions, one gets really cred-
ible data about the spread of corruption.
When comparing the data from 2001 with the data from 2006, it is 
clear that there were some considerable, statistically significant changes. 
The share of those saying they do not pay for extra services rose from 
one fourth (25%) to slightly more than one half (51%). Accordingly, in 
the survey conducted in 2001, slightly below one fifth (58%) does it and 
states how much compared to their revenue it is, while in the 2006 sur-
vey, their number was below two fifths (39%). At the same time, the 
number of those who pay for extra services in the amount below one 
percent of their revenues grew a bit (from 15% to 19%). (Businesses 
with the revenues over ten thousand euro slightly more often than 
smaller ones stated that they make extra payments in the amount below 
1% of their revenues.) In the period of five years under observation, 
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according to what the entrepreneurs said, also considerably declining 
was the percent of those who set aside larger amounts for bribing pur-
poses. Thus, for instance, the share of those who pay between one and 
ten percent of their revenues fell from 27% to 15%, and the share of 
those who those who pay more than ten percent now fell, according to 
their statements, to a third (from 15% to 5%). No significant differ-
ences between private companies and sole proprietorships or between 
companies in different regions were noted in the two surveys.
 
Table 9  What percent of your company’s /sole proprietorship’s revenues is 
annually set aside for “informal payments”?
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
sig 0.00
0% 25 51
Less than 1% 15 19
1 – 1,99%  7 10
2 -9,99% 20  5
10-12,99%  9  3
13-25%  2  1
More than 25%  4  1
No answer / Don’t know 17 11
To tal 100 100
Figure 2 What percent of your company’s /sole proprietorship’s revenues is 
annually set aside for “informal payments”?
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Is corruption decreasing? 
In order to learn whether the corruption in Serbia is increasing or 
decreasing, we asked an additional set of questions. The comparative 
analysis of the 2001 and 2006 survey data suggests that things have 
slightly moved for the better. In the first survey the number of those 
who believed that things are moving for the better was between 9% and 
17%. Five years ago, the number of entrepreneurs who, in respect of the 
necessary bribe, believed that the situation was better that three years 
before, was between 13% and 37%. According to what they said, the 
situation was better with regard to the registration of companies, oper-
ating licences, connections to the telephone or electricity network, with 
regard to sanitary inspection and foreign exchange. When it comes to 
other institutions or services, such as financial police, tax administra-
tion, gaining contracts with local authorities, getting the building site 
(land), planning inspection, gaining contracts with state companies or 
the Government – the situation has not changed, namely, there is no 
statistically significant difference. 
Table 10  Compared with the period of three years ago the situation with informal 
payments is …“better”
Year
2001 2006
 N  327  30 1
Registration of companies  17  37
Operating licence 17 27
Connection to the telephone or electricity network 12 28
Financial police 16 24
Tax administration  15 22
Sanitary inspection 13 2 1
Gaining contracts with local authorities 17 16 
Getting the building site (land)  14 18
Planning inspection 12 17
Foreign exchange operations and inspection 9 19
Gaining contracts with state company 11 15
Gaining contracts with the Government 10 13
Surely, here, the same as elsewhere, there were some who thought 
that things have taken a turn for the worse. In the 2001 survey, their 
number was between 2% and 11%. Those who fared the worst at that 
time included: connection to the telephone or electricity network, 
financial police, tax administration, and gaining contracts with a state 
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company. In the 2006 survey, their number was between 8% and 18% 
and the worst off were the tax administration, getting the building site 
(land), and planning inspection.
 
Table 11  Compared with the period of three years ago the situation with informal 
payments is …“worse”
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
Tax administration 7 18
Getting the building site (land) 6 18
Financial police 7 13
Connection to the telephone or electricity network 11 8
Gaining contracts with a state company 7 10
Gaining contracts with local authorities 5 12
Operating license 5 11
Planning inspection 3 11
Foreign exchange operations and inspection 4 9
Sanitary inspection 3 9
Registration of companies 4 8
Gaining contracts with the Government 2 8
The second most important is the question: in what spheres of social 
life is the corruption most present? It is followed by: are there any chang-
es, i.e., is it increasing or decreasing? Comparative findings (expressed in 
indices) of the 2001 and 2006 surveys are shown in Table 12. 
The above findings suggest several things. 
First, in 2001 the corruptibility of public employees was the greatest 
when it came to getting a building site (land), customs clearance, con-
nection to the telephone or electricity network, gaining contracts with 
the Government, followed by contracts with local authorities and gain-
ing contracts with a state company.
Second, five years later getting a building site (land) was again ranked 
first, followed by gaining contracts with local authorities and gaining 
contracts with a state company, after which followed customs clearance 
and gaining contracts with the Government.
Third, corruptibility of public sector employees is statistically con-
siderably lower everywhere, with the exception of tax administration (it 
remained the same as in the previous survey). This drop in the corrupt-
ibility of public employees ranged more or less between 15% and 30%.
Fourth, the respondents’ answers polarised. Namely at one and the 
same time we have a growing percent of those who believed that the 
93Corruption in Serbia 2001–2006: From the Perspective of Enterpreneurs
corruptibility situation is better than three years ago, and a growing per-
cent of those who believe that the corruptibility situation is worse than 
three years ago. The reasons for this may lie in the polarisation in the 
political sphere. 
Table 12  Corruptibility of public sector employees (Index 1 – 5)5
Year
2001 2006
Customs clearance 3.0 2.3
Foreign exchange operations and inspections 2.7 2.0
Tax administration 2.1 2.1
Financial police 2.7 2.2
Registration of companies 2.3 1.8
Sanitary inspection 2.5 2.0
Planning inspection 2.6 2.2
Getting a building site (land) 3.1 2.5
Operating license 2.7 2.2
Connection to the telephone or electricity network 3.0 2.2
Gaining contracts with the Government 3.0 2.3
Gaining contracts with local authorities 2.8 2.4
Gaining contracts with a state company 2.8 2.4
Time needed for bribing
To better understand how widespread the corruption is and how detri-
mental it is to economic relations, one must ask how much time and 
energy private entrepreneurs spend on bribing different public servants 
and para-public servants. This question, along with the one asking them 
to estimate how much of their revenues they set aside for bribing pur-
poses, yields the most realistic data about the spread of corruption. 
These data are shown in Table 13.
In the 2001 survey, more than one third (34%) of respondents said 
that they did not lose any time while in the latest survey there were almost 
three fifths (57%) of them who said that. However, also slightly decreased 
was the share of those who stated that they spend less than 1% if their 
time for these purposes. The number of those who, according to what 
they said, lose between one and ten percent on bribing fell, from 16% (in 
2001) to 10% (in 2006), as did the number of those who stated that they 
have lost an enormous lot of time (more than 10%), namely their number 
5 Where: 1 – no one is corruptible, 5 – all are corruptible.
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has now fallen by more than four times. Neither of the surveys shows 
statistically significant differences in respect of the type of company, the 
line of business, or the geographical distribution. The time for bribing is 
lost, according to the entrepreneurs’ statements, primarily on ensuring 
discretion on the one hand, and because of their attempts to avoid this 
“extra payment”, on the other. However, they say that these attempts are 
mostly in vain when they come across a corruptible public employee. 
Table 13  The time needed for bribing of the public sector employees 
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
sig 0.00
0% 34 57
Less than 1% 21 18
1 – 1,99% 8 7
2 -9,99% 8 3
10-12,99% 6 1
13-25% 3 1
More than 25% 4 1
No answer / Don’t know 17 12
To tal 100%
Figure 3  The time needed for bribing of public sector employees
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Multiple bribing
To see whether it would be possible to protect oneself from corrupted 
public employees, we asked the following question: How often is the 
following statement true: “If one government officer acts against the 
regulations, I can usually go to another officer or his superior and estab-
lish a correct relationship without informal payments“. The answers we 
have received are shown in Table 14.
Table 14  Establishing a relationship with other public servant free of corruption
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
sig 0.47
Never 13 16
Seldom 28 23
Sometimes 23 25
Sum - 65 63
Sum + 22 23
Frequently 6 8
Mostly 9 7
Always 7 8
No answer / Don’t know 13 14
To tal 100%
Average 2.9 2.9
The above survey findings suggest that the protection against corrup-
tion within the existing bureaucratic apparatus is not strong. In this 
respect, nothing has changed in the past five years. Actually, only slight-
ly less than one fourth of respondents, in both surveys, believe that, if a 
public servant acts contrary to regulations, they can normally (“always”, 
“mostly” or “frequently”) go to another officer or their superior and get 
the job done with no corruption. That such visit can save them “some-
times” or “seldom”, is responded by more than a half (51%) of them in 
2001, and in 2006 almost a majority (48%). All in all, both surveys dem-
onstrated that there was no great protection against the corruptible 
public servants in complaining to their superiors or turning to another 
officer. The complaint to the superior does not work for he is most 
often “involved” and, even though he does not formally appear before 
the corruptor, he shares the “spoils” with his subordinate. Sometimes 
an entire chain is in place where the “profits” are allocated according to 
the position of the employee on the hierarchical ladder. In such a case, 
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the lowest position on this ladder is taken by a person who extorts and 
takes the bribe. It is also known to happen that the “boss” negotiates 
and takes the bribe and then distributes it to his subordinates according 
to their respective “contribution” to the job done. 
Corruption in political parties
Considering that political parties are important social institutions, it 
could be useful to see how spread the corruption is within them. How 
much private entrepreneurs pay to political parties for different illegal 
actions or to ensure the exercise of the rights guaranteed by law, on the 
one hand, or adjustment of legislation to suit the corruptor’s needs, on 
the other hand, are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15  Payment of services to political parties
Year
2001 2006
N 327 301
sig  0.00
Never 71 90
Seldom 10 5
Sometimes 9 4
Sum - 90 98
Sum + 7 1
Frequently 3 1
Mostly 2
Always 2 0
No answer / Don’t know 3 1
To tal 100%
Mean 1.6 1.2
A cursory look at the above Table reveals that, in the opinion of small 
businesses, corruption in political parties: first, is not substantial, and, 
second, that it has considerably lessened in the last five years. Considering 
that the sample did not include large private companies which have the 
interest and the power to bribe political parties, the findings of this sur-
vey should be taken with a large dose of reserve. The second reason for 
such a low level of political parties’ corruptibility may be sought in the 
fact that the corruptor directly addresses public servants (without the 
intermediation of a political party).
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TYPES OF CORRUPTION
As we have underlined in the Introduction, in view of the manner in 
which a the law is applied, violated, or passed, there are three main types 
of corruption: corruption to exercising a right, corruption to violate the 
law, and corruption to change the law. Findings of this part of the sur-
vey are shown in Table 16. 
Table 16  Corruption for the purposes of exercising a right, violating the law, and 
changing the law (in %)
Exercising 
of a right
Violating 
the law
Changing 
the law
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006
N 327 301 327 301 327 301
Connection to 
telephone or 
electricity network
53 38 18 27  5  5
Operating license 46 35 22 29  7  8
Registering the 
company 38 34 23 29 11  6
Gaining contracts 
with local 
authorities
39 24 19 33  6  9
Getting a building 
site (land) 36 27 28 33  8  9
Gaining contracts 
with a state 
company
37 21 20 30  6  6
City-planning 
inspection 30 27 32 35  9  8
Sanitary inspection 29 25 36 36  9  6
Tax administration 25 27 42 38 10  9
Gaining contracts 
with the 
Government
27 22 17 28  7  6
Financial police 25 20 46 40  9 10
Foreign exchange 
operations and 
inspection
17 20 29 35  7  5
Comparative analysis of the empirical data from 2001 and 2006 
revealed as follows:
First, the corruption in order to exercise a right, is declining. This 
decline is the greatest in the following segments: connection to the tele-
phone or electricity network, gaining contracts with a state company, 
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gaining contracts with local authorities, and obtaining of the operating 
licence. Faring a bit worse, but without any statistical significance, were 
the tax administration and the foreign exchange operations and inspec-
tion. This means that, due to stricter sanctions, public servants some-
what less frequently resort to bribe accepting or soliciting for a job they 
are under obligation to do.
Second, corruption in order to violate the law remained, all told, at 
approximately the same level. However, it has increased in some seg-
ments and decreased in others. A slight increase was noted in gaining 
contracts with local authorities and gaining contracts with the 
Government, which is followed by gaining contracts with state compa-
nies and connection to the telephone or electricity network. This means 
that it is harder to defeat the corruption at a higher level due to the 
greater power of both the corruptors and the corrupted.
Third, the corruption in order to change the laws or multitudinous 
bylaws also retained the level of the five years before. Some shifts may 
be noted in individual areas but they are not statistically significant. 
Fourth, this confirms our above thesis that the spread of corruption 
in transition societies depends on the degree of compliance with the 
law, both by public servants and the general public. 
CORRUPTION ANd MEASURES FOR CURBINg CORRUPTION
Table 17  What has been done to curb corruption in the past five years?6
To tal Line of business Re gion
Produc tion Tr ade Other Be l grade Cen tral 
Ser bia
Voj vodina
Nothing 22.9 21 28 19 35 16 19
Little 33.9 35 25 42 32 39 26
Moderate 
amount 32.6 30 39 28 23 36 40
Much 8.0 11  4 10  8  6 11
Very 
much 1.3  1  2  1  1  1  3
No 
answer / 
Don’t 
know
1.3  1  3  0  0  2  1
Average 2.3  2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.5
6  Where: 1 – Nothing was done, 5 – Very much was done
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Measures for curbing corruption must be comprehensive and may 
range from general to the individual and specific.7 On the above pages 
we have seen what measures have been undertaken in the last five years, 
and in Table 17 we will see how they are, in general, assessed by private 
entrepreneurs.
Almost one fourth (23%) of entrepreneurs believe that nothing has 
been done to curb corruption in the past five years, and slightly more 
than one third (34%) believe that little was done. Contrary to this, only 
9% of the entrepreneurs believe that “much” or “moderate amount” 
has been done to curb corruption. Also, the survey findings suggest that 
the entrepreneurs from Belgrade are somewhat more sceptical than 
those from Central Serbia and Vojvodina. 
Previous survey findings are not in harmony with the above present-
ed. Namely, to a large number of question the entrepreneurs answered 
that corruption in Serbia is now noticeably lesser than five years ago. 
Their answer to this question is that nothing or almost nothing was 
done to reduce or suppress it. This suggests that their expectations were 
high on the one hand, and that some of their answers were “politically” 
biased (expression of distrust towards the current government – which 
is quite another matter), on the other hand.
Table 18  how do you assess the activities of the Anti-Corruption Council?8
To tal Line of Business Re gion
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
T
ra
de
O
th
er
B
el
gr
ad
e
C
en
tr
al
 S
er
bi
a
V
oj
vo
di
n
a
sig 0.28 0.06
1 15.6 17 21 9 26 9 14
2 21.9 22 20 24 24 21 21
3 25.2 18 24 31 22 27 26
4   7.3 12 5 6 4 0 8
5   2.3 1 2 4 2 4
Never heard 
of them
18.3 20 19 17 13 19 25
No answer / 
Don’t know
  9.3 10 10 8 9 11 7
Average  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.6  2.1  2.7  2.4
7 See Corruption in Serbia (2001), CLDS, Belgrade
8 Where: 1 – very poor, 2 – poor, 5 – good
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With the aim of curbing corruption, the Government of the Republic 
of Serbia established the Anti-Corruption Council. Table 18 shows how 
it is assessed by business entities.
It appears that, in the opinion of the entrepreneurs, the activities of 
the Council were, to put it mildly, controversial. The survey results 
showed that: first, almost one fifth (18%) of the entrepreneurs have 
never heard of it, let alone know what they do. Second, the mark which 
the entrepreneurs gave to the Council was bad – 2.4 on average. And, 
third, the Anti-Corruption got the worst mark – 2.1 on average – from 
the entrepreneurs from Belgrade, and a somewhat better mark from the 
entrepreneurs from Central Serbia – 2.7 on average. The marks given 
by the entrepreneurs from Vojvodina coincided with the average.
CONCLUSION
The main causes of corruption in the Serbian society are, in brief, the 
absence of the rule of law (inappropriate legislation; low level of compli-
ance with the law, selective application of the law, and similar), a still strong 
influence of the government, and, in particular, of political parties, on eco-
nomic developments; disruption of social values, namely the anomie and 
crises of moral values; large unemployment, poverty, and, to a certain 
extent, absence of visible prospects that have permeated the society.
The survey showed that the trust in many institutions of the society 
remained at the level from the five years before, or has even decreased 
in some cases. This reveals how high were the expectations and the dis-
illusionment of businesses and the general public with regard to the 
political changes initiated in the year 2000. One of the causes of this 
distrust was the excessive and unrealistic promises given by the people 
who were the opposition at the time and now are in power.
Moreover, the survey findings unambiguously show that corruption 
in Serbia has declined in the last five years. Not only one but, as we have 
seen, dozens of indicators show this. Namely, corruption has declined 
in almost all segments of Serbian society. When we compare mean val-
ues of the spread of corruption, as experienced by the entrepreneurs, 
they were lower in 2006, compared with 2001, between 15% and 30%, 
depending on the segment under review.
In the last five years, the greatest drop was noted in the corruption 
for the purposes of exercising a right. In contrast, the corruption aimed 
at the violation of the law, and the corruption aimed at the change of the 
law, have more or less stagnated. This primarily means that, due to the 
stricter sanctioning policy, petty corruption is subsiding. This, to a cer-
tain extent, further means that, in line with our initial thesis concerning 
three types of corruption, the principle of the rule of law is becoming 
more prominent, although not to any spectacular extent. 
101
IV  Anti-Corruption Public Policies 
INdIRECT FIghT AgAINST CORRUPTION 
The creation of a new legal framework is one of the most important 
transition steps. In essence, through a reform of the legal framework, its 
modernization and the introduction of new market institutions, the 
fight against corruption is also waged. More specifically, in Serbia, as in 
other transition countries, three processes have been evolving in paral-
lel with each other: 
• Deregulation and liberalization, aimed at ridding economic life of 
administration by the state, in order to open up opportunities and 
materialize prerequisites for the establishment of a market econo-
my; it implied, for instance, the elimination of a system of numer-
ous licenses and approvals for the conduct of business activities, 
followed by liberalization of relations in foreign trade, and rescis-
sion of various laws and bylaws enabling the state to manage eco-
nomic life. 
• Introduction and building of new institutions, typical of a market 
economy, for example, those which contribute to the building and 
regulation of the securities market, or to market regulation in the 
sectors that were previously reserved for the state (e.g. telecommu-
nications, energy), in those cases where the market does not func-
tion properly.
• A radical reform of existing institutions, which had to be trans-
formed into forms compatible with a market economy. 
Before the October change, Serbia nominally had many institutions 
of a standard market economy: there were laws on enterprises, protec-
tion of property, privatization, bankruptcy, exchanges, securities, for-
eign investment, taxes, anti-trust legislation, accountancy legislation 
and the like. 
There were also institutions which were formally the same as those in 
market economies – independent companies, the central bank and 
other banks, exchanges, duty-free zones, courts, arbitrations, chambers 
of commerce, trade unions, etc. Companies were, for the most part, 
freely established although there were certain barriers; there existed the 
freedom of possession and sale of assets; competition among economic 
actors was recognized. Still, the Serbian economic system was in no way 
a market economy in its standard sense despite all the above. As a rule, 
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laws were bad and often not implemented, and the state and politics 
assumed, in an informal and unlawful way, the role of an arbitrator 
who exerts a decisive influence on all economic flows. Likewise, the 
existing laws were just superficially aligned with the market economy 
principles. By reviewing the laws in detail (and in this case the devil 
really is in the detail), one could see a wish of the government to regu-
late, control and supervise. Of course, a consequence of widespread 
government intervention based on discretionary powers was highly 
prevalent corruption. 
A standstill in transition, followed by its reversal during the 1990s, 
left Serbia with the legacy of almost all negative mechanisms of the 
functioning of the economy in the previous period and with new ones 
that were added: dominance of inefficient social and state ownership; 
discrimination against the private sector; dominance of politics over 
the economy; transformation of companies into social welfare centers, 
which brings about laxity in financial discipline; abuse of the police and 
the judicial system, which only contributed to a general rise in the crime 
rate and corruption; reduction of the market to the goods market, while 
the markets for money, foreign exchange, capital and labor were semi-
legal, and their prices usually administratively set; bankruptcy legisla-
tion was not applied to major companies; accumulation of tax arrears 
was a commonplace; the administrative distribution of foreign exchange 
and loans from reserve money on privileged terms to favorites from 
business circles was a rule; the concept of a closed economy (import 
substitution) continued to prevail; financial relations were governed by 
debtors, rather than by creditors and the like. Those nominal market 
institutions were obviously not functioning. 
The situation regarding the economic legislation was very bad. There 
were several types of laws; most of them were badly drafted and struc-
tured, allowing overly free and incorrect interpretations by government 
agencies to the detriment of companies; likewise, most laws were delib-
erately restrictive, in order for government agencies to be able to exer-
cise discretion in going after law violators; numerous laws enabled indi-
viduals to get rich on the basis of monopolistic benefits of different 
kinds; the few decent laws were not applied, such as, for example, the 
bankruptcy law; laws were often substituted with government decrees, 
which was unconstitutional; by virtue of its decrees, the Serbian gov-
ernment often regulated the subject matter falling in the competence of 
the federal state; moreover, it sometimes acted as if there were a regula-
tion granting it the right to intervene, although that was not the case. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that lawlessness prevailed in Serbia; 
hence a chaos in economic life was an inevitable consequence. 
Practically no one abided by the laws, partially because they were non-
implementable and any insistence on their application would have 
brought economic life to a complete standstill, and partially because it 
was a way to show favor to individuals from the ruling regime at the 
expense of other actors. In such a way, a situation was created in which 
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nothing was certain, where the only motto was “Find the best way out 
of an unclear situation”. Taxes were not paid, contracts were not hon-
ored (debts were not paid), the state was used as an instrument for 
enrichment, many did not live by working and being entrepreneurial, 
but as parasites, at somebody else’s expense. Rather scarce resources 
were redirected from the productive ones to those unproductive, 
allegedly for the sake of social peace. Socially and state owned assets 
became the subject of epochal plunder. Such squandering and abuse 
of money was financed not only from current revenue, but also from 
the existing capital and new foreign borrowing, when a creditor could 
be found (predominantly Russia and China). The unavoidable conse-
quences of weak institutions included uncertainty of doing business, 
general mistrust, and squandering of scarce financial resources, which 
resulted in a deep economic crisis. Economic sanctions and wars only 
contributed strongly to it. 
In such a situation, when society at large and the state in general are 
systematically corrupt and when for every, even the smallest-scale eco-
nomic activity, one has to apply with a government agency to obtain a 
license or approval, practically every reform process toward liberaliza-
tion and deregulation of business operations can be considered to be, in 
a certain sense, an anti-corruption process. Likewise, a systematic fight 
against the gray economy can be deemed an anti-corruption activity, 
since the gray economy persists owing to, inter alia, a high level of cor-
ruption among those who are “fighting it on the ground” (inspection 
services, police, customs agencies, etc). 
Generally speaking, both Serbian governments of the post-Milošević 
era can be assessed as governments that pursued relatively liberal eco-
nomic policies, despite their frequent populist and protectionist rheto-
ric. Naturally, there were individual inadequate solutions, whose objec-
tive was to isolate certain social groups from transition (e.g. the Labor 
Law adopted by the second government), but in a broader sense reforms 
can be characterized as pro-market, as reforms which contract the room 
for corruption by reducing the influence of the state. 
Foreign Trade 
A policy aimed at protecting domestic producers (protectionism) con-
stitutes a very strong source of corruption, and certainly the strongest 
source of demand for corruption of customs officers and all other par-
ticipants in foreign trade transactions. Protectionist policy implies high 
customs protection, as well as the existence of widespread quantitative 
barriers to imports (licenses or quotas). Furthermore, hidden non-tariff 
barriers to imports, such as restrictive technical standards, require-
ments related to homologation, and extensive phytosanitary and veteri-
nary protection in the case of agricultural produce and foodstuffs 
should also be counted as protectionism. Such policy necessarily gener-
ates considerable demand for corruption. 
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Specifically, the higher the tariff rate levied on an imported good, i.e., 
the more difficult it is to import a good, the stronger the incentive to an 
importer to avoid the payment of customs duties or to reduce their 
amount by bribing a customs officer. If, for instance, a tariff rate 
amounts to 40%, and a shipment is worth EUR 1,000,000, in principle, 
it pays the importer to pay for the exemption of customs duties, in the 
form of corruption, any amount lower than EUR 400,000, since he will 
thus appropriate rents. If the tariff rate goes up to 50%, the mentioned 
amount of potential corruption, i.e., of potential demand for corrup-
tion, goes up to 500,000. And an increase in that amount also increases 
the number of customs officers willing to offer the service of corrup-
tion. The equilibrium amount of corruption goes up, both in terms of 
the volume of transactions performed, and in terms of the total amount 
of bribes. Naturally, a cut in the tariff rate creates an opposite effect. If, 
for instance, the tariff rate is 1%, there will probably be no demand for 
corruption. 
All the above also applies to non-tariff barriers to imports; further-
more, they by their very nature open even more room for corruption. A 
regime of import licenses for a particular good inevitably leads to a drop 
in, i.e., the restriction on the total imports of the observed good. It 
means that only importers with licenses specifying the quantity of 
imports allowed per single transaction may import the permitted quan-
tity of a good. Since such licenses result in restricted imports, total sup-
ply is artificially (administratively) brought down (supply is lower than 
the supply that would be a result of equilibrium on the free market), 
which provides an opportunity for importers who hold licenses to gen-
erate rents. 
Issuance of import licenses generally does not fall among the tasks 
of the customs administration, but what falls among them is check-
ing, during the customs clearance procedure, whether the importer 
has a proper license for importation of the good in the shipment (in 
the envisaged quantity). If the importer has not managed to obtain an 
import license from the competent ministry (regardless of the man-
ner in which such license is obtained – legally or by bribing civil ser-
vants in the ministry in charge of foreign trade), the problem can be 
resolved in a very simple way: by bribing a customs officer, who will 
not determine the actual situation then, but rather let the shipment 
enter the country, despite the fact that there is no import license in 
the documentation. The same findings also apply, more or less, to 
quotas and technical standards. If the importer has failed to obtain 
such a license, the only remaining option for him is to nevertheless, 
and in contravention of the applicable regulations, import goods by 
bribing the customs officer. 
Of course, the higher the non-tariff barriers to imports, that is, the 
more restrictive the licensing and quota allocation policies, the higher 
the potential rents which importers could appropriate, hence the 
higher the demand for corruption, i.e., the amount of the bribe they 
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are willing to offer either for the grant of the license or for illegal entry 
of the shipment. 
Yet another case of a complicated procedure which boosts corrup-
tion is the one related to the existence of a large number of different 
tariff rates applied to similar goods (tariff numbers). Under such condi-
tions, there is a very strong incentive to corruptors to have the goods 
they are importing misclassified, by bribing customs officers, into 
(incorrect) tariff numbers with much lower levels of tariff rates, i.e., 
customs duties. Complicated and non-transparent decision-making 
procedures and/or conduct of business of the customs agency inevita-
bly leave broad discretionary powers to customs officers, which then 
sets the stage for their corruption, because they can facilitate a favorable 
outcome for the importer who is willing to bribe them through their 
biased discretionary decisions. 
In four years of transition, Serbia has gone through four stages of 
foreign trade liberalization: (i) initial liberalization of foreign trade in 
2000 and 2001; (ii) further, unwillingly pursued, liberalization with a 
view to achieving harmonization with Montenegro; (iii) a reversal of 
measures adopted during the period of harmonization with 
Montenegro, insistence on non-tariff protection mechanisms with a 
view to reducing a rising trade deficit and an ever louder rhetoric 
about the need for protection against uncontrolled imports, with con-
current processes of (iv) applying for membership of the World Trade 
Organization, signing numerous bilateral agreements on free trade 
with neighboring countries (which subsequently evolved into CEFTA), 
and launching the EU Stabilization and Association Process, which 
was subsequently suspended. 
The basic objective of the initial liberalization in 2000 and 2001 was 
to eliminate all non-tariff barriers (quotas, licenses), to reduce the 
spread of tariff rates (the number of tariff rates was reduced to a mere 6, 
ranging from 1 to 30 percent), and to simplify the overall foreign trade 
system as much as possible. It can be assessed that this first stage had a 
strong anti-corruption feature. Amendments to the Foreign Trade Law 
of December 2000 have eliminated a large number of administrative 
barriers to trade by removing numerous unnecessary controls, includ-
ing a minimum value of fixed assets of a company, the annual fee for 
the registration of trading companies in the amount of DM 1,000 and 
the obligation to report each foreign trade transaction and pay a tax on 
import/export transactions to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations, etc. 
Further liberalization of Serbia’s foreign trade regime was initiated in 
2003 by the Action Plan for Harmonization of the Economic Systems of 
Serbia and Montenegro. Through the harmonization process, the aver-
age level of tariff rates in Serbia was somewhat reduced, thus bringing 
the average tariff rate in Serbia closer to the average in other transition 
economies. The adopted liberalization measures were met with a great 
amount of odium, even from economic policy makers themselves. 
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Hence, with the coming into power of a new government, the reversal 
of all the measures adopted in 2003 had been immediately announced, 
to be actually materialized after the adoption of the twin-track approach 
in the negotiations between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro on the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement in October 2004. Part of the 
standstill in liberalization is certainly a consequence of lobbyist pres-
sures from some domestic producers whose efficiency is so low that 
they cannot successfully face the competition from abroad; however, 
the fact that such practice is also accepted by newly arrived foreign 
investors should not come as a surprise. 
In parallel with the strengthening of protectionism and an announce-
ment of the non-tariff protective measures introduction, Serbia has 
continued to negotiate the membership of the WTO, make use of pref-
erential treatment in trade with EU countries and expand free trade 
with countries of the Western Balkans. 
 Integration into the world economy is a key to Serbia’s further eco-
nomic growth, which will inevitably lead to further systematic lowering 
of the degree of protection. Essentially, it is in line with the trend of 
attracting foreign direct investments, which certainly do not need mea-
sures intended for “nascent industries”, although they will not hesitate 
to take advantage of them if they exist. Therefore, it is in the interest of 
Serbia to make its policy and pace of opening exogenous, meaning 
independent of future parliamentary elections, future ministers and, 
most importantly, independent of the influences of lobbyist groups, 
which have so far not only hindered attempts at liberalization, but also 
systematically reversed it. In that manner, a possibility is opened up to, 
for instance, finally lift the monopoly on oil imports. It was introduced 
way back at the beginning of transition, but its lifting is still uncertain, 
despite dozens of announcements to that effect. 
One of the areas that have remained largely non-reformed is the area 
of qualitative import restrictions, such as sanitary and veterinarian 
restrictions. Under the Food Safety Strategy, this area is regulated by 14 
laws, 62 rulebooks, 4 decisions, 3 orders, 1 decree and 2 sets of instruc-
tions. Serbia continues to apply a very restrictive regime of food imports, 
which is reflected in the fact that all imports are tested on several differ-
ent grounds, which significantly increases the costs of imports, thus 
introducing possibilities for corruption. 
Public Finances 
It is only natural that public finances, on both the revenue and the 
expenditure sides, are one of the main generators of corruption – 
administrative and political alike. Tax policy – which taxes will be lev-
ied, in which amount and manner – has far-reaching consequences 
for corruption. As in the case of customs, demand for corruption pre-
dominantly depends on the level of taxes. However, other factors, 
such as the type of the tax, the methods for determining the tax base 
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and for identifying taxpayers, can each also contribute to the expan-
sion or contraction of the room for corruption. In addition to cor-
ruption, unsound tax policy also results in the emergence of the gray 
economy, which, in turn, spurs new corruption and creates a power-
ful interest group of people whose interest tax reform would not serve. 
Likewise, on the expenditure side, the spending of public monies 
opens up possibilities for corruption. A good and efficient Public 
Procurement Law is one of the main anti-corruption mechanisms 
here, but definitely not entirely sufficient. From the viewpoint of 
reduction in corruption, it is necessary for the system of public financ-
es to be sound, simple and transparent. 
The soundness implies the keeping of the tax rates at a relatively low 
level, comparable with the countries in the region, for the purpose of 
preventing smuggling and the gray economy, as well as the refraining 
from providing tax incentives which, according to the idea of economic 
policymakers, stimulate taxpayers to act in a desired manner instead of 
allowing market criteria to influence their behavior. The soundness also 
implies restraint with respect to the proportions of redistribution that is 
in the domain of public expenditure policy. It further requires a careful 
choice of target groups that will be granted subsidies and/or transfers. 
The reasons are the same as in the case of tax policy. The minimization 
of the influence on decisions by individuals, who, against this backdrop, 
can direct their efforts toward creating conditions to be granted subsi-
dies, instead toward productive economic activities through which they 
will earn their income by themselves. Likewise, the existence of unclear 
procedures for access to subsidies strongly boosts corruption. 
The simplicity implies that it is necessary to incur certain costs for 
every type of revenue, including tax revenue. In the case of tax collec-
tion, there are direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are those incurred 
due to the existence and work of the tax administration, while indirect 
ones are those borne by the taxpayers in the discharge of their tax duties, 
which are transaction costs in their economic essence. The simplicity of 
the tax system minimizes both direct and indirect costs and increases 
net tax revenue. Similarly, a simple system of public finances implies 
reduced possibilities for discretionary decisions and generally less con-
tact between the state and the economy. 
The transparency is primarily related to public expenditure policies 
and its requirement is that taxpayers are, at least in general terms, famil-
iar with the purpose and use of taxes that they have paid. In other words, 
the general public must be familiar with public expenditure policy, if 
only with its global indicators, while the budget process should be car-
ried out through familiar and clear procedures and in defined time lim-
its. Once an annual budget is adopted, discretion in the use of public 
revenue must be minimal. 
Serbia embarked upon the transformation of its public finances 
with a largely destroyed and non-transparent budget system and prac-
tically non-existent public revenue and expenditure policies. More 
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than 40% of public revenue was flowing into numerous extra-budget-
ary funds which were financed by more than twenty different ear-
marked levies. By way of example, in 1998, 1999 and 2000 tax revenue 
(consumption taxes, taxes on corporate income, personal income and 
property) accounted for a mere third of total public revenue, while 
around 14% of public revenue was collected from various fees and 
dues. New public dues were introduced on the strength of by-laws, 
and in tax laws multiple tax rates and sectoral tax policies were a rule. 
The responsibility for assessing, collecting, and controlling public 
revenue rested with three mutually totally uncoordinated institutions 
– the Republic Public Revenue Administration (Serbian abbreviation 
RUJP), the Financial Police (FP) and the Payment and Settlement 
Bureau (Serbian abbreviation ZOP). Tax discipline was almost non-
existent, while selective and biased write-offs of tax liabilities, and off-
sets, which accounted for as much as 25% of the central budget reve-
nue, were a standard practice. The role of the Ministry of Finance in 
the budget execution ended at the point of transferring the money 
into the accounts of budget beneficiaries. Individual budget benefi-
ciaries managed the transferred budget funds independently, or 
deposited them with banks as “savings”. This is how an absurd situa-
tion was made possible, with the central budget running a deficit, 
while budget beneficiaries ran surpluses in banks. 
Of course, the lack of transparency in collecting and spending public 
monies was one of the main sources of corruption in Serbia, and irreg-
ularity and unreliability of budget payments, arrears and defaults on 
liabilities were a logical outcome of such a situation in Serbia’s public 
finances. 
When the features of the inherited condition of Serbia’s public 
finances, as well as of the present condition, are compared with the 
mentioned virtues, i.e., principles of good public finances, huge prog-
ress made in the past six years of transition becomes obvious. An indu-
bitable success is the consolidation and stabilization of the revenue side 
of the public finances and the introduction of the Treasury. A big step 
was also made in the setting up of a system of public finances which 
would have the above described virtues. However, there is still a lot to 
be done, particularly on the expenditure side. 
In comparison with the initial situation regarding the criterion of 
soundness, it could be noted that public finance policy has made tre-
mendous progress, particularly concerning the issue of consumption 
taxes. For the most part, the introduction of the VAT has brought the 
system to the level of other European countries. 
A similar remark can also be made vis-à-vis excise policy, although 
from the standpoint of corruption the situation is somewhat more 
complex here. The first problem is a relatively high level of excises on 
cigarettes (high in relation to the selling price, not in relation to their 
levels in the region). The high share of excises in the selling price cre-
ates strong incentives to smuggling and corruption, primarily in the 
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customs service. However, bearing in mind that the level of excises 
will be increased in the future, the only reasonable policy is to fight 
customs corruption and to establish better cooperation with customs 
services of the countries in the region. A separate problem (from the 
standpoint of corruption) will be posed by the lifting of a ban on the 
importation of petroleum products. Although this measure cannot be 
assessed as good from the standpoint of efficiency, the impression is, 
nevertheless, that corruption, although not reduced, has been at least 
centralized. Since tax policy of the previous period has obviously 
opted for taxation of consumption as the main source of income, low 
tax rates of the corporate income tax and the personal income tax are 
a good choice from the standpoint of the soundness principle. The 
greatest challenge in this domain is to continue with the consistent 
implementation of this law, fully depoliticize the Tax Administration 
and build IT and other capacities of this institution, which is the most 
important executive institution in every state. 
The greatest success from the standpoint of transparency is the adop-
tion and implementation of a law governing the budget system. The 
implementation of this law has established a clear budget procedure 
that is uniform for all levels of government, and made daily data on 
types of expenditure and beneficiaries of the central budget available. 
What remains to be done is to do the same in every local self-govern-
ment unit, and to achieve the ultimate objective of the setting up of the 
treasury – automatic payments on behalf of budget beneficiaries, which, 
after the budget has been adopted, should have no discretionary powers 
in the payment process as such. 
A large area which will constitute one of the toughest challenges in 
the further transformation of Serbia’s public finances is the area of local 
public finances, where the domain of revenue is yet to be comprehen-
sively regulated. Likewise, a lot still needs to be done to increase the 
simplicity of the tax system, in which there still is more than a hundred 
different fiscal instruments and even many more individual fiscal forms 
administered by the Tax Administration. 
Finally, a real reform of public expenditure policy is yet to be under-
taken. It implies, above all, a complete discontinuation of the provision 
of subsidies to companies, a reform of the social security system and a 
true restructuring of public companies. In a word, measures that can 
hardly be considered popular, which is, after all, the exact reason why 
they have been constantly put off. And just as public finance policy of 
the previous period successfully consolidated the revenue side, and in 
that manner enabled the regular execution of the expenditure side of 
the budget, thus cushioning a considerable part of the problems created 
because of the pursuance of structural policies in transition, in that 
same manner the acceleration of privatization, the implementation of 
the bankruptcy law and other structural policies have to enable public 
finances to reduce the pressure put by public spending on the economy 
and overall macroeconomic stability. 
110 Corruption in Serbia Five Years Later
Public Procurement 
The field of public procurement is certainly one of the areas particu-
larly prone to corruption. Since in such cases civil servants and politi-
cians are deciding on transfers of public funds to private individuals, it 
is clear that there exists a mutual interest to avoid taking a decision, 
which would be in the public interest. Therefore, the public procure-
ment procedure is very complicated in most democratic countries, and 
the same case is in our country. Moreover, when political criteria are 
introduced into an already complicated situation, like, for instance, a 
provision on advantage given to domestic tenderers, the situation 
becomes even more difficult, and the same goes for the fight against 
corruption. 
• In principle, there are several possibilities for corruption in public 
procurement transactions: 
• In establishing whether something will be purchased or not; 
• In specifying the goods/services needed; 
• In determining weights for assessing tenders; 
• In scoring (tender assessment); 
• In the complaint procedure. 
The first possibility is essentially related to the appropriateness of a 
procurement transaction. In situations where there is a small number 
of potential tenderers, the very decision to purchase something can 
have certain monetary value (e.g. a purchase of operational systems for 
PCs). The second possibility for corruption opens up at the point when 
a specification of a good/service to be purchased is defined. Potentially, 
it is possible to eliminate competition by making a specification. For 
instance, by setting a requirement according to which the product must 
meet a certain standard, while it is already well-known that there is only 
one tenderer, or a very limited number of them, who can meet that 
standard. Corruption can also occur in determining weights for differ-
ent aspects of a tender. If, for example, there are one high quality but 
expensive and one low-quality but cheap product, it is possible to reject 
one of these products in advance through the selection of weights for 
the price and quality. 
As for the scoring, points are often assigned to quality aspects; hence 
it involves a subjective assessment. A subjective assessment, of course, 
can lead to corruption. Complaint procedures also open up possibilities 
for corruption. 
The purpose of a contemporary public procurement law is to narrow 
the room for corruption in some of these aspects. For example, the 
Public Procurement Law can have just a limited effect on the first of the 
mentioned cases (a decision on whether to purchase something). 
Naturally, the public authorities and public services have absolutely free 
rein in taking such decisions, and the only limitation is posed by the 
availability of funds (Article 24, paragraph 1). The thing where the Law 
could be of help, but for the time being it is not, is the consolidation of 
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procurement transactions by different bodies for purchases of the same 
good/service, as well as the separation of decision-making processes in 
deciding whether to purchase something or not, and from whom to 
purchase it. When it comes to the drawing up of a specification for a 
purchase, every public procurement law, including ours, is also rela-
tively helpless. Since the procurement transactions in question are often 
very complex and require certain technical knowledge, a public author-
ity has fairly free rein in specifying requirements (Articles 27, 36). 
The situation with the choice of weights is similar (Articles 54, 55). In 
scoring, the situation is even more complex. Namely, if it involves an 
essentially subjective assessment (such as an assessment of the profes-
sional competence of tenderers, for instance), it is very difficult to pre-
scribe the scoring method in a law. On the other hand, in the case of an 
objectively defined criterion, the situation is very simple and it is diffi-
cult to change the decision by means of corruption. Therefore, each 
decision on public procurement should be based as much as possible 
on the price and other objective criteria. 
Lodging a complaint opens up additional possibilities for corruption. 
Since the procedure for filing a request for the protection of rights has 
suspensive effect on a public procurement contract, and since the insti-
tution of such a procedure is often very cheap (40,000 dinars, which is a 
small amount in the case of large procurement transactions), unsuc-
cessful tenderers institute a procedure for the protection of rights in 
each and every situation, thus often slowing down the whole procedure 
significantly. The decision-making on the validity of such requests can 
create demand for corruption. 
There is another dilemma related to the Public Procurement Law: 
should those companies which are state-owned, but operate on the 
market, be subject to this Law. Under the presently applicable law, the 
answer is that Article 3, paragraph 1, item g), prescribes that if the pub-
lic authorities or public enterprises exert a strong influence on business 
decisions, financing and operations of an enterprise, such enterprise is 
subject to the Public Procurement Law. Since that constitutes a signifi-
cant drawback in doing business (additional costs, public announce-
ments of all procurement transactions, on the basis of which the com-
petition can figure out financial plans), competition has a strong incen-
tive to hinder and stall public procurement in state-owned companies. 
Two examples of companies that are subject to the Public Procurement 
Law, whereas their competitors are not for the most part, include 
Galenika and Telekom (at least its mobile telephony part). Another 
interesting fact is that, despite a lot of speculation that considerable 
resources were channeled from Mobtel into the accounts of legal and 
natural persons connected with the family that managed the company, 
the question of why Mobtel was not subject to the Public Procurement 
Law was never raised, although it was clear that the state had strong 
participation in the management board of the company and that Mobtel 
could have been subject to the mentioned Article of the Law. 
112 Corruption in Serbia Five Years Later
From the standpoint of the fight against corruption, at first glance it 
is obvious that such companies do not have to be overly concerned 
about their cost management and that conduct of business in confor-
mity with the Public Procurement Law constitutes a barrier to corrup-
tion. However, if one takes a better look, a possibility is opened for the 
competition to obstruct the whole process. It is absolutely clear that the 
first best solution in terms of an anti-corruption strategy for such cases 
is the privatization of these companies. 
Although the fight against corruption is “permeating” the entire Law, 
corruption is directly mentioned only in Article 17, which sets out that 
“A procuring entity shall reject a tender if there is a verifiable evidence 
that a tenderer has given or promised to a current or former employee 
of a procuring entity a gift in money or in a non-monetary form, or that 
the tenderer offered employment or any other benefit, an object or a 
service that may be expressed in terms of money, in an attempt to influ-
ence an action, decision making or the further course of the public pro-
curement procedure.” 
From this Article, it is obvious that it applies only to the case when 
the tenderer has offered a bribe, but not to the situation where the 
tenderer’s competitor has offered a bribe in order to prevent or post-
pone a purchase. 
However, as with any other law, the most important thing is the 
implementation. Two new bodies have been set up on the strength of 
the Law, the Public Procurement Office and the Commission for the 
Protection of the Tenderers’ Rights. The question of how the Public 
Procurement Law is implemented can be best answered by providing 
the following figures: in 2005 there were 80,000 tenderers, 12,000 pro-
curing entities and 250,000 contracts. The number of employees in the 
Public Procurement Office is about 25 and it is completely clear that 
the Office cannot, and should not, deal with this problem on its own. 
The fact that the Supreme Audit Institution has not yet been established 
further aggravates this whole situation. 
Still, although the Law is not implemented in the most efficient way, 
primarily as a result of ignorance and disinterest on the part of procure-
ment officers in charge of these transactions in procuring entities, an 
assessment has to be made that the present situation, from the stand-
point of corruption, is much better than the one that prevailed prior to 
the entry into force of the Law. Of course, the procedure is complex and 
bound to make the job of civil servants more difficult, but that in fact 
was the essential idea behind the introduction of this Law. 
In the previous period several scandals were associated with viola-
tions of the Public Procurement Law, which was also expected. The 
situation is similar in other democratic countries, too. Whenever the 
government is spending money, possibilities for corruption arise. The 
objective of this Law is to prescribe which actions are illegal, and it is 
the job of the police, courts and prosecutorial services to identify and 
punish the perpetrators. The Public Procurement Law cannot be blamed 
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for the fact that judicial proceedings have not yet been concluded; the 
blame is on the institutions in charge of enforcing the Law. 
It is true, though, that scandals were often ignited without any solid 
evidence for them. That was the point when the PR teams of companies 
that lost in tenders took over and tried to exert pressure through the 
media and the general public for the repetition of tenders. Naturally, it 
is difficult to assess when they were right, and when they were wrong. 
An additional problem is posed by the fact that a large number of 
public procurement transactions in the fields of defense and internal 
affairs have remained “confidential”, so one could assume that cor-
ruption in these fields is quite prevalent, and at least three scandals 
from the mentioned fields corroborate the thesis that there is some-
thing wrong (the scandals “Mile Dragić”, “Satellite” and the procure-
ment of equipment for the Ministry of the Interior from a company 
in which the then Interior Minister, Dušan Mihajlović, had a business 
interest). Such a situation produced a kind of transparency which can, 
as it seems, pose a threat to some other state interests – for example, 
in the revised 2006 budget (the part related to the National Investment 
Plan) anyone can see that the army is planning to have five MiG-29s, 
two attack helicopters Mi-24, and a number of transport planes and 
helicopters overhauled. 
The recommendations ensuing from the above analysis can be out-
lined as follows: 
• to privatize public enterprises and other parastatals that operate 
on the market as soon as possible; 
• to consolidate public procurement transactions (e.g. to purchase 
goods for social welfare centers in a centralized manner, rather 
than have each center making its own purchases); 
• to set up the Supreme Audit Institution as soon as possible, so that 
it can evaluate and revise both the procedure for and appropriate-
ness of public procurement transactions; 
• to set aside the provision on favoring domestic tenderers, since the 
procedure for establishing domestic origin creates many opportu-
nities for corruption; 
• to introduce provisions on the prevention of the conflict of inter-
est covering all the members of all tender committees which assess 
tenders; 
• to strengthen the stage of contract performance control, with a 
view to making subsequent alterations of the contract more diffi-
cult. 
Subsidies 
The period from 2000 to date can be characterized as a period in 
which the state has declaratively undertaken to provide care to all – 
the unemployed, the employed, persons with an “unresolved housing 
issue”, the young, the elderly, the sick, entrepreneurs, businessmen 
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and others. Without getting into ideological debates here about 
whether the state should and can pursue such a policy, we primarily 
want to analyze the mechanisms by which the state has been trying to 
solve those problems. 
One of the most frequent mechanisms used in the previous period 
are subsidies. Thus, the state has started to co-finance entrepreneurs 
through the Development Fund, farmers through the Ministry of 
Agriculture, people who own no apartment through the National 
Mortgage Insurance Corporation, subsidies were granted for business 
startups through the National Employment Service, and guarantees 
through the Guarantee Fund. 
In principle, the state should not be engaged in these activities. Even 
if there was some kind of need for that in the first years of transition 
due to an underdeveloped financial market, the financial system could 
have assumed the financing role in full as soon as after the first 2-3 years 
of transition. However, seemingly paradoxical, with the development 
and strengthening of the banking system, the role of the state in financ-
ing all kinds of things was growing. The most recent parliamentary elec-
tion (2007) produced a promise that tens or hundreds of millions of 
euros would be spent for “start-up” loans, as well as for the payment of 
subsidies to companies which hired a sizeable number of workers. 
Some of these mechanisms are more prone to corruption, some are 
less. It seems that automatic payment of subsidies per new employee 
does not create many opportunities for corruption, since these are more 
or less objectively measurable things. However, “start-up” loans are, 
practically by definition, a possible hotbed of corruption. The state 
plans to allocate large sums of money to entrepreneurs-beginners and 
to assume all the risks of their business operations. The money is sup-
posed to be granted on the basis of a competition, in which a commit-
tee should go over business plans and perform the role of the market – 
deciding on which ideas for business are good and which are not. 
Likewise, loans that are approved by the Development Fund of 
the Republic of Serbia open excellent possibilities for corruption, 
admittedly not as excellent as in the case of grants, because the 
amount of the subsidy is just a difference between the interest rate 
charged by the Fund and the market-based interest rate, not the 
entire amount of the loan. Still, entrepreneurs are nevertheless able 
to obtain nominally significant amounts on very favorable terms, 
particularly if they come from distinctly underdeveloped regions. 
There are various corruption mechanisms, from direct payments to 
decision makers, to payments made to the employees of the Fund 
for the “preparation of a business plan”, to the party influence on 
the members of the Management Board. 
As mentioned above, the only way to solve the problem of corrup-
tion in granting subsidies is the elimination of subsidies. If the state has 
extra funds, be they from privatization or from some other source, the 
first best solution is foreign debt repayment or tax cuts. Subsidies are an 
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inferior solution from almost every aspect, particularly from the stand-
point of corruption, that is, the fight against corruption. 
Privatization 
Socially and state owned property has “proven itself” as extremely inef-
ficient and very prone to corruption. Simply, under the conditions in 
which the general manager is not held accountable to anyone for the 
operation of his company, one can reasonably expect him to be willing 
to put personal interests before the interest of the company and to pur-
chase materials at higher prices, for instance, while selling the product 
of his firm at prices lower than the market ones – of course, provided 
that he was given a bribe. The situation is additionally aggravated in a 
mixed situation, when both privately owned and socially/state owned 
firms operate on the market. There is no doubt that all-out and uncon-
ditional privatization is the only cure. 
The first democratic government of Serbia chose a modified model 
of standard sales of companies. The distribution of socially and/or state 
owned capital to all citizens through vouchers was a popular option in 
East Europe in the mid-1990s, after the fast privatizations in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. However, subsequent developments were not 
all that successful: it turned out that investment funds, in which most of 
the vouchers, that is, shares were put, did not function in the intended 
manner, and therefore corporate governance of privatized companies 
was not successful either. Serbia had an even worse experience, since 
huge discounts and gifts in Serbia resulted in workers’ shareholding, 
which is an economically very inferior type of corporate governance. 
In other words, the method for the sale of socially and state owned 
capital was chosen with the idea to try and find the right buyers, mean-
ing those who will make the most out of the companies undergoing 
privatization (economic resources). For, the standard logic in econom-
ic science is that the one who is paying knows why he is paying that 
particular amount and that the one who has paid the highest price is 
probably the best in managing these resources. However, the sale as a 
method of privatization also has one principled weakness: it is slower 
than voucher systems, since it implies the preparation of each individu-
al company, and that is, particularly in the situation of limited resourc-
es in the public administration, a fairly time-consuming process. 
Once the concept of the sale has been chosen, then the next step – the 
sale to majority, strategic investors – comes quite easy. Namely, the 
alternative is to sell shares through public offerings, which usually 
results in dispersed ownership and weaker corporative governance. In 
selecting the privatization model, the government rightfully attached 
great importance to corporative governance in the post-privatization 
period, so it opted for the sale of the majority stake (70%) of socially/
state owned capital to one investor. This has made possible the assump-
tion of full control of the company undergoing privatization by one 
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majority owner, who can thus run the company in his own interest 
without any particular complications. The idea behind it is to facilitate, 
i.e., make more efficient a very complex process of enterprise restruc-
turing in the post-privatization period. 
The experience of not only transition, but also developed countries 
shows that the principal-agent problem is always very painful and that 
there simply is no easy remedy. The problem of imposing restraints on 
the management or the owner having only a relative majority owner-
ship of the company in order to prevent selfish illegal steps, at the 
expense of minority shareholders, is particularly complex in transition 
countries, where the necessary institutions (the judiciary, registries, the 
stock exchange, etc.) are still in the making. In such countries, the reli-
ance on the majority owner is better, since it removes at least part of the 
principal-agent problem – the one arising from dispersed ownership. 
As for corruption, one has to admit that the proposed and adopted 
sale mechanism is rather sensitive to corruption. Namely, the distribu-
tion of shares, be it to the employees or to all citizens, from the view-
point of corruption, seems to be a better model at first sight. And, in the 
short run, that conclusion is correct. However, the experience of East 
European countries, and that of Serbia as well, has demonstrated that, 
in the long run, such a conclusion is very far from being true. Against 
the backdrop of a non-existent or maybe nascent financial market, the 
wide-spread lack of understanding of its role and the manner in which 
it should function, free distribution of shares constitutes a prelude to 
all-out plunder and asset stripping. Consequently, even in the sense of 
corruption, a properly implemented sale mechanism is superior to its 
alternatives. 
Taking into consideration the fears that the process would be bur-
dened with corruption allegations, the Law on Privatization provided 
for two sale methods, both competitive: auctions for smaller and weak-
er companies and tenders for larger and better ones, intended for for-
eign investors. The principle is to sell 70% of non-privatized equity 
(while the remainder of 30% is distributed free of charge, as mentioned 
above, to the employees and citizens). It is praiseworthy that the direct 
agreement between the government and the buyer is not mentioned as 
a sale method, as it is, although theoretically convenient and seemingly 
necessary for bad companies for which there is no demand, neverthe-
less overly risky from the standpoint of the government, since it facili-
tates – or rather encourages corruption. In such bad companies, one 
will opt either for organized restructuring or for bankruptcy. The exclu-
sive use of competitive methods of sale was supposed to ensure maxi-
mum transparency of the process, i.e., prevent corruption and other 
underhand dealings aimed at influencing the outcome of a privatiza-
tion transaction. That is to say, once a public and regulated competi-
tion among interested parties is secured under the rules that have been 
set in advance, then it is really difficult to organize a scam and ensure an 
unfair advantage for someone. 
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The orientation of the privatization model regarding the payment for 
the purchased company is toward cash, immediately after the signing of 
the contract at that. Still, certain flexibility is permitted. It refers first to 
frozen foreign currency deposits, whose matured bonds are equivalent 
to money, while the non-matured ones are also accepted, if there were 
no buyers for cash or for matured bonds. Second, it refers to time lim-
its: the possibility is also set down for individuals (natural persons) to 
pay for equity bought in auctions in six annual installments. This was 
intended to encourage domestic buyers, since they did not have to make 
the payment for the purchased company immediately; instead, they 
could make payments over time, out of the company’s profits. Yet, this 
is a risky arrangement, as demonstrated by the experience with several 
cases, because it enables unconscientious buyers to take over a company 
without a penny of their own money, strip all the assets very quickly 
and then leave it to the government to take care of it. There was a time 
when the centralized character of both the sale of equity and the entire 
privatization process (everything is done by the Privatization Agency) 
was heavily criticized. Still, it is questionable whether that criticism is 
justified. On the one hand, a strong role of the Agency has enabled sig-
nificant professionalization of the privatization process, which would 
be difficult to achieve in some decentralized form. On the other hand, 
the distribution of privatization proceeds cannot be called centralized 
by any standard, because these proceeds are also distributed to local 
communities, to Vojvodina, to the Employee Pension Fund and to the 
Denationalization Fund. 
It is interesting (and probably bad, too) that neither the Law on 
Privatization, nor the government Decree on Tenders lay down the cri-
teria for selecting the winner of a competition. In that manner, it was 
left to the Privatization Agency to set the criteria on a case-by-case basis. 
The practice so far has shown that the Agency used three criteria for 
tenders: the offered price and the amounts of investment and social 
programs. The price is by all means an indisputable criterion, but the 
question is whether the amounts of the planned investment and the 
social program should be used as criteria. In strictly economic terms, 
the seller, which is the government in this case, should not be interested 
in anything else but the price. And just how much the new owner plans 
to invest in the company is entirely his matter, because he is the only 
one who will enjoy the benefits. A special problem, as demonstrated by 
the experience of transition countries, poses the inability of the state to 
subsequently “punish” the buyer who did not abide by the provision of 
the contract on the investment program. Serbia tried to solve this prob-
lem by being tough: first, a bank guarantee is requested and, second, 
there is a threat of the annulment of privatization contracts without 
any reimbursement. The latter will maybe increase the degree of com-
pliance with the assumed obligations, but it will also increase the risk 
of the deal for the buyer, thus reducing the attractiveness of Serbian 
privatization to potential investors. Simply, if more obligations 
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(encumbrances) are shifted to the buyer, the price he is willing to offer 
will be commensurately lower. This is particularly true in the case of the 
social program, which for the buyers constitutes a cost equal to the price 
of the company, so they calculate it accordingly; in other words, the 
more expensive the social program, the lower the offered price. The 
government finally understood that, so in 2003 it removed the obliga-
tion to guarantee employment in the next 3-5 years in the case of ten-
ders, and in the next year in the case of auctions, taking social programs 
upon itself, in a reasonable expectation that proceeds from sales would 
be higher. After taking a closer look, it is clear that both criteria are 
redundant, and they were used mostly for the reasons of political mar-
keting: to show that both the development and the employed are of 
concern to the government. Likewise, the use of several criteria opens 
up possibilities for corruption, particularly in the subsequent evalua-
tion of whether the investment program was implemented or not. The 
obligation to invest is often fulfilled by contributing material objects to 
the company, whose value has to be appraised by someone. 
In 2005, three important amendments to the law were made. First, 
the Agency was given the right to autonomously and very easily cancel 
contracts with buyers, in case they fail to comply with the provisions of 
the contract. Maybe judicial proceedings were slow previously, but this 
effort to gain in speed and efficiency has resulted in overly broad pow-
ers for one interested party, at the expense of the protection of the rights 
of the other contracting party. Second, in an effort to make unattractive 
companies more attractive, the lawmaker has provided for conditional 
write-offs of government claims on companies undergoing privatiza-
tion – with a view to making their value positive and selling them – and 
for the settlement of the claims of public creditors (the budget, utility 
companies, state owned banks, etc.) from privatization proceeds, to the 
extent possible. It is not a bad move, but it will result in a success only 
in those firms where the configuration is such that these conditional 
write-offs turn their negative value into positive. Those firms which 
already have a positive value do not need such write-offs, and they are 
of no help to those firms whose value is very negative. Third, general 
managers are prevented from precluding the quotation of their compa-
nies’ shares by simply refusing to sign the prospectus. 
However, the biggest problems associated with corruption over the 
past 6 years did not exist in the privatization of socially owned com-
panies, but in the ownership concentration in companies that had 
been privatized in the previous period. The market for corporate con-
trol (the takeover market) was activated in October 2003, against the 
backdrop of a low level of protection for minority shareholders, which 
had been codified in the Enterprise Law. The second important fact: 
the regulation of the process of company takeovers in the Law on the 
Securities Market was provisional and markedly discriminatory in 
favor of the acquirer. This is exactly why the expected distortions of 
this market occurred. Public scandals, discredited regulators, strong 
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interest influences that were latent have shown their drastic forms on 
the market. One of the key distortions of this market refers to the fact 
that the best companies privatized under the 1997 Law, with a low 
level of protection for minority owners, are exposed to the highest 
risk of takeovers. There are almost no takeovers of other types of com-
panies. Maybe these problems are the best illustration of how justified 
the privatization model of 2001 has been. Simply, the downsides of 
dispersed ownership appear to be much stronger than the upsides 
(speed, absence of corruption in the short-run). 
The takeover targets have mostly been from the so-called horizontal 
line: companies pursuing the same or similar activity. An inversion of 
the function of this market has been registered here: instead of the sani-
tary role (predators, acquirers eliminate inefficient companies and 
managers from the corporate structure), the basic function here is the 
creation of rents (securing monopolies) or high capital gains. 
This is why the process of company takeovers in Serbia had all the 
characteristics of early transition: inefficiency of institutions, accelerat-
ed ownership concentration and a low level of protection for minority 
owners. Takeovers take place under the conditions of low price effi-
ciency of the marketplace. The main reasons for the low price efficiency 
of this market are systemic: the general level of the share price is lower 
than in comparable countries, which results in an increased risk of hos-
tile takeovers. This distortion permits us to describe the national mar-
ket for corporate control as discriminatory in favor of acquirers. The 
present market configuration allows the initiation of this procedure 
even in those cases where the share price is not known. 
The primary cause of the accelerated expansion of the takeover mar-
ket is the instability of the ownership structure created by the 1997 
Privatization Law. This characteristic of dispersed ownership has been 
registered in all the cases in which it was applied by transition coun-
tries. Undervaluation of companies on this market is a consequence of 
the fundamental imbalance between supply of and demand for privati-
zation shares. The supply on the takeover market is upward distorted, 
as a consequence of a low income level and poor protection of minority 
shareholders. As a rule, yield on shares is in no way related to the 
amount of companies’ net profits. Therefore, in most of the cases the 
shareholders of this type are trying to sell their assets. The acquirer(s) 
appear(s) on the demand side. Other potential owners (individual and 
institutional investors) are not buying the shares of the target company 
because the level of investor protection is low, due to the fact that the 
owner who took over the company can legally conceal profits or trans-
fer profits and/or assets to another company that he owns. 
Other organic laws governing this subject matter were not complete, 
consistent or coherent either. These regulatory imperfections give prac-
tically unlimited power to the management: they can “tunnel” the firm 
(reduce the value of its assets) and take decisions that go against the 
standard rules on the protection of property. On the other hand, the 
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Law on the Securities Market has treated all joint stock companies as 
open, thus unnecessarily increasing the risk of takeovers. 
Takeovers often happen as the market’s punishment of the manage-
ment for expropriating their own owners. In the majority of dramatized 
takeover cases it is possible to register non-standard behavior of man-
agers, who practically abolish or considerably limit the rights of owners. 
The Law on the Securities Market has not regulated a normal procedure 
of defense against takeovers. Therefore, a moral hazard occurs on a 
mass scale: the management, if not able to take the firm on their own, 
work more in favor of the acquirer than of their own principal. This 
situation produces the worst possible outcome. 
The phenomenon of takeover is not disputable as such. It is a world 
trend today and constitutes one of the main flows of restructuring of 
modern economies. What is problematic about this phenomenon in 
our country? The experience so far with takeovers of joint stock com-
panies in Serbia has shown that the thing which usually happens after 
the takeover is infringement of property rights of the existing owners 
on a mass scale. In the long run, this practice can compromise the 
financial market. 
A new owner, often immediately after the takeover, caries out a 
massive operation of expropriation of the remaining shareholders 
through a recapitalization operation. This is particularly frequently 
done by domestic owners. The issue price of the shares of the new 
issue is significantly lower than the actual and last achieved market 
price, i.e., the share price at which the takeover was carried out. In 
most of the cases, as a prior action, the preemptive right to the pur-
chase of the shares from the new issue is eliminated. These decisions 
are adopted by the shareholders meeting without any special resis-
tance because they (employees and pensioners) cannot afford to buy 
stock of new issues. Since our legislation does not regulate secondary 
dealings in this right it is, in the given circumstances, practically 
worthless. The result of this operation is a dramatic drop in the stock 
price. If the new owner is a financial or institutional investor, one 
cannot expect additional investment in companies that have been 
taken over, like in the case of takeovers by strategic investors. The 
basic strategy of a financial investor is to make capital gains. He takes 
over a firm which is obviously undervalued and with relatively low 
restructuring costs and a change of management achieves an adequate 
result. As of late, the presence of these investors, in particular of funds 
originating from “tax havens”, is on the rise. Domestic investors of 
this type were disadvantaged, because the law on investment funds 
was in the pipeline for several years. 
The results of Serbian privatization achieved so far were a disappoint-
ment to many. Still, it was unrealistic to expect privatization to turn an 
almost completely ruined economy, such as the Serbian one, into pros-
perous in a short period of time. And the Serbian economy really was in 
a wretched condition, after decades of self-management, sanctions and 
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eventually the bombing. However, results are there: privatized compa-
nies are now spearheading economic activity and productive employ-
ment. The privatization process has evolved relatively successfully, 
without any major scandals. It turned out that the Serbian public 
administration can operate properly, thus probably placing the field of 
privatization among the best managed reform areas. Certain mistakes 
in the procedures are probably a reflection of a game of big numbers (a 
large number of privatization transactions in a short period), rather 
than of corruption, as some believe. Privatization is only halfway there, 
namely the more difficult half is still ahead. In the commercial sector, 
mostly unviable companies are still non-privatized. Then there are also 
companies from the restructuring group, out of which a certain num-
ber will end up in bankruptcy. Also slated for privatization are state 
owned infrastructure and utility companies, whose privatization is 
more complex in both conceptual and technical terms. 
Likewise, one should note major progress made in the reform of the 
banking sector. Non-privatized banks combined with a privatized 
economy represent a recipe for large-scale corruption. Unfortunately, 
there are no scientific studies, but it is still possible to claim with great 
certainty that the banking system was one of the most corrupt parts of 
our society during the 1990s. 
After a mere seven years the banking system experienced a dramatic 
improvement and now it is possible to say that it is at the level of other 
transition countries. It means that the rules, as well as the practice, are 
largely such that corruption is relatively difficult. 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy proceedings can be very susceptible to corruption, if the 
procedure is not defined in the proper manner and if the interests of 
creditors are pushed into the background. The essence of a bankruptcy 
is the sale of a company’s assets in order to settle the debts to creditors. 
What is important to creditors, of course, is to sell the assets at as high a 
price as possible, in order for the claim collection rate to be as high as 
possible. However, when it comes to a socially owned company as the 
subject of a bankruptcy, or even worse, as a creditor, standard control 
mechanisms begin to fail and can lead to corruption, as well as to theft 
and plunder of either state owned or privately owned property. 
The until recently applicable law that governed bankruptcy was the 
Law on Composition, Bankruptcy and Liquidation, adopted at the same 
time as the first Enterprise Law in 1989. The environment for which 
that law was drafted was the prevailing socially owned property and 
self-management. The rules on bankruptcy and liquidation were tai-
lored to a legal and economic setting where many issues of legal and 
economic life were regulated through non-legal avenues, and legal pro-
visions, even those on bankruptcy, served only as an instrument for the 
execution of political decisions. 
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For that reason, the Law on Composition, Bankruptcy and Liquidation 
was rightfully assessed as inappropriate for a market economy and as a 
barrier to the establishment of clear and transparent economic and legal 
relationships. This assessment can be supplemented by saying that the 
inherited practice in the implementation of this law, particularly abso-
lute voluntarism in deciding on the institution, conduct and conclusion 
of bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings, probably constituted an even 
higher barrier of that type. Therefore, the primary purpose of that law 
was to eliminate from legal life entities for which it was established that 
they were permanently unable to settle their debts (insolvent). 
The reform of bankruptcy legislation was initiated as soon as the 
first year of transition by organizing working groups for the drafting 
of a new law on bankruptcy proceedings. The fact that a new law on 
bankruptcy was adopted only in mid-2004 testifies to the harshness of 
the conflict among (often misidentified) interests, as well as to the 
strength of the relapses of the socialist self-management logic and 
resistance to transition. 
Under the new law, bankruptcy can be concluded in one of the two 
manners: liquidation or reorganization. Liquidation implies the satis-
faction of creditors through the sale of assets of the bankruptcy debtor, 
who ceases to exist. Reorganization is creditors’ satisfaction in the man-
ner and under the conditions defined by the adopted plan for the reor-
ganization of the debtor company. 
Therefore, it is possible to point out the unavoidability, that is, the 
reliability of the criteria on the basis of which a decision is taken on the 
opening and/or initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding as the first key 
novelty of the new bankruptcy system. There should be no room any 
longer for discretionary decision-making by a court or some other insti-
tution and/or person. A creditor can set off the institution of a bank-
ruptcy, by asking a debtor to pay a debt which cannot be collected (on 
an exceptional basis, the debtor himself can trigger a bankruptcy by 
making it probable that he will not be able to pay his obligations once 
they fall due; potentially, his objective is then to enable, through a bank-
ruptcy, his own timely reorganization, i.e., restructuring, which will 
make it possible for him to become solvent again). It is very likely that 
precisely this novelty, the inevitability of a bankruptcy proceeding once 
the statutory conditions have been met, if proposed by a creditor or 
some other authorized person, and particularly in the cases for which 
no preliminary proceeding is envisaged, was the reason for the resis-
tance to the adoption of the Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings. 
The second important novelty is a completely changed role and sta-
tus of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. They have ceased to be pas-
sive observers of the actions by a bankruptcy judge, a bankruptcy panel 
and a bankruptcy administrator, and have become active participants, 
on whose decisions a model used for the conduct of the bankruptcy 
proceeding will depend, as well as its pace and finally the accomplish-
ment of the objective, that is, the satisfaction of creditors. 
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Depending on the character of creditors, whether they are bank-
ruptcy creditors, or excluding and/or secured creditors, the Law pro-
vides for their special procedural roles. The most important role is 
played by bankruptcy creditors, who act through special bodies, the 
creditors’ assembly and committee (the committee is a body elected 
by the assembly and constitutes some kind of its executive body). The 
creditors’ assembly is the one to decide whether the bankruptcy will 
be conducted in a proceeding which will lead to liquidation or to 
reorganization and resumption of work of the bankruptcy debtor. 
Creditors participate in the decision-making, through the creditors’ 
committee, by giving opinions to the bankruptcy administrator, 
regarding the method for sale of assets for cash, as well as regarding 
other issues related to the management of assets until the end of the 
bankruptcy. The committee also has a controlling role in relation to 
the bankruptcy administrator, with the right to file a complaint against 
his decisions with a bankruptcy judge or panel, propose his dismissal 
and appointment of a new one and set the amount of reimbursement 
for expenses and remuneration to the bankruptcy administrator. The 
committee lodges appeals on behalf of all its creditors against the 
decisions of the bankruptcy judge and panel. 
The third novelty is a considerably modified status of the bank-
ruptcy administrator. A separate law (on the Bankruptcy Supervision 
Agency) stipulates that a person can be licensed only on the basis of a 
special bankruptcy administrator exam and that the work of bank-
ruptcy administrators is to be supervised by the Agency. The bank-
ruptcy administrator is entitled to reimbursement for costs and to 
remuneration, so he has an incentive to carry out his task properly 
and swiftly. At the same time, he is also held liable for the damage 
sustained because of his unlawful and/or unconscientious work. The 
bankruptcy administrator may be dismissed (replaced) in the course 
of the proceedings, on the initiative of creditors. If a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is conducted against a debtor that is majority state or socially 
owned, the function of the bankruptcy administrator will be per-
formed by “a specialized institution set up by virtue of a separate reg-
ulation”, which is as a rule the Privatization Agency. The bankruptcy 
administrator, upon the opening of a bankruptcy, has the powers of a 
management body or owner of the debtor. The bankruptcy adminis-
trator is, like in the previous system, under the supervision of a bank-
ruptcy judge and a bankruptcy panel, but this time it is combined 
with the creditors’ control, which constitutes an additional guarantee 
for his lawful, conscientious and efficient work. 
An important novelty is an effort to set time limits for certain actions 
in bankruptcy proceedings. On a cumulative basis, according to these 
time limits a bankruptcy proceeding should take between six months 
and a year. In the sale of the debtor’s assets, in addition to the sale of 
objects and rights pertaining to assets, the sale of the debtor as a legal 
entity or part of the debtor is also provided for. The Law stipulates that 
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one of the two forms of public sale is to be applied, an auction or a ten-
der. Only exceptionally, under the strictly defined conditions and in a 
limited number of cases, a free sale is possible (through direct agree-
ment). 
Transparency of Ownership and Registration 
The way in which entry of new entities into economic (and legal) life is 
organized is very important, particularly at the initial stage of transi-
tion. Overly high obstacles and barriers to the organization of new eco-
nomic entities can be put not only by the rules of company law, but also 
on the formal side, in the process of their registration. 
The potential importance of this legislation is not exhausted there. 
Public registries on companies and entrepreneurs provide data on other 
participants in economic life. Their completeness, accuracy and updat-
edness also have great significance in the fight against corruption. 
Furthermore, obstacles and unnecessary delays can also occur in the 
case of changes in legal personality (mergers, acquisitions, divisions and 
links of business companies through capital). 
In Serbia, the procedure for the registration of companies until 
recently was governed by the regulations adopted in the pre-transition 
period (subsequently somewhat amended), in the most recent version 
of the Law on the Procedure for the Registration in the Court Registry 
of 1994, the Decree on the Registration in the Court Registry of 1997 
and the Law on Entrepreneurs of 1989. Under these regulations the 
Company Registry was maintained by the Commercial Court, pursuant 
to the rules on the non-contentious procedure, while the Entrepreneur 
Registry was maintained by a municipal administrative body. 
The method used by the court to decide on an application for entry 
into the Company Registry included an obligation to assess whether all 
prescribed requirements for the registration had been met, by review-
ing the application and the supporting documents. A legal issue that 
was raised here, particularly by analyzing the practice of commercial 
courts, was what the role of the court was, which kind of powers it had 
in relation to the contents of the filed corporate charter and by-laws 
(under the 1996 Enterprise Law, for the purposes of the registration 
application procedure, it was necessary to file the Memorandum of 
Association, that is, the Corporate Charter and by-laws), particularly 
regarding the prescribed rules on corporate governance. 
In practice, the court would refuse to register a company if it detected 
shortcomings in the composition, competences of and relations among 
company bodies, which constituted violations of the rules of the 
Enterprise Law, however, not by virtue of a negative decision, a ruling, 
but mostly by issuing a resolution, hence a type of decision which usu-
ally serves to administer the procedure, de facto calling upon the found-
ers to eliminate the detected shortcomings before a possible refusal of 
the registration by virtue of a ruling. 
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In some cases, following the logic and principles of the corporate 
governance rules, the court would also assess the appropriateness of the 
company’s arrangements, not just formal legality. This, in fact, was a 
preliminary control of corporate rules, which, according to some opin-
ions, constituted one of the main sources of corruption in the 1990s. 
Some authors think that such role of the court was to a certain extent 
desirable at the early stage of company law. However, one should also 
bear in mind that the knowledge of judges about the basic issues of cor-
porate governance was at an extremely low level, so the interference of 
the court in the assessment of the appropriateness of individual arrange-
ments was very detrimental, and corruption and extortion were fre-
quent phenomena. 
Although it was prescribed that the procedure for the registration in 
the Court Registry was to be considered urgent, the general assessment 
is that it took too much time, that too many documents, certified signa-
tures and other formalities were required in support of the application, 
that the courts acted too formally and rigidly. Relative tardiness, even in 
the case of the simplest entries of changes, can cause serious damage. 
Moreover, the engagement in the tasks related to the registration blocks 
judicial resources necessary for long (also too long) proceedings. In 
addition, the situation in commercial courts regarding human resourc-
es and technical capacities was (and still is) such that even the provision 
of data on entries (the Registry has the character of a public registry and 
any interested party is entitled to review it, i.e., obtain a transcript from 
it) creates difficulties. 
Therefore, one has embarked upon radical amendment of the legisla-
tion in this field (these regulations, too, were drafted by the first demo-
cratic government, but they did not make it to the agenda prior to the 
dissolution of the National Assembly, so they were adopted by the next 
tenure of the parliament). The simplicity and swiftness are the main 
features, i.e., intentions of the new system. The new Law on the 
Registration of Economic Agents has removed the tasks of registration 
from the jurisdiction of courts and entrusted them to a special business 
registry agency. In this manner, the bodies and the rules for the regis-
tration of business companies and entrepreneurs have been integrated. 
That further means that the procedure is not a court proceeding but a 
special type of administrative procedure. In that procedure, an appeal 
may be lodged only against the decision by virtue of which the registra-
tion is denied, not against the decision by virtue of which it is granted. 
The registration is carried out at the request (upon an application) of 
an entity, which is obliged to submit all the documents necessary for 
making an entry, in support of the application. A party which thinks 
that an interest of his has been violated by the registration (e.g. share-
holder or investor who believes that a change was registered in contra-
vention of the rules laid down by laws or company regulations) can 
exercise that interest only before a court, by proving that the document 
on the basis of which the registration was made (e.g. a decision of the 
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company’s management body) was illegal; the law provides for a cor-
rection and/or deletion of the entry. 
Other very important novelties brought by the new system include: 
• Urgent procedure, pursuant to the law, is not just an instructive 
rule. If the registrar (an authorized person appointed by the 
Management Board of the Agency, who performs all the tasks 
related to the entry, issuance of transcripts and certificates, etc.) 
fails to make an entry in the prescribed time limit, the entry will 
be considered to have been made, and the registrar is obliged to 
note that. 
• Single registry for the whole of Serbia; registries maintained by 
commercial courts did not constitute a single unity. Now, there is 
only one registry – irrespective of the office where the registration 
was made. 
• Maintenance of an electronic registry, which enables quick data 
manipulation. 
• Linkage with other registries where data on an economic agent are 
kept. 
• Obligation to submit annual reports on business operations, which 
implies not only transparency and/or availability of these data, but 
also a relevant legal response in the case of a failure to submit 
reports; the assumption is that the cause for it is a fact that a com-
pany or an entrepreneur had no economic activities, for which 
reason their status will be ex-officio reclassified as inactive, in case 
they fail to submit a report for two years. 
The laws which govern the status, founding procedure and termina-
tion procedure of economic agents that have proven to be unviable 
were adopted as late as the fourth year of transition; on the basis of the 
experience from other transition countries and due to the nature of 
things they are regulating, they could have been expected at the begin-
ning of the first stage of transition. 
This “delay” is caused partly by the fact, as already proven, that for-
mally and legally, structures provided for by pre-transition regula-
tions could serve as a framework for new conditions, i.e., new terms 
as well. This applies primarily to the enterprise law, that is, the law on 
business companies. The upgrading and fine tuning of the regulations 
could wait (necessary interventions for socially owned companies had 
been made before). 
From that perspective, the new Law on Business Companies consti-
tutes a good step forward. However, one should not forget that the sys-
tem, in the legislative sense, is far from being completed. A public debate 
which is still ongoing about certain aspects of the legal regulation of the 
capital market, as well as public scandals that broke in relation to the 
implementation of the existing regulations, clearly show which ques-
tions should be urgently regulated or reformed: the securities market 
and the role of investment funds. Not only that this market is not regu-
lated to the full and under the market economy standards, but also the 
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process of inclusion of some more significant share of the privatized 
(equity) capital into market mechanisms is evolving extremely slowly. 
Conclusion 
The overall assessment of the influence of indirect government poli-
cies on corruption can be mildly positive. Although the transition is 
slower than many would like it to be, considering the extraordinary 
circumstances and problems which Serbia has faced in this period 
(cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the process of resolving the 
issue of Kosovo’s future, the assassination of the Prime Minister), one 
has to admit that a lot has been done in these seven years. In all prob-
ability, liberalization of foreign trade, reform of public finances and 
privatization of both financial and real sectors have contributed to the 
reduction of corruption more than all direct anti-corruption mea-
sures taken together. 
Of course, there is still a lot to be done, but the impression is gained 
that with the completion of the privatization of socially owned com-
panies, as well as with the resolution of the issue of parastatals, the 
situation will further improve. Likewise, the process of joining the EU 
and a long-awaited accession to the World Trade Organization will to 
a large extent force the government to pursue further liberalization 
and deregulation, which beyond any doubt constitute the best anti-
corruption strategy. 
dIRECT gOVERNMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES 
In the past six years, the fight against corruption was often cited as a 
priority of the government. Serbia has adopted a good many standard 
legal arrangements in an effort to directly prevent corruption, or at least 
make it more difficult. The stress is mostly on formal constraints intro-
duced on politicians and political parties, related to their decision-mak-
ing and policy design, as well as to the control over the execution of 
decisions. 
Thus, the new Law on the Financing of Political Parties and the Law 
on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Discharge of Public Office were 
adopted, with a basic objective to aggravate the exerting of influences 
by “informal power centers” on politicians, as well as to make these 
influences transparent, because it is believed that the influence of busi-
ness on politicians is one of the main mechanisms of corruption. The 
second part of the measures can be considered less direct in a way, like 
the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance and the 
Anti-money Laundering Law, because they have some other purposes, 
too, in addition to combating corruption. Likewise, a number of strate-
gies have also been passed, which more or less directly touch upon the 
issue of corruption (Anti-corruption Strategy, Public Administration 
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Reform Strategy, Judicial Reform Strategy). A general assessment is that 
these measures are mostly aimed at dealing with the consequences, 
rather than the causes of corruption. Even the Law on the Financing of 
Political Parties, which is considered to touch upon the causes of cor-
ruption (the link between politics and the economy), can be viewed as 
tackling the consequences, because the cause of corruption is not the 
link between politics and the economy, but too much government 
interference with the economy. If this interference were at a lower level, 
the motivation of businessmen to even think about bribing politicians 
and civil servants would decline. 
Law on the Financing of Political Parties 
The financing of political parties is often considered to be one of the 
main factors (mechanisms) of corruption. Namely, since modern par-
ties engage considerable resources, both during election campaigns and 
outside them, a question is rightfully raised of how to ensure the trans-
parency of the financing of these activities. 
The link between corruption and the financing of parties is quite 
obvious – parties need money in order to achieve a good result in the 
election, and corruptors need favors after the election. That gives rise to 
a clear possibility for trade – corruptors may give money to parties for 
the campaign, and in return expect favors in the future. The main ways 
in which this link between corruption and party financing can be sev-
ered include the financing of parties out of the state budget, the control 
and transparency of private contributions, as well as the reliance on the 
membership fees as the basic source of revenue of a party. 
The fundamental question which is raised is – should parties be given 
money from the budget? Different states have resolved this issue in dif-
ferent manners. There are completely reasonable pro et contra argu-
ments. The arguments for allocating public funds to political parties for 
financing their work are mostly based on the assumptions that a more 
equitable political contest is ensured, dependence on private donors is 
reduced and thus also the possibility for corruption. The arguments 
against such an arrangement are based on the understanding that tax-
payers should not have an obligation to finance political parties, but 
only those who are members and supporters of political parties should 
have the right to do that. Likewise, it is considered that this financing 
method (where major parties obtain more money on a pro rata basis) 
essentially constitutes a barrier to entry of new parties, thus “cement-
ing” the dominant position of parliamentary parties. 
The Law, which the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 
adopted in July 2003, and whose implementation started on 1 January 
2004, accepted the position that the state should finance the work of 
political parties to a certain extent (which is relatively high). In the 
parliament, it was passed with a vast majority, with votes of all present 
MPs from different political parties. That consensus gives it additional 
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legitimacy and credibility, on the one hand. On the other, this consen-
sus can also be cynically interpreted – of course they agreed to take 
more money from the budget. However, the thing in which we are pri-
marily interested here is what kind of influence certain provisions of 
this Law can have on the reduction, i.e., increase in corruption. 
The Law sets out that the funds for the financing of political parties 
may be obtained from public and private sources. Public sources include 
the funds from the Budget of the Republic of Serbia, budgets of territo-
rial autonomy units and budgets of local self-government units. Private 
sources include: membership fees, contributions from legal entities and 
natural persons, income from promotional activities of a political party, 
income from property of a political party and legacies. 
In Serbia, a relatively high amount is set aside from public sources 
(maybe that is, after all, the reason for the compromise among political 
parties in passing this law). This law sets the said amount at 0.15% of 
the Republic of Serbia’s budget, 0.1% of the budget of a territorial 
autonomy unit, i.e., 0.1% of the budget of a local self-government unit, 
annually. Thirty percent of these resources is allocated in equal amounts 
to political parties with MPs or local councilors, while the remainder of 
the resources (70%) is distributed in proportion to the number of seats 
in the republican and/or local parliaments. By way of example, in 2006, 
since the budget amounted to around 520 billion dinars after the revi-
sion, transfers to parties from the republican budget alone should have 
amounted to around 780 million dinars, or around 10 million euros, 
although the appropriation in the budget was around 550 million dinars 
(7 million euros), or about 0.1% of the budget, which is an obvious 
violation of the Law. In other countries which have opted for partial 
financing of political parties from public sources, money is also distrib-
uted in a similar manner, commensurate with the number of votes won 
in elections and seats in parliaments. However, the question of financ-
ing non-parliamentary parties can be rightfully raised. 
On the one hand, it is possible to assess that these provisions of the 
Law can have a beneficial effect on the reduction of corruption, 
because they reduce the pressure on parties to raise money. On the 
other hand, however, economic theory (Becker’s model of relative 
pressure by interest groups) tells us that relative costs, rather than 
absolute ones, are important in advertising. In that sense, allocating 
money to all political parties does not change relative relations, so the 
thus spent money can perhaps be considered to be wasted. Alternatively, 
since it is important to have more money than other parties, the pres-
sure to raise additional funds continues to exist, thus also the pressure 
toward higher corruption. 
In all modern democracies political parties can collect resources from 
private sources as well, first and foremost membership fees. The financ-
ing by membership fees is generally considered to be the most demo-
cratic and the least problematic method for financing political parties. It 
guarantees a certain influence of the party’s rank and file on the official 
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party policy and prevents the creation of excessively strong positions of 
individual financial magnates. One of the main reasons for prescribing 
the method for financing political parties is precisely the encourage-
ment to the rank and file of political parties to participate, i.e., the 
attraction of a wide circle of individuals who will give relatively small 
individual contributions and pay membership fees. 
However, the fact that the Law recognizes as legal any membership 
fee defined by the statute of the party has brought about at least one 
interesting phenomenon. Namely, parties’ statutes often contain a pro-
vision prescribing that all the persons who hold public offices as a result 
of the membership of a party, have an obligation to pay a certain por-
tion of their salaries to their party. This is, on the one hand, satisfactory 
for the party because it raises additional revenue, but, maybe paradoxi-
cally, this is satisfactory for the holders of public offices, too, because 
that provision gives them a significant advantage in appointments rela-
tive to non-party candidates, since the party is making some gain from 
their salaries and has an additional motive to appoint them, rather than 
non-party candidates. 
In most countries, private contributions constitute the biggest source 
of income. However, such development could result in the creation of 
new possibilities for potential influence by those who are willing to give 
money to a political party, and it is precisely the thing that causes the 
greatest concern among the general public. Pursuant to the legal 
arrangement in Serbia, a natural person can make a contribution which 
may amount to not more than ten average wages in a calendar year, 
while for a legal entity that limit is a hundred average wages. Annual 
revenue from assets owned by a political party is also limited to not 
more than 20% of the total annual revenue. 
This Law prevents the financing of political entities in Serbia from 
the following sources: foreign countries; foreign legal and natural per-
sons; anonymous donors; public institutions and public enterprises; 
institutions and companies in which the government has an equity 
stake; private companies rendering services under a contract with gov-
ernment agencies and public services; enterprises and organizations 
exercising public powers; humanitarian organizations; religious com-
munities; organizers of games of chance; importers, exporters, sellers 
and producers of excisable goods; legal entities and entrepreneurs with 
tax arrears. 
It is interesting to take a quick look at that list of “undesirable” 
donors, because these provisions of the Law are probably the most 
important from the standpoint of combating corruption. Obviously, 
the lawmaker trusted neither political parties nor the private sector, 
nor foreigners for that matter. As for foreigners, it is not quite clear 
why foreign legal and natural persons are forbidden from making 
contributions, since the reason why contributions of foreign persons 
are considered more “dangerous” than contributions of domestic 
persons is not quite clear. At the end of the day, a foreign legal entity 
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can always set up a company in Serbia, thus complying with this for-
mality. Distrust of political parties is obvious from the fact that con-
tributions of public enterprises and institutions are forbidden. The 
purpose of this provision was not to protect the parties from the influ-
ence of these entities, but to protect the assets of these entities from 
being channeled to political parties. The thing which is not totally 
clear is why a company where the state has a small stake in equity is 
forbidden from making contributions. 
Likewise, it seems that other provisions, too, are overly restrictive 
and basically non-implementable. For instance, there is no place in 
Serbia that has a registry of “private companies rendering services under 
a contract with government agencies and public services”, so there is 
simply no way to ex ante determine whether the law is violated or not. 
The same applies to “legal entities and entrepreneurs with tax arrears”. 
At first sight, it seems that there would be essentially no one who could 
finance the work of the parties if all the persons who do not comply 
with individual provisions of this Law were excluded from the group of 
all legal entities. Similarly, the question is raised of why the manufac-
turers of and traders in excisable goods cannot make contributions. Just 
as a reminder, excises are also levied on non-alcoholic refreshment bev-
erages, syrups and powders for non-alcoholic refreshment beverages, 
fruit juices, concentrated fruit juices, fruit nectars and dehydrated /
powdered fruit juices. We assume that these provisions exist in the Law 
precisely because it is clear to everybody that they cannot be imple-
mented, and that they are, therefore, completely irrelevant. 
The Law also sets the absolute amount which parties can raise and 
spend on their work. Thus, the total amount of funds from private 
sources (other than membership fees) can amount to not more than 
100% of the funds received by a political party from the budget of the 
Republic of Serbia. For non-parliamentary parties, that limit is 5% of 
total budget allocations for regular work of political parties. This is 
essentially a ban on entry to “the market” of a new party backed by 
powerful economic interests. A question which can be rightfully asked, 
as it appears, is how the Serbian Strength Movement managed to finance 
its campaign. It is completely clear that the campaign cost much more 
than 5% of the total budget allocation. 
The next question is whether these provisions provide for a financing 
channel which should be prohibited. One of such examples is the provi-
sion of services to a political party below market prices. Cheaper adver-
tising space in some media outlets can serve as an example. Despite the 
fact that the law does prescribe that the amount below the market price 
should be considered to be a contribution, the procedure in terms of 
who is determining “the market terms” and how has not been defined. 
Likewise, it seems that an opportunity for companies to make contribu-
tions to political parties has been left open through various associations. 
For instance, if the companies with tax arrears are forbidden from giv-
ing contributions to political parties, these companies can establish an 
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“Association of Government Debtors” which is not forbidden from 
making contributions to political parties. 
The Law on the Financing of Political Parties, inter alia, governs the 
manner in which election campaigns are financed. The Law sets out 
that resources for the financing of the costs of an election campaign are 
to be raised from private and public sources, sets the amount of funds 
that are allocated and determines the limits on individual contribu-
tions, as well as a cap on the costs of the election campaign. From pub-
lic sources, the resources earmarked for covering the costs of an elec-
tion campaign amount to 0.1% from the budget of the Republic of 
Serbia, 0.05% from the budget of a territorial autonomy unit, i.e., 0.05% 
from the budget of a local self-government unit. 
The budget appropriation for the financing of election campaigns is 
distributed in the following manner: the resources in the amount of 
20% are allocated in equal amounts to nominators of registered elec-
toral lists, that is, to nominators of candidates, while the rest of the 
funds (80%) is allocated to nominators of electoral lists that have won 
seats in proportion to the number of seats won, that is to a nominator 
of a candidate who has won a seat. The unspent resources are returned 
to the budget of the Republic of Serbia. The total funds raised from pri-
vate sources may not exceed 20% of the total funds set aside from pub-
lic sources. The contribution which an individual natural person makes 
for the costs of an election campaign may not exceed 0.5% of the receipts 
that may be received from a private source, while a contribution made 
by a single legal entity in the election campaign may not exceed 2% of 
that sum. 
It seems illogical that there is a limit on total funds which a party 
may spend in an election campaign, i.e., that this limit is not set in an 
absolute amount, but rather in a relative one (relative to the number 
of seats won in parliament). This provision is a significant obstacle to 
new parties which cannot count on more substantial amounts of 
money from public sources, so these provisions seem to constitute a 
significant barrier to entry. Likewise, it is not clear who controls, and 
in which manner, whether these resources have really been spent on 
costs of campaigning. 
In addition to preventive provisions, it is very important for those 
laws which govern the financing of political parties to also define the 
mechanisms for financing supervision and control. Since the models of 
“illegal” financing are very similar all over the world, there is a univer-
sally accepted mechanism in the domain of control – the obligation to 
present and publish reports on financing and property. Pursuant to the 
law, these reports should be published in the Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia. 
A precondition for making reviews possible is, of course, a detailed 
definition of the procedure for record keeping, reporting and book-
keeping by a political party. The law stipulates that every political party 
is obliged to have an account for the funds earmarked for the financing 
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of regular activities. In addition, the obligation of all the participants in 
the electoral process is to open a special account for financing the costs 
of an election campaign. A political party is obliged to keep books where 
all their revenues and expenditures are recorded and to submit its 
annual financial statement and annual report on contributions and its 
assets to the Finance Committee of the National Assembly. The statute 
of a political party must lay down the method for performing internal 
controls of financial operations and lay down the right of party mem-
bers to be informed about the revenues and expenditures of the party. 
Parties are obliged to appoint a person responsible for financial opera-
tions, submission of reports and bookkeeping of a political party. The 
Finance Committee, pursuant to the Law, makes all the received reports 
available to the general public, and undertakes appropriate measures in 
order to ensure that all the citizens have access to information con-
tained in these reports. 
No part of the executive is considered to be sufficiently neutral for 
the role of controlling political parties in the political process. According 
to this legal arrangement the said role is split between two bodies – the 
Republican Electoral Commission and the Finance Committee of the 
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. That is to say, the control 
over the financing of election campaigns is entrusted to the Republican 
Electoral Commission, while the control of the reports on the financing 
of the regular work of political parties is in the competence of the 
Committee of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in charge 
of finances. Essentially, it is left to the parties to control their own 
finances and those of other political parties. 
Of course, violations of the provisions on the financing of political 
parties and election campaigns should not go unpunished. The usual 
sanctions provided for by these regulations include confiscation of 
the contribution, a fine or a ban on funds from public sources. Our 
legislator has opted exclusively for fines for violations of the provi-
sions of this law. A political party spending funds in an election cam-
paign in excess of the amount set out in this Law will be fined for this 
offence in an amount which is twice the sum in question. The Law 
also prescribes that the Chairperson of the Finance Committee is 
obliged, if he has identified irregularities related to the raising, using 
or recording of funds for the financing of political parties, to press 
charges with the competent authorities. The Finance Committee also 
decides on the loss of the right to funds from public sources, namely if 
a political party is punished for an offence prescribed by this Law by 
virtue of a final decision. 
Generally speaking, this law, despite certain shortcomings, is not a 
poorly drafted piece of legislation. However, there are many difficulties 
in the implementation of this law, which is proven, inter alia, by the 
Report on the Control of Financial Reports of Political Parties for 2005. 
Namely, as previously mentioned, political parties have an obligation to 
submit an annual financial statement, certified by an auditor, a report 
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on the contributions exceeding the amount of 6,000 dinars, as well as a 
report on their property. 
Out of a total of 421 political organizations in Serbia, all requested 
reports were sent by three parties (the Bosniac Democratic Party of 
Sandžak, the Social Liberal Party of Sandžak and the Democratic Party 
of Serbia), while 21 parties have submitted all the reports with the 
exception of the auditor’s report. The explanation is interesting. Some 
of those parties (for instance G17 Plus, PSS, SPS, SRS) failed to submit 
an auditor’s opinion because they are, pursuant to the Law on 
Accountancy and Auditing, categorized as small-sized legal entities, 
hence they think that they do not have an obligation to have their state-
ments audited. As for the DS, they have submitted a report on the audit, 
as well as the reports on property and contributions, but they failed to 
submit annual financial statements. 
Only 76 parties have submitted at least one report, which points to 
the fact that the number of essentially non-existent parties is large. 
Likewise, one should mention that only 7 parties have had their annual 
financial statements and mandatory reports published in the Official 
Gazette, which is also a statutory obligation. Among those who have 
not met this obligation are Nova Srbija (New Serbia), SPS, PSS, DS and 
G17 Plus. 
The mentioned Report notes that “no political party has exceeded 
the total sum of contributions for natural persons, which amounted to 
253,920 dinars, nor the total sum of contributions for legal entities, 
which amounted to 2,539,200 dinars in 2005”. 
Particularly interesting is the following observation: “Parliamentary 
political parties have submitted financial reports and other documents 
prescribed by the Law on the Financing of Political Parties before 15 
April 2006”. Hence, although it has been stated that only 3 political par-
ties submitted all the reports, the conclusion contains a remark noting 
that all parliamentary parties have honored their statutory obligations, 
which is paradoxical and points to the fact that the method under which 
political parties control the operations of political parties may not be 
the most appropriate one. 
A special paradox is the fact that the Ministry of Finance has issued 
an opinion with an interpretation that all political parties must have 
their financial statements audited, but the Finance Minister’s party did 
not do so, because it was of the opinion that it was not under such an 
obligation. 
In conclusion, an issue associated with corruption and the financing 
of parties is also the issue of lobbying. Since it is a notion which is rela-
tively unknown to our public and which is very difficult to precisely 
define and delineate from corruption, we believed that something 
should be said about that, too. The field of lobbying is normally highly 
regulated in the world, so the lobbyists have to be registered, and their 
operation is under a special regime. In Serbia, the field of lobbying has 
so far not been regulated in any way, although it is very clear that there 
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is a large number of associations and organizations for which lobbying 
constitutes the essence of their existence. The recommendation is to 
adopt a law that would specify the activities that are allowed, and those 
that are not, as well as which information on lobbying has to be public. 
Obviously, it is difficult to draw a border line between lobbying and 
corruption, but that is not impossible. 
Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in discharge of Public 
Office 
The main purpose of the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in 
Discharge of Public Office is to limit the possibility for a public official 
to put his private interest above the public one in decision-making. 
Although in the narrow sense the fight against corruption is not the 
purpose of this law, but the fight against embezzlement and biased 
decision-making, one still has to note that this law prevents certain 
mechanisms of corruption. For instance, one of the provisions of the 
Law, stipulating that a public officer cannot also be a consultant to legal 
entities, eliminates that mechanism of corruption – where a legal entity 
makes payments to a public official through consultancy fees. Likewise, 
the provisions on the obligation to report property to a certain extent 
eliminate the possibility for an official to significantly increase his prop-
erty during his term in office. 
However, one large portion of the law, which is related to the “con-
centration of functions” essentially does not affect either the field of 
corruption, or the field of the prevention of conflict of interest. The 
question is raised of which interests are really in conflict, for instance, if 
the energy minister is at the same time a member of the Management 
Board of the Serbian Power Company (EPS). One could say that this is 
about an old communist concept of de-accumulation of functions, but 
now in a new form and with a new rationale. 
As regards the coverage of the Law, an impression is gained that a 
very large number of public officials is covered. On the one hand, this is 
actually a shortcoming of this Law, because the number of public offi-
cials in terms of this Law is indeed high, so the Republican Committee 
for Resolving Conflicts of Interest must invest a large share of its 
resources in the creation and maintenance of a database on public offi-
cials. On the other hand, it seems that many true decision-makers are 
not covered by this Law. Here we primarily have in mind members of 
various commissions, such as commissions set up for the purpose of 
assessing bids in public procurement tenders (tender committees) and 
the like. This Law does not apply to them. Likewise, this law does not 
apply to people who do not personally take decisions, but have a sig-
nificant opportunity to influence the decision-making process, such as 
advisors to the prime minister and deputy prime minister, as well as 
advisors to ministers. 
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The greatest objection made by the public to this Law was related to 
the provisions of the Law by virtue of which MPs were “spared” in the 
sense that certain provisions do not apply to them. 
Likewise, certain provisions are simply absurd, such as, for instance, 
Article 6, paragraph 1, pursuant to which “An official may not use pub-
lic office to … benefit himself or related person by way of influencing 
decisions…”. It is only natural for almost any decision to benefit some-
one (otherwise, it would be a completely irrelevant decision), so it is 
not clear how something like that can be avoided. 
The law also prohibits a public official from having managing rights 
in a business company, i.e., he has to temporarily assign these manag-
ing rights, for the duration of his term in office, to someone who is not 
a related party. It seems that this provision is overly restrictive. It is 
clear, for example, that the National Bank Governor must not hold 
shares of a commercial bank, but it is not clear why he should not be 
allowed to be a shareholder of a factory, for instance. Similarly, it is pre-
scribed that public officials must not be members of managements of 
public enterprises. These are the provisions that both the professional 
circles and the general public were interested in the most, although it is 
not clear exactly about which conflict of interest we are talking about 
here, since public enterprises, at least according to the law, work in con-
formity with the public interest. However, as previously mentioned, 
these provisions do not apply to MPs. Obviously, those who voted for 
this law found themselves in a situation in which they put a personal 
interest above the public one. 
It is also interesting to take a look at the forms which all officials 
have fill in and submit to the Republican Committee. The first thing 
that can be observed is that the form is really exhaustive and that 
almost all relevant items have been covered. The thing that is missing 
is a request to submit evidence for the figures stated in the form. For 
instance, one of the items in the form refers to “claims”. Potentially, 
an official may put a very large amount into that item at the begin-
ning of his term in office, and then to explain an increase in his assets 
in the course of his term with the reduction of his claims. In a situa-
tion when no proof of a claim is requested, such machinations are 
possible, and their detection impossible. Also, it is not quite clear what 
happens in a situation when an official cannot obtain data on the 
assets owned by related parties. Does, for instance, an official’s father 
has any legal obligation to disclose to his son the information on all 
the property he owns? 
In its Work Report, the Republican Committee has stated that almost 
all republican officials had submitted the requested data, and that the 
largest problem was with the officials in local self-governments, which 
is in a way expected. The key thing here, which is missing, is a report on 
the quality of supplied data and the information about whether these 
data are controlled (e.g. in cooperation with the Tax Administration) 
and what the findings were of these controls. 
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As regards the penal provisions, penalties seem to be too mild. The 
first penalty, a confidential caution not disclosed to the general public, 
constitutes practically the first step after it has been established that a 
public official has violated the law. The second penalty (the public 
announcement of a decision that this law has been violated for elected 
public officials and a public announcement of a recommendation to 
resign for other public officials) is the most serious penalty. One would 
have to introduce more serious penalties as well, such as an obligation 
to return salaries and fees received in the period in which the law was 
violated, as well as, if possible, a provision allowing the seizure of the 
assets for which no proof can be offered to show that they were legally 
acquired, provided that they were acquired during a person’s term in 
office. 
Bill on the Anti-corruption Agency 
After a lot of time and public debating, the Serbian Government 
approved this Bill and submitted it to the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Serbia. Although the law has not yet been adopted, and we 
do not know which specific provisions will be incorporated in it, we still 
believe that it is important to briefly analyze the bill that is pending in 
the parliament. 
First and foremost, one should say that this Law supplants the Law 
on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Discharge of Public Office and 
that the bulk of the provisions of the mentioned law have been taken 
over. In the part dealing with prevention of conflict of interest the key 
provision is the one specifying that this issue will be dealt with by the 
Anti-corruption Agency instead of the existing Republican Committee 
for Resolving Conflicts of Interest. Other provisions are practically the 
same. Likewise, a Bill on the Amendments to the Law on the Financing 
of Political Parties was approved in parallel with this Bill, by virtue of 
which the implementation of that law is assigned to the newly estab-
lished Agency. 
However, the provisions related to the Agency as such, its organiza-
tion and competences are completely new. First and foremost, the 
Agency is in charge of the implementation of the Anti-corruption 
Strategy and the Action Plan. Likewise, it is authorized to participate in 
the preparation of regulations in the field of the fight against corrup-
tion. Under the Bill, the Agency is supposed to have a Management 
Board, whose 7 members are elected by the National Assembly at the 
proposal of seven authorized nominators, who each puts forward a list 
of 3 candidates. 
It seems that the idea to set up an Anti-corruption Agency is related 
primarily to the implementation of the provisions of the present Law 
on Prevention of Conflict of Interest and the Law on the Financing of 
Political Parties, which means that the activity of the Agency is ori-
ented toward political corruption, that is, state capture. Implicitly, it 
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is possible to conclude that administrative corruption is “left” to the 
regular bodies of the state, primarily to the police and the prosecuto-
rial service. 
The problem, however, is related to the fact that such a concept of 
work of the Agency means that the advisory function of an anti-corrup-
tion body is practically abandoned, which is certainly not good, since 
that function cannot be transferred to any other body.  
National judiciary Reform Strategy
The basic goal of the National Judiciary Reform Strategy, which was 
adopted in April 2006, as stated in it, is to restore the citizens’ confi-
dence in the judicial system by establishing the rule of law and legal 
security. Carrying out the strategic reform at all levels of the judicial 
system is cited as a precondition for realizing this goal and identified as 
its greatest shortcomings are the inappropriate constitutional frame-
work, inadequate number of courts, unclear judge election and dis-
missal criteria, obsolescence of judicial administration and lack of con-
tinuous training of holders of judicial functions. In addition to the lack 
of harmonization between the political-legal system and the existing 
social relations, also stated as an important reason for adopting the 
Strategy is an easier implementation of the EU accession process and 
fulfillment of all international obligations of the Republic of Serbia.
The Strategy adoption process was long and included a wide circle of 
interested persons, domestic as well as international factors. Before the 
final adoption, two drafts were prepared (in July and December 2005) 
that were the subject of intensive discussions. A certain number of given 
suggestions has been adopted and included in the final version of the 
Strategy. A large number of them was directed towards as great preci-
sion and level of detail as possible, particularly regarding short-term 
goals and implementation, as well as ensuring as wide representative-
ness as possible in the institutions in charge of the Strategy implemen-
tation.
The Strategy mentions independence, transparency, responsibility 
and efficiency as the four key principles on which the reformed judi-
ciary should be based.
The largest part of the Strategy is dedicated to the judiciary reform, 
dealing with other parts of the judicial system as well to a smaller extent: 
the Ministry of Justice, the prosecutor’s office, execution of correctional 
sanctions, and independent judicial professions. The judiciary reform 
framework includes 12 basic goals of reform, with each of the four pre-
viously mentioned key principles comprising three goals relating to 
solving the most important problems in the judiciary. Each of the goals 
is presented by a short description of the present state, the vision of new 
judiciary, as well as the necessary basic activities for reform implementa-
tion. The initiatives are grouped according to short-term (2006-2007), 
medium-term (2008-2009) and long-term (2010-2011) implementation 
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time limits. The Strategy includes standards by which progress in the 
judiciary reform will be measured, which are specified in a separate 
Action Plan and relate to individual goals defined in the Strategy. 
The Strategy also provides for establishment of the Strategy 
Implementation Commission, which is composed of representatives of 
relevant judicial institutions. One of the important tasks of the 
Commission is proposing standardized forms of collection of statistical 
data needed for the assessment of reform processes on the basis of which 
the institutions of the judicial system will make strategic decisions.
One of the greatest novelties the Strategy brings is proposing intro-
duction of the institution of High Judicial Council, which has become, 
with the adoption of the new constitution, a constitutional category as 
well. Proceeding from the constitutional separation-of-powers princi-
ple, the establishment of an “optimal relationship” between the Ministry 
of Justice and the High Judicial Council, as institutions responsible for 
the functioning of the judicial system, was stipulated. 
This new institution should be a guarantor of independence and 
autonomy of courts and judges, as well as the managing and supervi-
sory body of the judicial system. Namely, the Council has the key role 
in the process of election, promotion, responsibility, financial status 
and termination of judicial function, and also has authority regarding 
human resources, organization and supervision, budget, performance 
measurement, general framework and internal regulation and opera-
tion of courts and strategic planning.
It is of particular importance that the High Judicial Council has the 
sole authority to propose the candidates for the first election to judicial 
function to the parliament, which elects them for a definite period of 
three years. Upon expiry of this period, the Council decides on perma-
nent appointment to judicial function, which is declaratively confirmed 
by the Speaker of the National Assembly.
The following important novelty, whose goal is to ensure the judi-
ciary’s independence, is the introduction of independent judicial budget. 
In the transitional period, until transferring the budget authority com-
pletely to the judiciary in 2011, or until the moment the High Judicial 
Council, together with the Treasury of the Republic and the Ministry of 
Finance, is prepared and authorized to determine, approve and distrib-
ute the budget for the judicial system, the Ministry of Justice will still 
represent the judiciary in negotiations with the Ministry of Finance.
In order to enable a more efficient processing of criminal cases, the 
Strategy also provides for gradual limitation of the role of investigative 
judges, and for the prosecutors assuming the responsibility for evidence 
collection. Stated as the reasons for introducing this change are positive 
experiences of the neighboring countries and obligations for legal pro-
tection within “reasonable time limit” prescribed by the European 
Human Rights Convention. Prosecutors will also be allowed to accept 
plea bargains, which would be supervised by courts, in order to solve 
the problem of backlog of criminal cases and delays. The impression is 
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that, if the possibility of plea bargaining is not prescribed in detail and 
controlled, this proposal introduces significant discretion into the sys-
tem, thus increasing the possibilities for corruption.
By the new constitutional and legal framework, the authority of the 
prosecutor’s office is also changed by a clear definition of its role in 
protecting the constitutionality and legality. The intention is to achieve 
legal security by abandoning the previous traditional system of extraor-
dinary remedies against valid judgments, making the courts solely 
responsible for the decision-making on violations of legality and con-
stitutionality, and reducing the prosecutor’s role to the right to bring 
such issues before the highest court in exceptional cases. 
In order to provide a more credible image of the judiciary, the 
Strategy provides for enabling access to information about cases, with 
simultaneous protection of privacy of the parties in the proceedings. 
Automated systems in courts available to all citizens will have a special 
role in achieving this goal. The judicial system is also to undertake edu-
cation of the public and the media in a proactive manner, in order to 
change the existing bad image it has in the public. This task will primar-
ily be entrusted to the newly-established public relations offices with 
the High Judicial Council and courts. The Council, and in time all lower 
courts as well, will use the automated system for monitoring the citi-
zens’ complaints, as well as for responding to them. Increasing the 
transparency of the court work is certainly a step in the right direction 
regarding fight against corruption.
The Strategy provides for the adoption of a new Law on Training of 
Judges, Public Prosecutors, Deputy Public Prosecutors and Judges’ and 
Prosecutors’ Assistants, which should create conditions for acquiring 
knowledge and skills necessary for efficient performance of judicial 
function. A significant supplement to this Law is the National Judicial 
Training Institute that the Government should establish by 2008. The 
function of the Institute, which will replace the existing Judicial Centre, 
will be to provide standardized initial and permanent advanced profes-
sional training at several levels for employees in the judiciary. Due to a 
large backlog of cases, the emphasis will be placed on case management 
techniques. 
It is anticipated that the Institute diploma will become a highly 
respected criterion for the first election of candidates to judicial func-
tions and, at the same time, permanent advanced training of holders of 
judicial functions will be mandatory. Furthermore, the colleges of law 
will be obliged to strengthen the departments that prepare lawyers for 
work in the judiciary, as well as to expand practical training.
In the introductory part, the Strategy identifies most of the problems 
the judiciary in Serbia is currently facing and properly formulates four 
key principles that should be fulfilled owing to the reform – indepen-
dence, transparency, responsibility and efficiency.
The most sensitive part of the Strategy, which was the subject of a 
broad discussion in the period prior to its adoption, is certainly the 
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proposed functional connection between the Ministry of Justice and 
the new body – the High Judicial Council. On the one hand, opinion 
has prevailed in the expert public that a complete deprivation of the 
Ministry of Justice of administrative authority in favor of the Council 
would be inappropriate, because it is only applicable in the countries 
that already have a stable, well-accepted and respected judicial system, 
which is not the case in Serbia. On the other hand, one of the main 
criticisms is that this relation is not determined precisely enough and 
that the success of the Strategy will depend on the manner of its realiza-
tion.
The Strategy Implementation Commission was assessed similarly. Its 
establishment and composition were welcomed (particularly the pres-
ence of representatives of the Assembly’s Judicial Committee), but, on 
the other hand, the prevailing opinion is that the insufficient precision 
of the guidelines for its work leaves a lot of room for inefficiency and 
susceptibility to futile political discussions.
Evaluated particularly positively was the aspiration to a transparent 
and responsible judicial system and, before all, introduction of a trans-
parent procedure of election, promotion and, in particular, dismissal of 
holders of judicial functions, which is a necessary precondition for res-
toration of confidence in the institutions.
However, when it comes to criticism, another three stand out – the 
assessment that, given the amount of necessary investments, the dead-
lines for introduction of the new judicial system are overly ambitious, 
as well as that it is necessary to separate the legal aid budget from the 
general budget for the judiciary and pay more attention to the citi-
zens’ rights. 
Taking into account the state the judicial system in Serbia is in and 
the relatively poor reputation it enjoys in the society, the approach of 
joint responsibility and cooperation, with simultaneous provision of 
necessary independence to the judiciary, which was accepted in the 
Strategy, seems appropriate. Gradual transfer of authority from the 
Ministry of Justice to the High Judicial Council, an institution consist-
ing of those who should be most familiar with the problems in this area 
and be able to solve them, constitutes the most significant part of the 
Strategy. The success of the reform will depend mostly on the success-
fulness of development of that process, and on the proper distribution 
of responsibility. 
There are certainly no ready-made models for solving institutional 
problems, which is demonstrated by the solutions applied by other 
countries. What is the most important and, at the same time, the hard-
est is achieving the balance between different branches of power. The 
fact that all aspects of the judicial system are covered by the Strategy, 
although to a different extent, presents the first important step towards 
successful and efficient reform.
One of the essential problems, which is particularly pronounced in the 
judiciary, is the absence of a visible new beginning that would follow the 
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political changes initiated in 2000. In contrast to other branches of 
power, only minimum personnel changes took place in the judiciary. 
Therefore, apart from necessary procedural novelties, it is necessary to 
create clear characteristics of a new beginning in the judiciary as well, 
which would contribute to restoration of confidence. The establish-
ment of the new Supreme Court of Appeals, which is provided for by 
the Strategy and confirmed by the new Constitution, could perhaps 
represent a symbol of a new beginning, especially because it is to have 
new headquarters, better equipment and higher wages.
The next important step towards establishing an efficient judicial 
system is the establishment of a standardized system of education and 
training. The National Judicial Training Institute, an institution accept-
ed in a large number of other countries, which should start its work by 
2008, should play a major role in that.
Finally, establishment and strict observance of clear criteria for judi-
ciary performance assessment, as well as appointments, promotions 
and dismissals of holders of judicial functions should lead to radical 
changes. This will depend largely on the executive authorities, particu-
larly the Ministry of Finance, and, ultimately, on the parliament to 
which the Ministry and the whole Government are responsible.
2.5. Anti-corruption Strategy
The National Anti-corruption Strategy should present a set of measures 
and activities that the government bodies will undertake in order to 
fight corruption. However, it may be concluded without any doubt that 
the Strategy in fact presents an internally inconsistent list of nice (and 
not so nice) wishes. 
As for the consistency, perhaps it is best to start from the beginning 
of the text. The first paragraph states: “Corruption is an equally harm-
ful phenomenon in the societies at all levels of development. The prob-
lem is larger and more difficult in the societies on the path of demo-
cratic transformation, because new needs dictate numerous tasks…” A 
question arises whether corruption is an equally harmful phenomenon 
in all societies (the first sentence), or whether it is indeed a larger prob-
lem in the countries in transition (the next sentence). This should only 
be an example of how the Strategy is written and how seriously serious 
matters were considered.
As for the definition of corruption, it seems that corruption is defined 
too broadly, or as “a relation established by abusing authority in the 
public or private sector for the purpose of acquiring personal benefit or 
benefit for another person”. Such a definition is bad because it is neces-
sary to define what is then considered as abuse; in particular, what 
exactly is considered to be an “abuse of authority in the private sector 
for the purpose of acquiring personal benefit”, and how to differentiate 
the term “abuse” from the regular term “use”.
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The goal of the Strategy is stated to be a “reduction of corruption and 
achievement of anti-corruption culture at the level of developed 
European countries”, which may be characterized as insufficiently pre-
cise. Firstly, the level of corruption varies even among the “developed 
European countries” (Finland and Italy, for example), and secondly, no 
indicators are mentioned on the basis of which the realization of this 
goal will be monitored. An unclearly defined goal may lead to a situa-
tion in which it is not known at all whether the goal has been achieved 
or not, as well as how far we are from achieving the goal, whether we are 
approaching it or not. 
The assumption is that this goal will be achieved when the 16 men-
tioned sub-goals are achieved. Some of them are quite clear and justi-
fied (it may be assumed that they indeed represent a precondition for 
achieving the basic goal of the Strategy), like the “open and transparent 
procedure of planning and utilization of budgetary funds and public 
control over the use of budgetary funds”. However, some of the men-
tioned sub-goals are rather unclear, or insufficiently precise, for exam-
ple “permanent elimination of conditions for appearance and growth 
of corruption”. What exactly this means and how it will be done remains 
completely undefined.
The corruption causes are defined rather poorly and vaguely. For 
example, the ownership structure in the economy is considered to be a 
source of corruption (probably with good reason), but for some reason 
the “ownership transformation” is also considered to be a source of 
corruption. Leaving aside the fact that the standard expression “privati-
zation” is called “ownership transformation”, a question arises whether 
it is justified to include privatization (if the term transformation implies 
privatization at all) as one of the causes of corruption. “Failure to 
observe market laws” is mentioned as another unclear cause of corrup-
tion. It remains completely unclear who fails to observe market laws 
and what this means at all (“failure to observe market laws” makes as 
much sense as “failure to observe the law of gravity”). Poverty is also 
mentioned as one of the economic causes. Again, a question arises – 
whose poverty and how it affects corruption. Does this refer to the pov-
erty of employees in the state-owned sector, who try to attain a good 
level of the standard of living by taking bribes, or to the poor parts of 
the population? In any case, completely undefined and unclear. Standard 
thinking in the field of economic analysis of corruption is that poverty 
is a consequence and not a cause of corruption. More or less all causes 
usually thought of are mentioned as political causes of corruption, but 
it is unclear in what manner, say, the “uncertain legal status of the state” 
or “absence of consensus about strategic objectives of the state develop-
ment” affect corruption. As for legal causes, the impression is that the 
right causes have been selected: failure to apply or selective application 
of regulations, existence of gaps in the law, discrepancy of regulations.
Consequences of corruption are grouped into two areas: economic and 
socio-political. Economic consequences are more or less indisputable, 
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such as jeopardizing market economy, GDP decrease, investment 
decrease, or increase in poverty. However, the following consequence is 
also mentioned – increase in the country’s indebtedness. The mecha-
nism of increasing a country’s indebtedness due to high corruption is 
completely unclear and unknown in the economic literature, and it is 
not clear, either, what mechanism could lead to that. Furthermore, the 
indebtedness itself cannot necessarily be perceived as a bad thing. 
Financing through borrowing is not in itself, or does not have to be, an 
inferior way of financing.
After explaining the consequences of corruption, the Strategy con-
tinues with Chapter 2, which deals with giving recommendations by 
specific area. There are six areas in total: political system; judicial sys-
tem and police; system of government administration, territorial auton-
omy, local self-government and public services; public finance system; 
economic system; media; participation of citizens and civil society in 
the fight against corruption.
A short overview of the basic measures proposed for each of these 
areas is given below, with a presentation of elements from the Action 
Plan for Strategy Implementation, which was adopted in the meantime. 
State when it was adopted
Political system
Generally speaking, the recommendations are too general, for example 
“increasing the efficiency of the supervisory function of the National 
Assembly” or “reinforcing the publicity and transparency of work of 
government bodies”. These are indeed necessary reforms, but it is 
unclear what it means exactly. We assume that the idea was to describe 
such recommendations in more detail by the Action Plan. However, the 
Action Plan does not provide completely clear answers to the concrete 
questions relating to the recommendations from the Strategy, either. 
Although some actions were defined precisely, for example “Enable the 
public to access information of public significance in the premises of 
government bodies”, there are still many unclear actions remaining, for 
example “execution of prescribed measures for the purpose of securing 
the right to appeal in cases of violation of the right to accessibility of 
information”. Furthermore, the Action Plan was also expected to pro-
vide approximate estimate of costs for carrying out particular actions. 
However, we have mostly remained deprived of this information. In the 
field “Necessary resources” there are mainly the following data “No 
additional funds needed”, or “Funds are needed for working groups, 
expert opinions and organization of round tables”.
Some recommendations are, however, quite clear and seemingly com-
pletely justified. As an example, we may mention the recommendation to 
“limit the immunity to actions and statements made regarding the per-
formance of public functions (material immunity)”, or “providing spe-
cial control of harmonization of regulations and their consistency from 
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the anti-corruption aspect”. The last recommendation should be par-
ticularly commended. The fact is that so far nobody has explicitly been 
put in charge of performing such an analysis of regulations. Indeed, the 
Republican Legislation Secretariat performs a limited control of har-
monization of regulations with the Constitution and other laws but, 
taking into account the Secretariat’s capacity and the number of regula-
tions that should be assessed, it is clear that they are unable to perform 
that function sufficiently well. It seems that a new, expert or operation-
al body should do that work. 
Legislative system and police
The impression is that this part of the recommendations is written most 
concretely and most clearly. Basically, a large part of the recommenda-
tions does not require additional improvements and in that sense it 
may be commended. As for the assessment regarding the contents of 
the recommendations, they appear rather consistent. 
It seems that the basic idea of this group of recommendations is to 
offer both the stick and the carrot to the judiciary and the police, and to 
increase both the rights and obligations of the judiciary and the police. 
As for the rights, provision of appropriate wages and working condi-
tions for the holders of judicial functions, establishment of permanence 
of the function for holders of public prosecution functions, indepen-
dence of the judicial budget, provision of appropriate wages and work-
ing conditions for police officers are envisaged. Interestingly, in the 
“necessary resources” column it is written that “for the time being no 
financial funds may be determined” for the provision of appropriate 
wages for the judiciary as well as the police. Also, it is unclear why the 
“provision of appropriate wages” is placed within the competence of 
the Ministry of Finance, and not the ministries of justice and the inte-
rior, or at least the entire Government.
As for the stick, the following recommendations are given by the 
Strategy: introduction of disciplinary responsibility of the holders of 
judicial functions, introduction of periodic mandatory performance 
analysis of the bodies in charge of detection, prosecution and trials, 
combating corruption within the court administration, mandatory 
additional inspection of the prosecutor’s office’s decision in the cases in 
which proceedings have not been initiated or have been terminated for 
the criminal offences with elements of corruption, or in the cases of 
delaying criminal proceedings.
System of government administration, territorial autonomy, local self-
government and public services
This part of recommendations is rather imprecise and full of common-
places. Although territorial autonomies, local self-governments and 
public services are mentioned in the title, they were completely ignored 
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in the recommendations. All the recommendations refer solely to gov-
ernment administration in the narrower sense and essentially they may 
be reduced to the recommendations stated in the Government 
Administration Reform Strategy. Of the concrete things, the recom-
mendation for the “introduction of the principle of rotating the officers 
of administrative bodies and public services at the positions liable to 
corruption” may be noted and commended, although it is already car-
ried out in some government bodies.
The impression is that this part of the Strategy is insufficiently well 
written, especially taking into account numerous assessments that it is 
precisely the government administration, local self-government bodies 
and public services that are most exposed to corruption. It is complete-
ly unclear why the health care, education or inspection services are not 
mentioned here at all. It is not even emphasized, either, in which direc-
tion the fight against corruption at the local level will go.
Public finance system
The recommendations relating to the public finance system are mainly 
clear and relatively precise. There are obviously unclear and overly gen-
eral recommendations here as well, such as “improvement of the exist-
ing regulations on the work of the Treasury”, or “harmonizing the tax 
regulations with the European Union regulations”, which is unneces-
sary, because the EU as such does not collect taxes, so it does not have 
its regulations, either. If some concrete directive or a concrete solution 
that has been applied in some of the member states is what was meant 
here, it should have been specified.
The recommendations relate to the revenue side as well as the expen-
diture side of the budget, but also to the procedure of public revenue 
collection and the procedures of public money spending. Reforms and 
a better control of work of the Tax Administration and Customs 
Administration have been touched upon, and certain changes of the 
public procurement procedure are suggested as well.
Economic system
The part dealing with the economic system is rather inconsistent, inter-
nally as well as with the rest of the Strategy. Although the first recom-
mendation is quite commendable – “Limitation of the government’s 
role in the economy to setting basic rules for fair competition, freedom 
of agreement negotiation, creation of environment suitable for efficient 
business operation, as well as to regulating major disruptions in the 
market” – the impression is that this statement is a result of a fair lack of 
sincerity or perhaps competence, taking into account the other recom-
mendations. 
Also interesting is the recommendation to “introduce an indepen-
dent body for control of the privatization process” in the year when the 
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privatization of the socially-owned sector should be completed. It is 
also unclear why the recommendation on the “establishment of man-
datory internal control in the public sector” was put in this chapter and 
not in the chapter dealing with administration and public services. One 
of the recommendations is also the “establishment of independent 
external audit of accounting operations of the largest economic enti-
ties”. We are of the opinion that this is completely unnecessary when it 
comes to private companies whose shares are not traded on the stock 
exchange. The transparency of their operations should simply imply 
paying taxes and end with that, if they assess that it suits them so. 
Everything else may be considered with good reason to be a violation of 
privacy. It is also unclear what it has to do with corruption.
It is really strange that so little space was dedicated to this chapter. 
Taking into account the theoretical, as well as empirical evidence that 
the government intervention in the economy is the basic generator of 
corruption, it is simply unbelievable that the recommendations have 
remained so superficial. Foreign trade, licenses, consents, inspection 
supervision, monopolies established and maintained by the state, indus-
try entry barriers, the whole areas of town planning and construction, 
public companies and similar have not been mentioned with a single 
word.
The media
As for the media, first of all, their great role in corruption prevention is 
indisputable. However, many of the recommendations stated in the 
Strategy are disputable, particularly the recommendation to perform a 
“differentiation between the advertising activity and the informative 
function within the media”. The recommendation itself is not clear in 
the sense of how to do it, or how to force the media to do it without 
violating the independence of the media. In democratic countries, the 
media formulate their editorial policy by themselves and are allowed to 
report in a biased manner, if they wish to do so.
The Action Plan suggests the following activities: organization of 
public debate on the subject “analysis of regulations and possible prep-
aration of amendments to the regulations and their adoption and tak-
ing care of the media independence and objectivity”. Of course, we may 
be worried most by the second item, i.e. the possible preparation of 
amendment to regulations, which may mean any number of things. It is 
also completely unclear what the following recommendation means 
(and it is not clarified by the Action Plan, either): “prescribing sanc-
tions against trading media influence”. 
Participation of citizens and civil society in the fight against corruption
It is quite clear that the active participation of civil society is one of the 
preconditions for corruption level reduction. An “outsider” is simply 
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necessary, because the government apparatus will not reform by itself, 
without external pressures. The recommendations mostly amount to 
informing and educating citizens, as well as to “including civil associa-
tions in the activities of government bodies in the fight against corrup-
tion”, which can be generally assessed as good. However, one of the 
potentially dangerous recommendations says: “provision of full trans-
parency of financial operations and work of civil associations”. Such a 
recommendation may sound, particularly in Serbia, as a veritable threat 
(“if we are not satisfied with your selection of corruption cases, we shall 
send you the financial police”) in advance to discourage some civil asso-
ciations from serious and unbiased calling attention to corruption in 
the government bodies.
The Anti-Money Laundering Law
The main goal of passing the 2004 Anti-Money Laundering Law was 
to improve significantly the efficiency of detecting and preventing this 
criminal offence. The legislator wanted to define the obligations of 
obligors more precisely than it was defined by the previous law passed 
in 2001 at the federal level, thus facilitating anti-money laundering 
activities. 
During the preparation of the law, the interested parties had the 
opportunity to state their opinions. The Anti-Money Laundering 
Agency organized meetings and seminars at which the government 
bodies obliged to fight against money laundering were informed about 
the solutions in the Draft Law, and some of the opinions they stated 
were incorporated in the Law. The Agency also organized a series of 
seminars for obligors, at which they were informed about the novelties 
introduced by the new Law. Even after the Law came into force, the 
Agency stayed in regular contact with the obligors and government 
bodies.
This law, first of all, defines money laundering and prescribes actions 
and measures undertaken for the purpose of its detection and preven-
tion. It also regulates the authority of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Agency, as well as of other bodies in charge of enforcing this law. The 
law also defines the obligors who are obliged to undertake actions and 
measures for the detection and prevention of money laundering, as well 
as these actions and measures. Certainly the most significant obligation 
is party identification in each transaction (cash or cashless), or in sev-
eral mutually connected transactions, the amount of which is 15,000 
euros or more, in dinar equivalent.
Special sections of the law are dedicated to obligations of audit com-
panies, certified auditors and legal and natural persons responsible for 
keeping business books or dealing in tax consulting, as well as to data 
recording, protecting and keeping. These obligations are specified pre-
cisely and, in case of suspected money laundering, the mentioned obli-
gors are obliged to notify the Agency accordingly. It is characteristic 
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that on the basis of the Ministry of Justice’s opinion this obligation was 
not introduced for lawyers and lawyer’s offices. This obligation is 
required by the international standards, primarily the Second Directive 
of the European Union on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System 
for the Purpose of Money Laundering. The Directive prescribes explic-
itly the obligation for lawyers to report suspicious transactions of their 
clients when representing the clients in specific transactions that are not 
exclusively transactions related to lawyers’ work. 
As regards data protection, all information and documentation are 
protected as official secret and may be used solely in accordance with 
the Law. This means they may be forwarded only to the competent gov-
ernment bodies or the government bodies of foreign countries and 
international organizations under the condition of reciprocity, as well 
as on the basis of signed agreements on cooperation and data exchange. 
An additional condition is that the state to which the data are forward-
ed has regulated the protection of personal data. As for the records, all 
data that the obligors and the Agency are obliged to keep records of are 
defined and mentioned in the Law. Compared to the law previously in 
force, the number and types of data have increased, with the aim of 
enabling more complete records and search according to various 
parameters. In accordance with international standards, a time limit is 
also defined within which the obligors are obliged to keep the data and 
documentation. 
The Law also defines supervision over the enforcement of the Law. 
The following are listed as institutions in charge of supervision: the 
Anti-Money Laundering Agency, the National Bank of Serbia, the 
ministry in charge of internal affairs, the ministry in charge of finance, 
the Securities Commission and other inspection bodies that, in accor-
dance with other laws, are competent for the performance of inspec-
tion supervision. Also, the Law introduced significant changes in the 
penal provisions compared to the previous law and increased the pen-
alties in accordance with the Law on Economic Offences and the Law 
on Infractions. The criminal offence of money laundering is in line 
with the codification of criminal legislation, regulated by the new 
Criminal Code.
The most significant assessments of the Law were given by the Anti-
Corruption Council and the OSCE, with the domestic institution level-
ing most criticism. Namely, the Council stated the following as the main 
shortcomings:
• Unclear concept of money laundering – according to the Council, 
“introduction of illegally acquired money into legal financial 
flows” should stand instead of “covering up the illegally acquired 
assets”;
• Disputable independence of the Anti-Money Laundering Agency, 
since it is an integral part of the Ministry of Finance;
• Privileged position of the Minister of Finance – he/she regulates the 
anti-money laundering methodology and procedure and has a 
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discretionary right to exempt certain obligors from reporting the 
financial transactions that exceed EUR 15,000;
• There are no sanctions for a failure of government bodies to fulfill the 
obligation to provide information to the Agency;
• Too many economic entities having the obligation to cooperate with 
the Agency – according to the Council, the obligation to control a 
wide range of transactions will overload the Agency.
In contrast to the Council, the OSCE was somewhat more balanced 
in its evaluation:
• The definition of money laundering is “substantively” in accordance 
with the European Convention on Money Laundering;
• Unclear definition of the origin of assets from money laundering – 
whether that origin is just direct or also indirect. The question is 
where the connection between illegally acquired assets and legal 
business ends. The OSCE emphasizes the special importance of 
this in the privatization process;
• Unclear mechanism of seizing illegally acquired profit. Confiscation 
of illegally acquired assets is prescribed in Serbia; however, accord-
ing to the OSCE, the question is how efficient it is in the well-de-
veloped money laundering schemes;
• Excessively long list of obligors which leads to the overloading of the 
Agency with materials;
• Absence of obligations of the institutions that are at least partially 
financed from the budget, which is, according to the OSCE, espe-
cially problematic for the Privatization Agency.
The Anti-Money Laundering Law has certainly brought positive nov-
elties compared to the law previously in force. First of all, obligations of 
obligors are defined in detail, institutions in charge of the enforcement 
of the Law are clearly specified and penal provisions are harmonized 
with the severity of criminal offence. On the other hand, the Law con-
tains several significant unclarities that have negative consequences: the 
money laundering definition itself is insufficiently clear, the list of obli-
gors is too long, which led to the overloading of the Agency (around 
1,000 cases a day) and its inability to process the materials adequately, 
the independence of the Administration is disputable and mostly 
depends on the personality of the Minister of Finance, while the absence 
of sanctions practically leads to the absence of obligation of govern-
ment bodies to provide relevant information to the Agency.
Although 0.2% of financial transactions have been assessed as suspi-
cious so far, which is within the range of the European average, the dis-
proportion between the registered sum of illegal profit and the sum reg-
istered as suspicious transactions (approximately 5:1) indicates that the 
Law is not enforced efficiently. If we add to this that so far there have 
been practically no judgments for money laundering, but only a large 
number of reports, a small number of registered suspicious transac-
tions, and an even smaller number of activities of the prosecutor’s office 
and the police, it is clear that a lot still remains to be done in this area.
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The Law on Free Access to Information of Public Significance
The Law on Free Access to Information of Public Significance was 
passed in November 2004. There were four basic reasons for passing it:
• possibility for citizens to control government bodies efficiently, 
which is a precondition for the existence of a truly democratic 
society;
• related to the previous item, existence of legal rules on free access 
to information of public significance indicates the development 
level of democracy in every society;
• provision of necessary conditions for efficient work of the media 
that have a specific role in the control of government bodies;
• fulfilling the requirements of the Council of Europe (in February 
2002, the Committee of Ministers of this international organization 
adopted the Recommendation on Access to Public Documents by which 
it called on the member states to adopt legal rules that will protect the 
interests of individuals in more efficient control of work of govern-
ment bodies. The Recommendation also defines the legal standards 
that should be adhered to when adopting these new rules).
The civil sector had the key role in the preparation of this law. 
Namely, the Belgrade Centre for Improvement of Legal Studies pre-
pared a model of the law that served as the basis for the draft law adopt-
ed by the Serbian Government in July 2003. However, due to the assem-
bly dissolution that followed soon, the law was passed, with minor 
changes, as late as in November the following year. This occurred large-
ly owing to the activities of NGOs and, above all, the Coalition of Non-
governmental Organizations for Freedom of Access to Information, estab-
lished at the initiative of the Fund for Open Society. 
The Law, first of all, defines the terms “information of public signifi-
cance” and “public authority”, determines the justified interest of the 
public to know, as well as the limitations of the right to access this type 
of information. The Law also establishes the institution of the 
Commissioner for Information of Public Significance, determines his 
position and authority, as well as the rules on protection of the rights of 
the requesting party before him. Furthermore, the Law defines the rules 
on the manner of exercising the rights guaranteed by the law in the pro-
ceedings before a public authority, as well as the measures for improv-
ing the publicity of their work. Finally, the law also prescribes damages 
or fines if the authority unjustifiably denies or limits the rights to access 
information of public significance.
Information of public significance available to the public authority is 
defined by the law as the information about everything that anyone has 
a justifiable interest to know about, while the definition of public 
authority includes not only all government bodies, bodies of territorial 
autonomy and local self-government, but also the persons entrusted 
with exercise of public authority, as well as the legal persons established 
or financed wholly or predominantly by a government body. 
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As regards justified interest of the public to know, the law determines 
that it always exists when it comes to the information relating to endan-
gering or protection of health of the population and natural environ-
ment, as well as when it comes to the information that originated in the 
course of work or in connection with work of authorities and the infor-
mation more than twenty years old. 
The law defines the principle of equality in exercising the rights, pri-
marily the following: the right to be notified whether the public author-
ity possesses certain information of public significance, and whether it 
is otherwise available, then the right to have insight into the document 
containing the information of public significance, the right to a copy of 
that document, as well as the right to delivery. 
The Law also prescribes limitations of this right: 
• endangerment of life, health, security or other important property 
of a person; 
• endangerment, hindrance or obstruction of prevention or detec-
tion of a criminal offence, charging with a criminal offence, con-
ducting pretrial proceedings, conducting court proceedings, exe-
cution of sentence or execution of penalty, or some other legally 
regulated proceedings, or fair treatment and fair trial; 
• serious endangerment of national defense or public security; 
• substantial reduction of the Government’s ability to manage eco-
nomic processes in the country, or substantial obstruction of real-
ization of justified economic interests; 
• if the disclosure of the information designated as secret could lead 
to severe legal or other consequences to the interests protected by 
the law that prevail over the interest to access information.
Finally, excluded from the general legal regime of access to informa-
tion of public significance is the information that is not of a public 
character, or if the right to privacy, the right to reputation or some 
other right of the persons the requested information personally relates 
to would be violated by it.
As for the rules on the manner of exercising the rights guaranteed 
by the Law in the proceedings before a public authority, the most 
important is the provision that the requesting party does not have to 
state the reasons for the submitted request. The Law also prescribes 
the deadlines within which these authorities are obliged to respond to 
those requests (not longer than 15 days), as well as the fees for neces-
sary costs of making the copy of the document containing the request-
ed information.
The public authority is also obliged to forward the received request 
to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance in case it is 
found out that the document containing the requested information is 
not in its possession. The Law also defined the rules of the Commissioner’s 
conduct in this case, as well as in case of appeal against the public 
authority’s decision and the so-called silence of administration. The 
Commissioner also has the opportunity to conduct investigations 
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independently, and the Law also contains provisions on validity or the 
binding character of the decisions and resolutions made by him, as well 
as provisions on legal remedy against his decisions.
The provisions by which the Commissioner is established and precise 
rules on his election and term termination, position and authority are 
defined are based on the intention to ensure his independent position, 
so they largely rest on the rules of judge appointment and dismissal.
The Law also provides for several different legal mechanism for 
improving the publicity of work of authorities, among which the fol-
lowing are the most significant:
• the Commissioner’s obligation to publish and keep up-to-date a 
manual with practical instructions for efficient exercise of legal 
rights and inform the public about its contents;
• obligation of public authorities to appoint a spokesperson who, 
inter alia, receives requests and provides the requesting parties 
with necessary assistance in exercising their rights, receives com-
plaints on the work of the authority and takes care of the informa-
tion carriers, as well as to publish a regular annual information 
booklet with the data about its work;
• obligation of government bodies to conduct training of employees 
in connection with its enforcement;
• obligation of the spokespersons to submit to the Commissioner a 
regular annual report with the data relevant for exercising of the 
right to access public information.
According to the Law, public authorities are liable for the damage 
caused by the fact that a medium was unable to publish the information 
because an authority has denied or limited without justification the 
rights to access information of public significance, and fines are pre-
scribed in the area of offence sanctions for violating the provisions of 
this law. Finally, the Ministry competent for information affairs is in 
charge of supervision over enforcement of this law.
A comprehensive assessment of the law and its application was given 
by the already mentioned Coalition for Freedom of Access to 
Information. Namely, in the period from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 
2006, the Coalition conducted a monitoring of the application of this 
law. The basic conclusion contained in the monitoring report is that the 
problems in the implementation of the law are least of all the conse-
quence of the legal text itself, and the following are mentioned as the 
three most significant obstacles to its more successful application:
1. Normative environment 
The greatest danger for the application of the law is the possibility of 
derogating its rules by provisions of other legal texts. That was done, 
first of all, by the Law on Police, by which the extent of freedom of 
access to information was reduced. The problem is also the absence of 
the Law on Secret Data, as well as an appropriate new Law on Personal 
Data Protection.
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2.  Insufficient interest of entitled persons 
The monitoring showed that neither the citizens nor the media nor 
the non-governmental organizations are using the freedom of access to 
information to a sufficient extent.
3. Ignorance and obstruction by public authorities 
The following are stated as the most frequent problems with enforc-
ing the law in connection with the activities of public authorities:
• insufficient familiarity with the law, especially as regards public 
officials at the local level;
• frequent attempts to avoid obligations and duties arising from the 
law by arbitrary interpretation of its provisions or by invoking 
secrecy as the reason for refusing to provide information;
• exceeding the time limits, or the so-called silence of administra-
tion (in almost 50 percent of cases of sent requests);
• insufficient capacities of the Ministry of Culture (the line ministry 
in charge of supervision over enforcement of the law) for initiating 
infraction proceedings against the responsible authorized persons 
not acting in accordance with the law;
• failure to fulfill the obligation of forwarding requests to the 
Commissioner in case when the public authority does not possess 
the document containing the requested information; 
• many public authorities have still not appointed an authorized 
person for handling the requests in connection with the law;
• most of the government bodies do not observe the legal obligation 
of publishing an information booklet and of training the employ-
ees in connection with the enforcement of the law.
However, when it comes to the shortcomings of the legal text itself, 
the Coalition points to the following: 
• impossibility of lodging an appeal to the Commissioner against 
the decisions of the highest authorities – the National Assembly, 
President of the Republic, Government of the Republic of Serbia, 
Supreme Court of Serbia, Constitutional Court and the Republican 
Public Prosecutor;
• absence of obligation of all public authorities to publish an infor-
mation booklet;
• absence of protection of insiders – the so-called “whistle-blowers”.
In its report, the Coalition also commended the work of the 
Commissioner for Information of Public Significance and of his office.
As could be seen from the previously mentioned, the law has been 
implemented with great difficulties from the very beginning. One of the 
reasons for slow enforcement is that the Commissioner has been with-
out the basic work resources for a long time (appropriate premises, 
budget, assistants). The Government, which did not provide the neces-
sary resources on time, is responsible for this. The second important 
reason is that a new right is introduced by the law – the right of the 
public to know, which presents a great novelty in the society with inher-
ited well-developed “culture of secrecy”.
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Therefore, a necessary precondition for a proper application of the 
Law is continued education, media and other forms of campaigns 
directed towards citizens as well as towards public authorities. Certainly, 
the fact must not be disregarded that a serious shift has already been 
made in the area of education, primarily owing to the activities of the 
Commissioner, Coalition and other non-governmental organizations, 
as well as of some international organizations, primarily the OSCE 
Mission to Serbia.
In addition to intensified education activities, amendments to the 
law itself are also necessary, primarily because the most important gov-
ernment bodies are exempted from its application, as well as because of 
the limitations that are not defined precisely. Therefore, the Coalition 
formulated amendments that need to be adopted, the most important 
among them being the following:
Ensuring the right to appeal to the Commissioner against the deci-
sion of the President of the Republic, National Assembly, Government, 
Supreme Court, Constitutional Court and the Republican Public 
Prosecutor as well;
• Increasing liability in case of violating the law;
• Provision of efficient system of supervision over the application of 
the law; 
• Protection of “whistle-blowers”.
The new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia also took into account 
the recommendation that the right to access information be included in 
the corpus of human rights as a separate human right (Article 51). On 
the other hand, however, the Commissioner for Information of Public 
Significance has not become a constitutional category.
In addition to the previously mentioned amendments to the law, it is 
necessary also to ensure the observance of the principle of legal text 
hierarchy and the principle of legal system unity, as well as to pass a new 
Law on Handling Secrets and Law on Personal Data Protection.
Conclusion 
Although a large number of laws have been passed that are the legal 
basis for direct policies of the Government in the anti-corruption 
sphere, it certainly has not led to a significant shift in the sphere of direct 
anti-corruption policies. The reasons should be sought in the following. 
First, the analysis showed that many of these laws or documents do not 
contain optimum solutions but that compromises were made in that 
sphere, bearing in mind political and other interests of parliamentary 
parties. This relates particularly to penal provisions. Secondly, and 
probably more importantly, some legal solutions have not been applied 
(not applied consistently, and in some cases not applied at all), since 
that, on the one hand, was not in the interest of the parliamentary par-
ties, while on the other hand there were no appropriate administrative 
capacities. Third, operative documents, such as strategies (fight against 
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corruption, or judiciary reform) have been formulated not because 
there were autochthonous political motives for that, but mostly under 
the pressure of the international community and donors, particularly 
multinational European organizations, and with their active participa-
tion. Because of that such documents include to a large extent the posi-
tions or desires of those organizations, i.e. strategy elements that are 
better suited to some other countries, particularly those that have a far 
greater administrative capacity than Serbia.   
However, the key cause of modest results in the sphere of direct anti-
corruption policies lies in the lack of political will – fight against cor-
ruption is not at the top of the political priorities of the authorities. 
There are several reasons for that. First, the governments in Serbia are 
coalition governments, which means a number of diverse parties par-
ticipate in them. Internal stability of those governments depends on a 
special balance achieved within the coalition, and corruption very often 
plays a significant role in achieving such a balance – there is not a single 
incentive for the Prime Minister of such a government to disclose cor-
ruption scandals of his/her coalition partners, since undisclosed rather 
than disclosed scandals of that kind represent a powerful weapon for 
political blackmailing of the partner and keeping the balance (of fear). 
Even if there is no previously mentioned mechanism, coalition govern-
ments are unstable by their very nature, so they have no solid basis for a 
strong fight against corruption. Only the creation of a powerful govern-
ment may create a precondition for effective fight against corruption. 
INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ASPECT 
Introduction
The authorities in Serbia place, at least formally, international standards 
and obligations in the center of fight against corruption. Namely, stated 
in the introductory part of the National Anti-corruption Strategy, 
adopted in December 2005, as the starting basis is the “Comprehensive 
Anti-corruption Policy of the European Union”. Moreover, a special 
emphasis is placed on the “Ten principles for improving the fight 
against corruption in acceding, candidate and other third countries”, 
which are, at the same time, an integral part of this policy1. Having in 
mind the fact that the EU integration has been declared to be a pri-
ority, fulfilling the mentioned ten principles should be certainly 
1 Among these criteria are the following: clearly expressed political will for fight 
against corruption; adoption and application of national anti-corruption strategies 
or programs; ratification and implementation of all most significant international 
anti-corruption instruments; competent and visible anti-corruption bodies; 
openness, competence, responsibility and transparency of government 
administration; conducting campaigns for raising awareness of the gravity of the 
corruption problem; clear and transparent rules of political party financing; 
creation of incentives for the private sector to abstain from corruption.
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among the top priorities on the authorities’ agenda. Namely, in this 
document the European Union requires explicitly all the countries 
that want to become its members not only to adopt the EU Acquis 
but also to ratify and apply all the most significant international 
anti-corruption instruments, particularly stating the relevant con-
ventions of the United Nations, Council of Europe and the OECD. 
According to the EU, progress in corruption elimination and insti-
tution strengthening are essential for further development of the 
West Balkan countries. 
Apart from this wider, regional approach to the problem of corrup-
tion, through different forms of relations, firstly with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, than the State Union Serbia and Montenegro 
and finally with the Republic of Serbia, the European Union has been 
pointing out the problem of corruption, mostly within the wider issues 
of the rule of law. This also applies to negotiations on the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement, which were suspended in May 2006 due to 
the absence of full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. Namely, the 
anti-corruption problem is mentioned in Section 7, Justice, Freedom 
and Security, which has not been discussed yet, within the part dealing 
with institution strengthening and the rule of law.
When it comes to specific issues in connection with corruption raised 
by the European Commission after the adoption of the Draft 
Constitution in the Assembly of Serbia in late September 2006, a special 
emphasis was placed on the issue of the judiciary independence.
Overview of formal fulfillment of international standards
When it comes to formal fulfillment of international anti-corruption 
standards, the Republic of Serbia (until May 2006 in the state union 
with Montenegro) has signed and ratified a number of agreements. This 
process has been developing more slowly compared to the other coun-
tries in the region, primarily due to the nonfunctional State Union 
Serbia and Montenegro, formed in spring 2003, within whose compe-
tence was ratification of international agreements. Thus, most of the 
conventions were ratified in the period of existence of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, immediately after the constitution of the dem-
ocratic government in Serbia at the beginning of 2001.
The following conventions were ratified:
1. The UN Anti-corruption Convention (2005) 
The goals of the Convention are the improvement and strengthening 
of measures for more efficient and more successful fight against cor-
ruption and its prevention, as well as facilitation of international coop-
eration and intensification of technical assistance, including return of 
illegally acquired assets as well. It also serves as a reference point to the 
governments, citizens and donors in their work and provides standards 
for the areas such as ethics in the public sector, access to information 
and codes of conduct in the private sector.
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2. The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
(2002)
The main goal of this ambitious instrument is achieving efficient 
cooperation in criminal matters at the international level. It also con-
tains additional criminal-law measures for improvement of interna-
tional cooperation in prosecuting perpetrators of corruption acts. The 
implementation is supervised by the GRECO – the Group of States 
Against Corruption. It covers a wide area and supplements the exist-
ing legal instruments.2 When handing over the ratification instru-
ment, S&M made a reservation and retained the right to refuse the 
requests for international legal aid “if they relate to an act that has the 
character of political act according to domestic law.” This reservation 
was revoked in late 2005 when an amendment to the Law on 
Ratification of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption was adopted.
 3. The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (2002)
A significant instrument in money laundering prevention, particu-
larly focused on the sources of financing. This convention is to be 
replaced by the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism, which has not come into force yet and which 
contains the obligation of introducing preventive measures as well as 
intensifying international cooperation in this area. When handing over 
the ratification instrument, S&M made a reservation according to which 
certain confiscation measures would be applied only under the condi-
tions prescribed by our criminal legislation. Since the Council of Europe 
Legal Advice Department and Treaty Office assessed the mentioned res-
ervation to be unacceptable, because it would limit the application of 
confiscation measures that, according to the definition of the conven-
tion, relate solely to the assets acquired by committing criminal offenc-
es, in late 2005 the Assembly of the S&M adopted the amendments to 
the Law on Ratification of the Convention, by which this reservation 
was revoked.
4. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (2001)
It requires the signatory states to stipulate in their legislation measures 
for prevention of participation in organized groups, whose criminal activ-
2 Among the corruptive activities the Convention covers are the following: active or 
passive bribery of domestic and foreign government and international public 
officials, members of parliament, members of private sector, judges and members 
of courts; active and passive influence trading; money laundering as a result of 
corrupt activities; accounting infractions related to corrupt activities. According 
to the Convention, the countries are obliged to undertake efficient sanctions and 
measures that also include arrest and extradition. The Convention also contains 
the criteria for determination of country jurisdiction, liability of legal persons, 
establishment of specialized anti-corruption bodies etc. 
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ity is aimed at illegal financial benefit, money laundering, corruption and 
obstruction of justice. It also requires them to engage in international 
cooperation in this area. Two additional protocols for prevention and 
punishment of human trafficking and migrant smuggling were also rati-
fied together with this convention.
5. The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
with additional protocol (2001)
According to this convention, the states that acceded to it undertake 
to provide the widest legal aid possible in any proceedings relating to 
criminal offences the prosecution of which falls within the competence 
of the state that sent the request. The procedure of that cooperation is 
also specified by it.
In addition to the previously mentioned ratified conventions, Serbia 
also signed the following conventions: 
1. The Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (2005)
The basic goal of the Convention is the provision of efficient legal 
instruments by each state in its internal legislation to those suffering the 
damage that is a consequence of corruption, so that the injured parties 
could defend their rights and interests, including the possibility of 
receiving compensation for the damage. The convention also contains 
the definition of corruption, which enables its application to corrup-
tion in the private sector and in the public sector, as well as at the inter-
national level. The formal reason that the convention has not been rati-
fied yet is poor translation. Although it was expected that the dissolu-
tion of the State Union will accelerate the ratification process and that it 
would occur by the end of 2006, the instability of the Government, the 
adoption of the new Constitution and early elections postponed the 
whole procedure until the constitution of the new parliament, and for-
mation of the new Government.
2. The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of 
Terrorism (2005)
As stated previously, this convention should replace the Convention 
on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime and that is the first international agreement that simultaneously 
covers prevention and control of money laundering and terrorism 
financing. The formal reason that the convention has not been ratified 
yet is also poor translation. Therefore, the ratification of this conven-
tion will also have to wait for the new parliament.
3. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and Additional 
Protocol (2005)
It requires the countries of the Council of Europe and of the European 
Union to cooperate mutually in the fight against “cybercrime”, and the 
developed countries to provide aid in that fight to less developed coun-
tries in equipment and training. The Convention includes in the forms of 
that crime disallowed access to information and their illegal interception, 
data changing, deletion and falsification, disruption of computer systems 
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and sale of hardware and software the purpose of which is illegal. Other 
forms of that crime are the violation of copyright and related rights, and 
piracy over the Internet, as well as data falsification, or manipulating 
computer systems for the purpose of acquiring illegal profit. This con-
vention has not been ratified yet, either, due to poor translation, and the 
problems with technical terms, as well as because no reservations have 
been made. As in the case of the previous two conventions, the ratifica-
tion is expected in the new parliament.
4. The Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption (2005) 
The Protocol expands the scope of the Convention and supplements 
the provisions whose objective is the protection of the judiciary from 
corruption. The states that ratify this document are obliged to adopt 
necessary measures by which active and passive bribing of domestic and 
foreign arbitrators and jurors would be considered a criminal offence.
The Republic of Serbia has not signed the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, either, because it was sug-
gested by this international organization that it was too early for that.
International anti-corruption cooperation 
The Republic of Serbia has well-developed international anti-corrup-
tion cooperation. It participates in a number of international programs, 
bodies and initiatives, and bilateral cooperation programs are taking 
place as well. Certainly, the most significant projects are those carried 
out by the Council of Europe, whether by itself or together with the 
European Commission, of which three have a regional character:
1. The Council of Europe PACO Impact Project. This project sup-
ported the implementation of the anti-corruption plans in 
Southeast Europe. Within this project, the Ministry of Justice of 
the Republic of Serbia has begun the introduction of Integrity 
Plans in district courts and the district attorney’s office in Belgrade. 
The project was completed in July 2006.
2. The CARDS Justice Project – a joint project of the Council of Europe 
and the European Commission, whose goal is to establish an inde-
pendent, reliable and functional judiciary, as well as to promote 
court cooperation in the West Balkans. In Serbia, it is implement-
ed in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and is primarily 
directed to institutional capacity building.                
3. The CARDS Police Project – a joint project of the Council of Europe 
and the European Commission. The project’s goal is strengthen-
ing the capacity of the police in fighting felony in the Southeast 
Europe. In the Republic of Serbia, support has been provided to 
institutional capacity building of the Ministry of the Interior – pri-
marily the Organized Crime Directorate and the Criminal Police 
Directorate, as well as to developing a modern border manage-
ment system.
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Cooperation with the Council of Europe.
The Republic of Serbia is also active in the work of the Council of 
Europe bodies and programs, such as the Council of Europe Group of 
States Against Corruption (GRECO), the Council of Europe Program 
Against Corruption and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe 
(OCTOPUS) and the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL), and it also partici-
pates in the PACO-Serbia Program. 
As a member of the Council of Europe Group of States Against 
Corruption (GRECO), Serbia has responded to the first and second 
evaluation rounds. The evaluation team of this body of the Council of 
Europe visited Serbia in September 2005, its report was adopted in June 
2006 and published in October of the same year.
It is emphasized in the report that the corruption in Serbia is a sig-
nificant problem encompassing a large number of areas. The judiciary, 
local self-government, customs service, police and health care service 
are particularly emphasized as the sectors in which corruption is most 
apparent. On the other hand, efforts the authorities invest in the fight 
against this phenomenon are welcomed and the creation of the anti-
corruption strategy and the action plan for its implementation are par-
ticularly singled out in this, as well as the judiciary reform, whose goal is 
to provide its integrity and better functioning. 
The report also contains 25 recommendations whose fulfillment, 
as well as the submission of the report on their realization, is expect-
ed by the end of 2007. The most significant recommendation is the 
pointing out to the need for greater specialization and cooperation 
of the bodies engaged in detecting and prosecuting perpetrators of 
corruption. However, when it comes to government administration, 
a faster establishment of the institution of Ombudsman at the coun-
try level, adoption and dissemination of the code of conduct of civil 
servants at the national level, expanding of the existing rules on the 
conflict of interest to all government officials, as well as provision of 
appropriate protection of “whistle-blowers” are demanded. The 
GRECO also recommends the establishment of liability of legal per-
sons for corruption, money laundering and trading influence, as 
well as efficient, appropriate and deterrent sanctions. The level of 
fulfillment of these recommendations will be assessed in the first 
half of 2008.
As regards cooperation within the Council of Europe Program 
Against Corruption and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe 
(OCTOPUS) and the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL), a number of work-
shops and conferences have been organized, and the Anti-Money 
Laundering Agency, in accordance with its authority, cooperates 
actively in this area. The Agency has also been a member of the inter-
national association of financial intelligence services – the Egmont 
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Group since July 2003, or since the time when the Federal Anti-Money 
Laundering Commission, established one year earlier by the Anti-
Money Laundering Law, was transferred into the competence of the 
Republic of Serbia and changed its name. Membership in the Egmont 
Group is possible when an institution meets internationally recog-
nized criteria, and when it is able to exchange financial intelligence 
with the related institutions throughout the world in an efficient and 
safe manner. 
Finally, within PACO-Serbia, the Council of Europe Program Against 
Corruption and Organized Crime in Europe, also financed by the 
European Union, support was given to the project of fight against eco-
nomic crime, money laundering and terrorism financing, as well as 
cybercrime. The project started in December 2005 and will last 24 
months.    
The project goals are the following:
– support in preparing national legislation for fight against econom-
ic crime and provision of its compliance with the existing interna-
tional standards, as well as elimination of any non-compliance;
– familiarizing the legislators as well as those enforcing the law, 
judges and prosecutors, with the best practice in criminal law and 
system of law application in other countries;
– strengthening the system of preventing money laundering and ter-
rorist financing through training, improvement of legislation and 
development of an IT department in the Anti-Money Laundering 
Agency of the Ministry of Finance; 
– improvement of capacities for fight against cyberterrorism through 
training and aid in fulfillment of international standards; 
– assistance in ratification and incorporation into the national legis-
lation of the European treaties Serbia has not acceded to yet (espe-
cially the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism).
Cooperation with other international organizations and foreign 
partners 
The Government of the Republic of Serbia cooperates actively in the 
anti-corruption sphere with other international organizations and for-
eign governments as well, with whose help a number of conferences, 
seminars and working visits have been organized, particularly signifi-
cant of which are the two initiatives under the auspices of the Stability 
Pact: the Southeast Europe Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative (SPAI) 
and the Initiative Against Organized Crime (SPOC).
The Republic of Serbia participated in the establishment of the SPAI 
Secretariat in Sarajevo, as well as in the seminars where knowledge was 
exchanged about the best ways to fight corruption, whose special goals 
were the creation of a regional framework for information exchange, 
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improvement of regional cooperation by establishing direct contacts 
between the members of the ministries of the interior and formulation 
of the proposal for improvement of national legislation and institution-
al framework. Representatives of the Republic of Serbia also regularly 
participate at the meetings of the SPOC Council that are held twice a 
year and at which national and regional strategies of fight against orga-
nized crime are discussed, as well as the issues of capacity strengthen-
ing, legislative reforms and raising the awareness of the gravity of this 
problem.
When it comes to the regional dimension of fight against corruption, 
this issue has also been discussed regularly within the Southeast European 
Cooperation Process (SEECP), as well as the Anti-corruption Network for 
Transition Economies (ACN).
The Republic of Serbia also cooperates with other international orga-
nizations, such as the World Bank and the OECD, as well as with the 
international aid agencies of other countries such as DFID, USAID, 
OECD, CIDA, and with other relevant institutions in draft preparation 
and application of anti-corruption regulations and strategies.
Last, but not least, Serbia also participates in the International 
Chamber of Commerce Anti-corruption Program, and the cooperation 
has also been established with the FBI International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA), whose courses are attended by the members of the 
Ministry of the Interior.
Also, within the Twinning Project of support to institutional capacity 
building of the Ministry of Justice, this ministry, in cooperation with 
the Slovenian Anti-corruption Commission, works on the preparation 
of the Action Plan for Anti-corruption Strategy Implementation. 
Future necessary standards and activities 
In spite of the fact that Serbia has ratified most of international anti-
corruption instruments, as we have already seen previously, a certain 
number of international conventions and documents still remained to 
be ratified:
1. Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption;
2. Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption;
3. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing 
of Terrorism;
4. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and Additional 
Protocol.
In the future, Serbia is to sign and ratify the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.
However, considerably more important than the adoption of the 
previously mentioned international instruments is the application of 
international standards, primarily concentration on the fulfillment of 
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the GRECO recommendations and the “Ten principles for improving 
the fight against corruption in acceding, candidate and other third 
countries” that constitute an integral part of the National Anti-
corruption Strategy. Therefore, it is crucial to undertake the following 
steps:
• pass the Law on Anti-corruption Agency and establish it;
• prepare and apply the Action Plan for Anti-corruption Strategy 
Implementation;
• establish the Ombudsman institution at the national level;
• establish the state audit institution;
• improve the application of the Law on Public Procurement;
• expand the application of the Law on Conflict of Interest;
• improve capacities and coordination between the government 
bodies in charge of fight against corruption;
• improve regional and international cooperation.
 
Overview of formal fulfillment of international standards
UN Anti-corruption Convention Ratified(2005)
UN Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime and additional protocols to the UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime for prevention and punishment of human 
trafficking and against migrant smuggling
Ratified (2001)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption Ratified (2002)
Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption Signed (2005)
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime
Ratified (2002)
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism
Signed (2005)
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption Signed (2005)
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, as 
well as Additional Protocol Signed (2005)
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters with additional protocol Ratified (2001)
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials Not signed
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Overview of participation in international anti-corruption programs, bodies and 
initiatives
Bodies and 
programs of the 
Council of 
Europe
joint projects of 
the Council of 
Europe and the 
European 
Commission
Regional 
initiatives
Other
GRECO – 
Council of 
Europe body
CARDS Ju sti ce SPAI – 
Southeast 
Europe 
Stability Pact 
Anti-
corruption 
Initiative
World Bank, THE 
OSCE. UNDP, 
OECD 
(Cooperation 
with other 
international 
organizations)
OC TO PUS CARDS Po li ce SPOC – 
Initiative 
Against 
Organized 
Crime
DFID, USAID, 
OECD, CIDA 
(cooperation with 
agencies for 
international aid 
of other 
countries)
MO NEYVAL PA CO Ser bia Anti-
corruption 
Net work for 
Tran si tion 
Eco no mi es
International 
Chamber of 
Commerce Anti-
corruption 
Program
PA CO Im pact SE ECP Twinning EU
Conclusion 
Starting from 2001, Serbia has ratified a large number of international 
anti-corruption instruments, although a certain number of interna-
tional conventions and documents still remains to be ratified. The 
problem, however, is not about which documents Serbia has ratified 
and which it has not but to what extent the authorities in Serbia (execu-
tive and legislative) truly accept those documents and their recommen-
dations and to what extent they do it due to specific political pressure of 
the international community. It seems that not many deputies were 
interested in the contents of the documents they ratified. It was yet 
another vote according to the proposal of the executive authorities; the 
deputies from the parties that support the Government voted “in favor”, 
while the deputies from the opposition parties voted “against”, neither 
of them getting into the details of what they voted about.  
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ANTI-CORRUPTION COUNCIL ANd ITS RESULTS 
A Short historical Background of the Council 
The establishment of the Anti-corruption Council of the Government 
of the Republic of Serbia is linked to the initial days of the first demo-
cratic Government of Serbia formed in January 2001. Two men played 
the key role in the establishment of the Council and definition of its 
role: Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić and Finance Minister Božidar Đelić. 
More specifically, it can be easily assumed that the inspirer of the estab-
lishment of this body was Božidar Đelić. What were his motives for this 
action? Mr. Đelić came to Serbia in late 2000, from the “big wide” world 
and was very well informed about the topics that arouse the keenest 
interest – he astutely noticed a kind of global “fashion” to tackle the 
phenomenon of corruption, that is, the fight against it. By grabbing this 
topic, too, for his portfolio, Mr. Đelić secured a kind of recognition for 
himself in international circles, i.e., created an image of a politician who 
fits into the internationally recognized value system. Moreover, Mr. 
Đelić’s policy was to maximize the competences of his Ministry and he 
did that, within the boundaries of the law, by assigning topics and/or 
issues to the Ministry of Finance, which he simply declared to be in his 
own portfolio. Thus, for instance, the Ministry of Finance worked on 
the Draft Law on Denationalization, which, unfortunately, never saw 
the light of day. Relatively scarce resources of the Ministry, i.e., its rath-
er limited administrative capacities, in relation to a huge burden of 
obligations that Mr. Đelić voluntarily took upon himself, simply result-
ed in the non-fulfillment of some of these obligations and/or their inad-
equate fulfillment. Under such conditions, it seems that dealing with 
corruption had great importance primarily in the domain of public 
relations (in the broadest sense of the word), and that Minister Đelić 
was in fact more interested in the topics such as reform of the taxation 
system, building of the tax administration and consolidation of the 
budget, and rightfully so, since that is the core of the activity of the 
Ministry of Finance. Still, the fight against corruption paid part of the 
price for this kind of prioritization. 
The assumption that the inspirer of the establishment of the Council 
was Mr. Đelić brings us to the question of Zoran Đinđić’s motivation 
in accepting this initiative and backing it completely. There are some 
indications that Mr. Đinđić was not satisfied with the image of him 
that prevailed in the public, according to which he was seen as an effi-
cient and pragmatic politician who did not care much about ethical 
norms. A strong contribution to such an image was made by Đinđić 
himself, through his political activity, that is, his conduct during the 
1990s. It can be illustrated by his statement: “Those who care about 
morality should go to church”, or by his fickleness in the course of the 
1996/97 protests. The establishment of an anti-corruption body of the 
Serbian Government was supposed to bring an improvement in the 
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Prime Minister’s image among the broadest political public. Indirectly, 
it could be concluded that Zoran Đinđić’s commitment to the idea of 
setting up a government body to deal with corruption was based pri-
marily on the value of such a body from the standpoint of public rela-
tions. It is beyond doubt that the pragmatic Mr. Đinđić was oriented 
toward the future and that his interest was in finding the way for 
Serbia to change as quickly as possible and become part of prosperous 
Europe as soon as possible, and he did not want anything to distract 
him from that goal. He left the lead political role in the pursuance of 
anti-corruption activities to his Finance Minister. Consequently, 
Božidar Đelić was the “guardian” of the Council, in the political sense, 
at the beginning of its work. 
In such conditions, in which the basic political motives are not in the 
domain of contents, but rather in the domain of public relations, the 
fundamental issue of the term of office, that is, of the task of the body 
which has been established, remains open. Namely, irrespective of a 
formal founding decision, which has defined the term of office of this 
body, the lack of a clear and firm political will to fight corruption, i.e., 
of a desire for effective work of the Council, has led to the problems in 
defining its mandate, the activities that this body should actually pur-
sue, as well as in the selection of Council members and its internal orga-
nization. 
In one of the first meetings that Zoran Đinđić had with the members 
of the Council (before the official establishment of the Council as such), 
when asked by one of the (prospective) members of the Council about 
what exactly they were supposed to do to, Mr. Đinđić laconically replied 
“Well, do whatever you like!”. All follow-up questions were met with 
the following answer: “Boža (Đelić) will be in charge of that”. It was 
evident that the Prime Minister had no clear concept for the work of 
the Council and that he was not very keenly interested in it. The Anti-
corruption Council, that is, the fight against corruption in Serbia as 
such was not his political priority. Such an attitude was a consequence 
of the pragmatism of the late Prime Minister, as well as of his attitude 
toward the Council, which he perceived as a mechanism for building 
good public relations, not as a body which can make a contribution in 
the field of governance methods in the country. In addition, on several 
occasions Zoran Đinđić spoke about the Council as the conscience of 
those in power, i.e., the conscience of the people in the Government. 
The conveyance of such signals was obviously not beneficial from the 
standpoint of defining the mandate of the Council, so the huge energy 
of the Council members was absolutely expectedly spent on a debate 
about it. 
The second problem, which was a consequence of the mentioned 
political concept, was the selection of the cadre for the Council. In the 
second half of 2001, an informal public competition for the members of 
the Council was announced, with Mr. Đelić, as the mastermind behind 
it, being the most active person in bringing people together. The basic, 
168 Corruption in Serbia Five Years Later
and almost only criterion, for the selection into the Council was the 
social standing, that is, “morality” of candidates. In other words, it was 
not important how competent Council members were, that is, whether 
they knew something about corruption and its mechanisms or not, to 
which extent they were willing to learn something from that field, how 
much talent and will for teamwork they had – the only important thing 
was that they were reputable, i.e., moral. This is how a group was formed 
of very reputable and indubitably moral members, very differently 
qualified for the execution of the Council’s mandate, who were sup-
posed to work as a team – a recipe for disaster. And all the more so 
bearing in mind that reputable people in Serbia are very often quite 
self-important.  
The beginning of the work of the Council was marked by an internal 
debate about the mandate and several scandals. A huge amount of ener-
gy was spent on finding an answer to the question of what the Council 
should do, though without any success. As for the scandals, the most 
significant one was a public exchange of accusations between Council 
member Čedomir Čupić and owner of TV Pink Željko Mitrović. An 
attack by Mr. Čupić (of whom it was not clear whether he acted in his 
own name or as a Council member) provoked a counterattack by Mr. 
Mitrović and accusations by the latter against the former, and every-
thing was concluded by Prime Minister Đinđić’s statement that “he had 
no desire to get involved in a fight of sparrows in the dust.” Insulted by 
such an attitude of the Prime Minister, Mr. Čupić resigned from the 
Council in early 2003. That was preceded by several other resignations, 
only to culminate with the resignation of the Council Chairperson, 
Slobodan Beljanski (in July 2002), on account of “personal disagree-
ment with the manner in which the Government treats the Council”. 
The departure of a number of the members, both due to resignations 
and to the assumption of new offices that would create a conflict of 
interest (Predrag Jovanović took the post of the Director of the Public 
Procurement Directorate), brought about a reduction in the number of 
the Council members, the selection of new members in mid-2003, as 
well as the election of a new Chairperson of the Council – Verica Barać. 
A change which was very quickly noted was the intensity of public 
appearances of the Council’s leading figure – Ms. Barać has had a high 
frequency of appearances in the media from the very beginning. In 
time, the Chairperson of the Council has become, as it seems, a syn-
onym for the Council, at least regarding public appearances. 
The problems associated with defining the mandate and activities of 
the Council led to the need for new talks with the Prime Minister. 
Moreover, a meeting of the Council with the Prime Minister was sched-
uled for 12 March 2003 at 13:00 on the premises of the Government. 
Zoran Đinđić was assassinated when he was arriving for that meeting. 
His successor Zoran Živković applied his aggressive style of commu-
nication with people who thought differently (and whose number was 
steadily growing in the course of his term in office) not only to political 
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opponents, but also to the Chairpersons of the Council, which is, at 
least formally, the Council of the Serbian Government. The other side, 
however, never failed to answer back. As a result, the general public 
bore witness to rather intensive verbal clashes between the leading fig-
ures of the Council, predominantly its Chairperson, and the Prime 
Minister. 
The arrival of a new Serbian Government in March 2004 and a new 
Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica, has changed the relationship 
between the Government and the Council. Namely, the Prime Minister 
was not particularly agitated by the reports, memorandums and public 
appearances of the Chairperson and Council members, all the more so 
because the majority of accusations was directed toward the cabinet 
members from G17 Plus (Miroljub Labus and Mlađan Dinkić), as well 
as toward the process of privatization which had been carried out dur-
ing Zoran Đinđić’s, i.e., Zoran Živković’s governments. Naturally, being 
a political pragmatist, Vojislav Koštunica did not see anything wrong in 
the deterioration of the credibility, i.e., political positions of his current 
or potential rivals and/or coalition partners. Therefore, increasingly 
heated public appearances of the Chairperson and individual Council 
members were not met with any reaction on the part of the Prime 
Minister, or other people from his party, but they provoked some fer-
vent reactions by Mlađan Dinkić. One of the TV duels between Verica 
Barać and Mlađan Dinkić certainly belongs to the highest achievements 
of the Serbian political kitsch in terms of communication style and 
soundness of accusations. The said TV duel, together with the matching 
campaign waged by Verica Barać, constitutes the greatest contribution 
to the deprivation of sense of the public debate about corruption in 
Serbia – in exactly the same manner in which parliamentary debates in 
Serbia have long been rendered senseless by radical-like rhetoric of 
Vojislav Šešelj and his followers.
During the term of Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica’s cabinet of 
March 2004, a new National Anti-corruption Strategy was adopted, 
which provides for the establishment of an Anti-corruption Agency. 
After the setting up of that Agency, the Council will cease to exist. Since 
the Law on the strength of which the said Agency is to be established has 
not yet (June 2007) been passed, the Council is still existent and active. 
The forming of the Government in May 2007 was accompanied by 
Verica Barać’s fierce attacks on new Finance Minister Mirko Cvetković. 
Bearing in mind the controversy that surrounded the selection of can-
didates for the Finance Minister (there were several candidates for that 
office), and obvious dissatisfaction at that choice on the part of certain 
circles in the political party to which the finance ministry was allocated, 
it is difficult to get rid of the impression that through the attack on 
Mirko Cvetković, related to his alleged actions as Privatization Agency 
Director, the Anti-corruption Council was used in clashes at the level of 
everyday politics, even the intra-party level. It is not very likely that an 
institution which was abused in such a manner can have any kind of 
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credibility. From its beginning, associated with the internal clashes in 
the Council over its mandate, to the (near) end, which is associated 
with its complete instrumentalization, the work of the Council was sur-
rounded with a lot of controversy, and all that has affected its achieve-
ments in the field of combating corruption in Serbia.   
 Term of Office of the Council and its Organization 
The Council was established on 2 October 2001 by virtue of a Decision 
of the Government of the Republic of Serbia (RS Official Gazette 59/01). 
It was established as “an expert and advisory body of the Government 
of the Republic of Serbia”. 
Under the Decision, that is, the founding document, the mandate, 
i.e., task of the Council is undisputed. “The task of the Council shall be 
to review anti-corruption activities, propose measures to the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia, which should be undertaken 
with a view to efficiently combating corruption, and monitor their 
implementation, as well as to put forward initiatives for adoption of 
regulations, programs and other enactments and measures in this 
field.”
If one translates this sentence from the language of administrative 
law into the everyday language, several things clearly arise from it. First, 
the Council has no mandate to deal with specific corruption cases in 
Serbia; instead, it deals with “measures”, “regulations” and “enact-
ments”, which constitute the matter that can give rise to corruption. 
Second, the Council has no investigative, but solely advisory role. Third, 
the Council is supposed to give advice to that effect to the Government 
of the Republic of Serbia. All in all, at the normative level, the issues 
associated with the Council’s mandate are very clear, hence the ques-
tion is raised of how and why the obvious confusion over the tasks and/
or business of the Council was created. 
 The confusion over the Council’s mandate, on whose resolution a 
tremendous amount of energy was wasted at the first stage of its work, 
was probably a consequence of the already mentioned problems with 
the choice of Council members. Had, for example, the Council com-
prised civil servants, they would have read the very unambiguously 
worded text of the Decision and proceeded to implement it, that is, they 
would have dealt with the things they are authorized for. The issue of 
their results, that is, of the effectiveness of those civil servants in com-
bating corruption, is a different matter, but at least there would have 
been no dispute over the Council’s mandate. In addition, the already 
mentioned (political) message “Well, do whatever you like!” has sent at 
least two signals to the Council members. The fist one is that the provi-
sions of the Decision, that is, the official founding document, are not 
relevant, since the above Prime Minister’s sentence called on the viola-
tion of the said Decision. The second signal is, in all likelihood and 
despite the fact that the mentioned statement could be interpreted as 
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giving the Council a free rein to work on combating corruption, a sig-
nal that the mentioned statement can be interpreted as a message that 
the executive is not keenly interested in the work of the Council, i.e., 
that the Government has some other priorities.
The selection as Council members of reputable and moral people, 
independent individuals, who do not possess the discipline of civil ser-
vants and little propensity to teamwork, who have a strong inbuilt sense 
of justice (irrespective of whether they agree on what justice is or not), 
and among whom some were not quite familiar with the problem of 
corruption, coupled with the mentioned signals sent out by the Prime 
Minister, inevitably resulted in a long and broad-based debate about 
the mandate and/or tasks of the Council. That debate failed to yield a 
positive result, so no consensus was reached on the role of the Council, 
and that issue kept running through numerous meetings with 
Government representatives. 
Many Council members were inclined toward investigations into 
specific cases of corruption, but there was no consensus even among 
themselves on the issue of the time horizon for such actions. For 
instance, will investigations include corruption cases before October 
2000 or only after that date or, alternatively, no cut-off dates of any 
kind will exist? Furthermore, the fight against corruption was linked to 
the then policy of collecting the so-called extra profit tax, that is, to the 
consistency in the pursuance of that policy, and it resulted in dissen-
sions in that respect among the Council members. The propensity to 
investigations into individual cases actually ignited the first scandal 
associated with the work of the Council, namely the already described 
conflict between Čedomir Čupić and Željko Mitrović, which was relat-
ed to the payment of the extra profit tax by the owner of TV Pink, i.e., 
to the issue of a zoning permit for a new facility of that TV station. 
No one ever called into question the need for the Council to imple-
ment its mandate under the Decision (“measures, regulations and 
enactments”), but many Council members were of the opinion that this 
job was of second-rate importance, and there was no agreement either 
about the method to be used in the analysis of “measures, regulations 
and enactments”. While some thought that a public hearing should be 
organized in the process of adopting new laws, in which the competent 
minister, that is, the proposer of a bill, would be “heard”, others were of 
the opinion that it would suffice if the Council members made an anal-
ysis of the proposed law.   
There was disagreement over the definition of corruption as such, 
i.e., regarding the answer to the question of whether any violation of a 
law and/or any abuse of office constituted corruption. While some 
Council members advocated the idea of not limiting the work of the 
Council only to corruption in the narrow sense, but of including in its 
scope of work any abuse and any law violation which brings some mate-
rial benefit, others advocated a bit more conservative approach accord-
ing to which the Council would focus on corruption in the narrow 
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sense, namely the type of corruption assessed as the most dangerous 
one. 
In addition to the dissensions regarding the mandate and work meth-
od, dissensions also emerged with respect to the organization of the 
work of the Council. One of the key issues over which no agreement 
was reached at the very beginning of the Council’s work was whether 
the Council members should receive remuneration or rather discharge 
their duties on a completely voluntary basis. An opinion gradually pre-
vailed that they should be remunerated for the work in the Council, 
and that is how the Council members started to receive remuneration 
for their engagement in this body as of 2003. 
It remains unclear, however, what the internal organization of the 
Council is, how decisions are taken within the Council, whether there is 
division of labor in the Council, etc. It is not known whether it has the 
Statute or Rules of Procedure, since none of these documents can be 
found on the Council’s website (www.antikorupcija-savet.sr.gov.yu). 
Likewise, it is not completely clear to whom the Council reports and in 
which manner. Since the Council is a body of the Serbian Government 
which, pursuant to Article 33 of the Law on the Government, has the 
status of a “provisional working body”,3 the reporting obligations 
defined by the 2004 Rules of Procedure of the Government (Article 22) 
are applicable to it, which means that the “provisional working body 
shall be under an obligation to submit to the competent committee a 
report on its work at least once in 60 days, and to the Government at 
least once in 90 days”. Contrary to the mentioned obligations, the 
Council draws up a report on its work once a year, and on the website 
of the Council annual reports for 2004, 2005 and 2006 can be found. All 
available annual reports, succinctly written, have between seven and 11 
pages, and present pure facts about the activities of the Council, that is, 
of its members. The financing of the Council was mentioned only in the 
report for 2005, in order to highlight the problem of underspending, 
namely that a mere 11.3 million dinars was spent out of the 12.46 mil-
lion dinars worth budget appropriation. All available reports are signed 
by Council Chairperson Verica Barać. 
By reviewing the available reports it is possible to conclude several 
things. First, the Council is not of the opinion that it should abide by the 
obligation stipulated in the Rules of Procedure of the Government. 
Second, the Council believes that it should very tersely inform the 
Government and/or the general public about its activities – and for the 
most part activities – while there is much less about its results. Third, the 
Council believes that the amount of received and spent budget resources 
3 The status of the Council as a “provisional working body” is derived from 
paragraph 3, Article 33, of the Law on the Government, which sets out that 
provisional working bodies are to be set up by a decision defining their task and 
composition, while standing working bodies are to be set up by virtue of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Government. The Council was established pursuant to a 
relevant decision (RS Official Gazette, 59/01).
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should not be published in annual reports. That is to say, the total amount 
of resources spent by the Council is mentioned only in the case where, in 
the Council’s opinion, problems arose with its financing.  
Furthermore, on the Council’s website, it is not possible to find its 
annual financial statements, which would provide the information to 
the public on how much of (taxpayers’) money the Council received in 
the course of a year and how that money was spent and on what. It is 
clear that there is no statutory obligation of the Council to present the 
said information in this manner, but such a move could be expected 
from an entity which keeps insisting on transparency and on the need 
to oversee the spending of the budget monies, i.e., from an entity which 
has accused many, with or without arguments, of the lack of transpar-
ency. It is interesting that, as yet (June 2007) no one has publicly raised 
the question of the availability of data on the salaries of the members of 
the Council, as a budget beneficiary, although that question was raised 
in the case of certain faculties of Belgrade University. 
Incidentally, it is possible to learn from the report of the Council that 
the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro is an affiliated member of 
the Council, and that on behalf of the Mission the meetings of the 
Council are attended by Svetlana Zorbić. It remains unclear how, that 
is, pursuant to which decision, the OSCE Mission, as an international 
organization, has become an affiliated member of the Council, since it 
is the Council of the Serbian Government. Moreover, it is not clear 
what the function of the OSCE Mission as an affiliated member of 
Council is. It is all the more so because the Decision on the Establishment 
of the Anti-corruption Council stipulates that “professional and admin-
istrative-technical tasks for the needs of the Council shall be performed 
by the Ministry of Finance and Economy of the Republic of Serbia”, 
with these tasks being later on reassigned to the General Secretariat of 
the Government.4 
 The Work of the Council and Cases Considered 
The work of the Council has so far been completely oriented toward 
political corruption, while administrative corruption, i.e., corruption 
of civil servants, such as corruption in the health sector, judiciary, tax 
administration or customs agency, has been completely neglected. As if 
these rather prevalent kinds of corruption had not been interesting to 
the Council at all. All the cases covered by its reports boil down to polit-
ical corruption, which inevitable gave rise to a direct conflict with the 
Serbian Government, that is, its officials. At the beginning of a report 
on the bankruptcy of “Sartid” the Council states that it is “resolved to 
4 It is evident that for a long time the members of the Council were not satisfied 
with the professional and administrative-technical support provided to them by 
the Government, from the premises allocated to the Council for its work, to all 
other elements of that support, so the question is raised of whether the co-opting 
of the OSCE Mission to Serbia was a way to overcome that problem.
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analyze the highest-profile grand corruption cases in our country.”. 
Instead of systematic research into the phenomenon of corruption in 
Serbia, an analysis of its causes and identification of possible policies to 
curb corruption, the Council has focused on the investigation into the 
most “attractive” cases of political corruption – cynics would say those 
cases which infallibly bring Council members to the cover pages of 
high-circulation newspapers. 
By way of example, customs corruption, as typical administrative 
corruption, was not the subject on which the Council worked, in any 
way whatsoever. The Council did not make an effort to carry out 
research into the causes of this kind of corruption, nor did it analyze 
laws which define public policies conducted by the customs agency, nor 
did it voice its opinion when officials of the Serbian Chamber of 
Commerce insisted on introducing non-tariff barriers to imports, which 
constitute a great danger from the standpoint of corruption; moreover, 
even the favorite target of the Council’s attacks, Mlađan Dinkić, was 
spared from any comments when he advocated protectionist public 
policies of that kind, and the Council never paid any attention to the 
internal organization of the customs agency and wage policy for cus-
toms officers. Simply, all these questions were not interesting for the 
Council. 
The attitude of the Council toward customs corruption has changed 
when in late November 2006 a large group of corrupt customs officers 
was identified and arrested. The Chairperson of the Council, Verica 
Barać, then made a statement in which it accused the Government by 
saying: “…had there been true will to eradicate customs corruption, 
that would have been done a long, long time ago and the Government 
would not have waited to carry out that action just before the election”5, 
and added that the top management of the customs agency had not 
been replaced ever since the days when it had been run by high-ranking 
official of Milošević’s regime Mihalj Kertes. “In Kertes’s days, that was a 
machinery that financed the regime through criminal actions in the 
customs agency, but its key figures have not been brought to justice. 
The only certain thing is that, essentially, the top echelon involved in 
the smuggling ring has not so far been identified, let alone punished”. 
On the following day, the Chairperson of the Council claimed that the 
action resembled an election campaign because six years had elapsed in 
which some very important things for fighting customs corruption had 
not been done. “If no way has been found to really bring people like 
Mihalj Kertes and all the people around him to account and, more 
importantly, to return the money which they took from public revenue 
to the state, then I really do not believe that these are some serious 
actions aimed at fighting customs corruption. These are mostly various 
5 Cited according to the news published on the B92 website, on 28 and 29 November 
2006. 
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moves which should embellish the reality, but the reality behind the 
make-up is much worse than one would allow to be seen.”
Although before the said arrest the Council had never dealt with 
customs corruption, as mentioned above, the first action made in that 
direction was used for harsh attacks on the Government. More spe-
cifically, for the Council, the fight against corruption is reduced to 
arrests, recovery of monies and to the all-mighty human resources 
policy, so dear to communists – one only needs to dismiss the top 
people in the customs administration and everything will fall into 
place after that: that is meant by “serous actions”.6 No prevention, no 
reform of public policies, no foreign trade liberalization, no elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions and hidden non-tariff barriers, no 
tariff rate cuts, i.e., harmonization of excise policy with the neighbor-
ing countries, only arrests, seizures and good human resources policy. 
So much like some ancient times! 
If there was a dilemma at the beginning of the work of the Council 
regarding its mandate, that dilemma has been resolved in time, through 
the engagement of the Council itself, namely the Council effectively 
changed its mandate in relation to the one given to it under the Founding 
Decision by the Serbian Government – its founder. The Council turned 
completely to the investigations into alleged specific cases of corrup-
tion. It can be best seen by the structure of the reports and communica-
tions of the Council, at least those available to the public on the Council’s 
website.7 Out of 24 reports and initiatives posted on the Council’s web-
site, three documents (12.5%) are annual reports of the Council, one 
document (4.2%) is a report from an event and its conclusions, five 
documents (20.8%) constitute analyses of laws and policies, while as 
many as 15 documents (62.5%), an overwhelming majority, deal with 
investigations into individual corruption cases, i.e., into something 
which the Council considers to be specific corruption cases. 
Irrespective of the fact that the Council has thus already deviated 
from the mandate given to it under the Founding Decision, an addi-
tional problem is also posed by another kind of deviation from the 
mandate. Namely, the problem is in the fact that the analyses of specific 
cases, regardless of the extent to which reports of the Council are based 
on facts, show that the Council dealt with alleged law violations as such, 
that is, with different criminal offenses, starting from thefts, to frauds 
6 The replacement of all the top people in the Bulgarian customs agency in the early 
1990s, without any change in public policies, caused the level of corruption at the 
customs to even rise within several months, relative to the one prevailing at the 
time when the previous management was dismissed and arrested. 
7 By comparing statements in the annual reports with communications and reports 
of the Council publicly available on the website of the Council, it is obvious that 
the Council assessed that some of its communications should not be posted on the 
website. For instance, the 2005 annual report states that a letter was sent to the 
Government, that is, the Prime Minister, containing recommendations related to 
the alleged corruption of Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus, but that letter is 
not on the Council’s website.  
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and the like, to law violations related to the non-compliance with con-
tractual obligations, and not corruption which constitutes a separate 
criminal offense. 
Moreover, when the Council, for a change, dealt with certain public 
policies, that is, “measures, regulations and enactments,” that analysis 
not only was not limited to the analysis of corruption, but it was also 
expanded to include an analysis of their validity from the standpoint of 
the public interest. By doing so, the Council overstepped its mandate 
completely, not to mention that in this case, too, no compelling argu-
ments were offered to show that certain public policies are not in the 
public interest. All the above can be best seen from the activities of the 
Council associated with the privatization process, the most favorite 
topic of the Council since its establishment.  
A very large portion of the activities of the Council was oriented 
toward the analysis of the privatization of the real sector in Serbia, 
namely the privatization that was launched in 2001, since the Council 
gave an assessment that “…at this point in time, the privatization pro-
cess is the most serious candidate for a disgraceful role of the leader in 
corruption” (the Report on the Bankruptcy of “Sartid”). Such an assess-
ment, however, was not corroborated by relevant arguments. 
Two reports of the Council are devoted to the issue of privatization 
as such. At first glance, these are the kind of reports which the Council 
was mandated to prepare – analyses of public policies and regulations 
from the standpoint of the fight against corruption. The first Report 
was on the privatization policy and process dated 15 March 2004. This 
report, in addition to the analysis of legal arrangements, looks at a large 
number of privatization cases, predominantly on the basis of com-
plaints by employees and trade unions (it is stated that complaints were 
lodged from 88 companies), in order to draw conclusions on these 
grounds concerning the privatization policy and process. Unfortunately, 
in that respect, even this report, for the most part, constitutes an inves-
tigation into specific cases of alleged corruption, this time in privatiza-
tion, with slight, very often impermissible generalization, since the con-
clusions that have been drawn do not follow from the facts presented in 
the analysis of specific cases, irrespective of whether these findings are 
congruent with the facts or not. The Council was again engaged in 
investigations into specific corruption cases. 
The evaluation of legal arrangements related to the privatization ini-
tiated in 2001 has practically nothing to do with corruption; instead, 
value judgments are made regarding privatization as such, i.e., regard-
ing the privatization model defined by the Law. It is stated, for instance, 
that the Privatization Law contravenes Article 56 of the then 
Constitution, which “recognized different forms of ownership: social, 
state, private and cooperative”, despite the fact that the said Article of 
the Constitution is essentially just a guarantee for the equal legal pro-
tection of all ownership types, and no guarantee whatsoever for the 
existence of all ownership types, since Article 59 of the then applicable 
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Constitution clearly states that the conditions for the transformation of 
socially and state owned property into other ownership forms are to be 
regulated by the law. Regardless of the incorrectness of the assertion by 
the Council that the Law contravenes the Constitution, the question of 
what it has to do with corruption remains open. Furthermore, the 
report claims that the Law “stipulates that natural resources and goods 
of the public interest may not be subject to privatization,…while in 
practice even such goods as the baking industry and the dairy industry 
are included in the privatization procedure…”. Such allegations show 
elemental incompetence (milk as a natural resource or the baking 
industry as a good of the public interest), without offering an answer to 
the already posed question: what does it have to do with corruption?  
Also interesting is the obsession with the phenomenon of the esti-
mated value of a company (firm) undergoing privatization. It is the rea-
son for the following statement: “Although Article 22 of the Law lists all 
the pieces of data on a firm in the privatization procedure, which have 
to be presented, a sizeable amount of assets is often excluded, in order 
to reduce the estimated value of the firm, which is then sold at a low 
price”. Moreover, it is asserted that “consultants are making evaluations 
of firms and they can fix the time when the evaluation is to be made 
(e.g. to postpone it in order to make debts in the meantime, which 
reduce the value of the firm’s equity)”. 
The mentioned views reveal several things. First, the Law stipulates 
that companies, i.e., their equity, are sold by using methods which cre-
ate competition on the demand side (auctions and tenders), so the sell-
ing price of a company is the highest price which someone is willing to 
pay for that company,8 and the estimated value of the company’s equity 
is simply not relevant. It has a solely technical value, serving to fix the 
opening price before the bidding, which will in fact set the actual value 
of a particular company, that is, its equity. Second, assets of a company 
are confused with its equity. A buyer of a company in the privatization 
process does not buy the assets of that company, but its equity – assets 
reduced by total liabilities. No proof was offered to corroborate the 
allegation that “a sizeable amount of a firm’s assets is often excluded”. 
A future owner can very well evaluate on his own the assets whose 
owner he is to become (indirectly), and on that basis, after including 
the information on liabilities, he decides by himself about how much he 
is willing to pay for them.   
After a mere two pages of general analysis in this report, the Council 
switched to the analysis of specific corruption cases, so dear to its heart, 
8 Competition on the demand side creates incentives to all interested parties to 
truthfully state the price they are willing to pay for the offered company. Strictly 
speaking, the selling price in a tender is the highest selling price which any of the 
participants is willing to pay. In the case of auctions, the obtained, i.e., the winning 
price is the price of which it is possible to say with certainty that it is higher than 
the highest price which the second highest bidder was willing to pay, but that it 
does not constitute the highest price which the highest bidder is willing to pay. 
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in order to reach the following conclusion, based on them: “From the 
mentioned analysis it is possible to establish that there are many out-
standing issues in the privatization policy and procedure, which can be 
the cause of abuse and offenses: …Privatization proceeds are not used 
sufficiently to boost economic development, because they were invested 
mainly in the restructuring of big conglomerates and replenishment of 
the budget.” In other words, the assessment of the Council “that priva-
tization proceeds are not used sufficiently to boost economic develop-
ment” (irrespective of whether that is true, i.e., of whether that is the 
cause for concern, or not), is offered as proof that abuse and offenses 
can occur. The problem is in the fact that the entire report of the Council 
is in essence a critique of the privatization model applied in Serbia since 
2001, even a criticism of privatization as such, rather than an analysis 
that would be compatible with the Council’s mandate. This is the only 
way to explain the position that “privatization proceeds are not used 
sufficiently to boost economic development”, which has absolutely 
nothing to do with corruption, but with certain public policies formu-
lated and implemented by the legitimately elected government.9   
The next report of the Council entitled “Shortcomings of Proposed 
Amendments to the Privatization Legislation” of 3 February 2005 con-
stitutes an exception in the work of the Council, since it really deals 
with the matters supposed to be the Council’s mandate, namely the 
analysis of regulations. However, one can very quickly see how far away 
that analysis is from the task of the Council to deal with corruption, 
since it constitutes a general analysis of new regulations, even regula-
tions in force since 2001 in large part. For example, the subject of the 
criticism is an amendment to the Law, which introduces the institution 
of debt forgiveness, and this criticism is supported by the argument that 
such an arrangement contravenes the Bankruptcy Law. Of course it 
contravenes that Law, that was precisely the basic intention, in order to 
make possible, in the special case of companies undergoing restructur-
ing, their privatization through debt forgiveness. And the principles lex 
posteriori derogat legi priori (each new law is to supplant the already 
passed law) and lex specialis derogat legi generali (each new law defin-
ing some specific arrangements derogates that same general law applied 
to all the cases) are well-known. Furthermore, some of the views pre-
sented in that report are simply not based on facts (“Absence of criteria 
for deciding on the method to be used for the sale of a company”). 
9 It is interesting that this report of the Council was signed by Zagorka Golubović as 
a Council member, not by Verica Barać as its Chairperson. Furthermore, although 
the report was publicly released in 2003 for the first time, its version posted on the 
website is dated 15 March 2004, one day after the formation of a new government, 
and the report was sent to Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica and the then Minister 
of Economy Dragan Maršićanin, who had made numerous accusations in the 
election campaign against the privatization process during Đinđić’s and/or 
Živković’s Governments, as well as to the newly appointed Privatization Agency 
Director, Branko Pavlović. What an interesting coincidence! 
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Finally, certain findings are so terse that they are unclear (“Non-
transparency of decisions.”). 
In addition, although this report of the Council, in line with its man-
date, does not deal with investigations into specific cases, it dramati-
cally oversteps the task of the Council to deal with corruption. It can be 
best seen from the recommendations of this report not to adopt the 
proposed amendments to the privatization legislation, inter alia because 
they “do not touch upon certain problems”, such as: “Privatization of 
natural monopolies, which was reduced in practice to a situation where 
a privatized company used a natural resource or its monopolistic posi-
tion, without paying any fees.” or “Privatization of socially owned capi-
tal in cooperatives and privatization of urban buildable land.” Not to 
mention the grotesque logic that something should not be adopted 
because “they do not touch upon certain problems” – the problems 
cited as reasons not to adopt the proposed amendments have nothing 
in common with corruption and the fight against it.  
Although the “Sartid Bankruptcy Report” of 10 May 2004 is a report 
on a bankruptcy, as clearly stated in its title, its introduction discusses 
the relationship between the principal and the agent, which enables 
corruption in the sale of companies. This is a report on a concrete case 
of alleged corruption, hence it is certainly outside the Council’s man-
date, but it is interesting, since it accuses “top-ranking representatives 
of the executive” of corruption, only to point out the following in the 
next moment “Whether government officials have received material 
benefits for abusing their office or not is of lesser importance in this 
whole matter. According to the contemporary understanding of cor-
ruption, the benefit does not have to be material in all the cases, because 
abuse of office is also committed for the purpose of gaining political 
advantage (Article 18 of the UN Convention against Corruption speaks 
about trade in influences).” First, modern understandings of corrup-
tion differ among themselves and the concept of “trade in influences” is 
quite controversial, and the mentioned Article of the Convention is 
rather unclear and difficult for implementation. Second, even if there 
existed none of the mentioned conceptual problems, an open question 
of what is demonstrated in this report on the specific corruption case 
would still remain. If the report claims that corruption occurred, be it 
in the form of “gaining political advantage”, it is not clear who gained 
political advantage and in which manner. The report does not provide 
an answer to that question. Furthermore, if it is “trade in influences”, 
the indisputable fact is that it is an exchange (someone is selling, and 
someone is buying influence), but nothing can be found in the report 
which would indicate who the seller of the influence was (US Steel, the 
executive of the domicile country of that company or some third party), 
who the buyer was, and what the subject of trade (exchange) was. All 
that is missing from the report which deals with one specific case. The 
presented accusation of corruption (“In all likelihood, grand corrup-
tion occurred, in which top-ranking representatives of the state were 
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involved, who made it possible for a foreign company, with ample sup-
port from courts, to make high illegal gains.”) is not corroborated by 
facts, let alone evidence. The view that “The selling price of 21.3 million 
dollars seemed to be on the low side to many.” is presented as crown 
proof. It is a perfectly expected consequence of the fact that the Council 
dealt with specific cases of corruption, without being mandated or 
equipped for such investigative activities.        
The Council has so far dealt with various specific cases of real sector 
privatization and analysis of legislation, i.e., of the regulations governing 
the privatization process and it has reached the conclusion that certain 
elements in those regulations can make room for corruption, which is, 
unfortunately, taken as evidence that corruption has occurred in privati-
zation. More specifically, there is no analysis of whether some other mod-
els, i.e., methods of privatization would create more or less room for cor-
ruption, and there is even less analysis of whether the survival of socially/
state owned property, instead of privatization, would bring more or less 
opportunities for corruption. In other words, privatization process is not 
analyzed within the available possibilities, i.e., in the categories of oppor-
tunity costs of opting for one of the available options.  
From the standpoint of investigations into specific cases of alleged 
corruption, irrespective of whether the statements presented in the 
reports correspond to the facts, many behaviors which were described 
constitute only violations of laws, some other regulations or some other 
kind of illegal conduct, and as such they do not constitute corruption. 
Thefts, forgeries, non-performance of contractual obligations and the 
like do not constitute corruption, and thus definitely do not fall in the 
competence of the Council. Irrespective of that, the reports on specific 
cases of alleged corruption did not offer enough evidence to conclude 
whether corruption actually occurred. 
Moreover, it seems that, in its analysis of the privatisation process, the 
Council completely focussed on the selling price issue, i.e. on the privati-
sation proceeds, so that the working hypothesis was that corruption leads 
to the reduction of privatisation proceeds. Accordingly, the Council abso-
lutely fails to address other issues pertaining to privatisation and corrup-
tion, such as how corruption, if any, leads to disruption in the process of 
selecting the best owner in terms of upgrading the company that was pri-
vatised, to the appropriate ownership structure which creates the incen-
tives to the owner to restructure the company, the incentives to the new 
owner to invest, etc. Implicitly, the Council has decided to equate the 
public interest in the privatisation with the selling price, i.e. the privatisa-
tion proceeds. That is why the Council now fears that, because of corrup-
tion, our companies will all go for a song. In addition, often completely 
disregarded are the liabilities (debt) of the company that is being pur-
chased and that the new owner assumes.   
It is interesting that the Council was exclusively interested in the pri-
vatisation through sales, which started in 2001. Formerly completed 
privatisations were not of interest to the Council, regardless of the fact 
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that it was these privatisations that led to the dispersed ownership struc-
ture which, inter alia, triggered the problems and irregularities that 
arose when the companies privatised at that time were taken over. 
Namely, the irregularities with the suspected corruption, as it was dem-
onstrated in the previous section, were much greater in the process of 
taking over the companies privatised before 2001 (and not solely when 
the shares owned by the Share Fund were sold), than in the privatisa-
tion initiated in 2001. 
During 2006, the Council prepared three reports which constitute its 
output and completely fall within the boundaries of its mandate. These 
reports presented the remarks on three draft laws in terms of the pos-
sible impact that the proposed legal solutions could have on the level of 
corruption (Law on Prevention of Money Laundering, Law on the State 
Audit Institution, and the Anti-Corruption Law). Unfortunately, these 
reports are sparse (maximum two pages), their findings are mostly triv-
ial, and such are the recommendations for their improvement.  
In the last three years, the Council has been very active in its com-
munication with the general public, where the greatest portion of that 
communication fell on the shoulders of the Council’s chair, Ms. Verica 
Barać. It looks as though she did not find this a burdensome task. The 
Council apparently attaches a high value to her media appearances 
which can all be seen at the Council’s official website. The media appear-
ances of the Council were mainly connected with different scandals, 
with regard to privatisation, or in respect to the activities of the Council’s 
favourite target – Mlađan Dinkić.  
For instance, in its press release of 18 January 2007, under the title 
“Response of the Anti-Corruption Council to Mlađan Dinkić’s untruth-
ful allegations about the fight against corruption” we have learnt that 
“Dinkić continuously disseminates untruths about the activities of the 
Anti-Corruption Council”. However, we could not find out what these 
untruths were, namely, what is it that Dinkić said – we were only 
informed that he did this “in the attempt to conceal his role in the fol-
lowing illegal activities”. This was followed by a list of eleven illegal 
activities. For example “Making false statements that 95% of the ‘fro-
zen’ foreign currency savings were paid out without mentioning wheth-
er he was thinking of the number of accounts or the amount of debt.”; 
or “Negotiations regarding the sales of Mobtel, which should be subject 
to serious investigation”. Hence, the examples of the violation of law 
include making statements, or the negotiations on the sale which, it is 
true, was not yet investigated, but unbiased investigation would surely 
expose some criminal offence! This lack of seriousness discredits the 
anti-corruption efforts in Serbia.  
Moreover, its statements lack consistency. According to the Council’s 
release of 16 May 2007, the Council’s chairperson maintained that 
“between 2003 and 2004, (Mirko) Cvetković, as the top manager of the 
Privatisation Agency, was involved in at least 88 shady privatisations”. 
What were these privatisations and why were they shady remained a 
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secret but it was obvious that the Council’s Chairperson had doubts 
about Mirko Cvetković. Somewhat later (04 June 2007) as a guest in the 
“Poligraf” TV program, when asked why “did she so fiercely criticise 
the new minister, you had also criticised his work when he was the 
director of the Privatisation Agency”, Ms. Barać said: “We did not criti-
cise anything, the journalists asked us about the facts from the time 
when he was the director of the Privatisation Agency, and we repeated 
them because there is clear evidence of it. That is to say, he was at the 
same time the director of the Privatisation Agency and the executive 
director of “Ces Mekon”, that is how he was entered in the court regis-
ter, we criticised nothing, we just presented the facts as they are”. Only, 
it still remains unclear what has happened with those “at least 88 shady 
privatisations!”10 
Speaking about the Council’s activities in the above TV program, Ms. 
Barać said: “Therefore, we do not deal with the criminal-law issues, 
whether the corruption was present or not.” That was what the Council’s 
chairperson said, the Council having devoted most of its activities to 
investigating specific cases of corruption (see the list of the corruption 
cases: Sartid, Mobtel, Nacionalna štedionica, sugar exports, Keramika, 
Jugoremedija, Poslovni prostor, Olympic games, building extensions in 
Konjarnik, Veterinarski zavod…) and it was Ms. Barać that signed, for 
instance, the Report on the Bankruptcy Proceedings over Sartid, in 
which the following was said “Everything suggests that this was a case of 
grand corruption in which the highest government officials were 
involved”. An unbiased and benevolent observer, not familiar with 
everyday life in Serbia, would think that it has at least two councils. 
Valuation of the effects of the Council’s activities
The sailors still believe that it is a very bad omen if the champagne bot-
tle does not break when the ship is first launched into the sea. Such a 
ship is deemed to be cursed – it takes people, it is prone to damage, it 
soon sinks. Of course, later, it turns out that it the champagne bottle 
was not to blame, but rather the inappropriate basic design, bad struc-
ture, inappropriate materials, shoddy workmanship, and the lack of 
discipline during construction. 
The fate of the Anti-corruption Council resembles that of the cursed 
ship. Although there was no champagne when the Council was launched, 
all the above (ship related) faults were soon to come to light. 
Inappropriate basic design was a consequence of the fact that it was not 
clear what was wanted, except to improve the Government’s relations 
10 By the way, the resounding number of 88 privatisations equals the number of 
complaints that reached the Anti-corruption Council and that are mentioned in 
the first report on the privatisation policy and process which was published shortly 
after Mirko Cvetković was appointed to the position of the Agency’s director. It 
may be a coincidence but, considering the above description of the Council’ 
activities, anything is possible. 
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with the public, in the broadest sense of the word. Even though the 
decision on setting up the Council was clear in respect of its mandate, 
the absence of firm political will and sending of mixed signals caused 
the confusion about its mandate. Numerous conceptual disagreements, 
along with the limited capability for teamwork, almost blocked the 
activities of the Council in its early days. 
The Council resumed activities after major changes in the composi-
tion and reduction of the number of its members, but, unfortunately, 
there was no improvement. Instead of doing its job, the Council focused 
on some specific cases of corruption, attempting to find proof that the 
executive authorities were involved in corruption. The sensational news 
is what they were looking for! And the sensational news was missing 
because the Council did not have the capacity nor the mandate to 
undertake investigative activities. 
The focus on seeking sensational news and exposure of the cases of 
grand political corruption meant that it neglected the everyday, system-
atic dealing with corruption, in particular administrative corruption, 
that which is associated with civil servants. That is how systematic work 
that is, any systematic investigation of the corruption, its causes, mech-
anisms, and consequences escaped the Council. Everything was virtu-
ally reduced to several axioms, such as “corruption is the greatest evil in 
our society”, and then a new case of corruption was sought to once 
again “prove” that the government is corrupt. 
Some analysis of the causes of corruption performed is not at a high 
analytical level. Major errors were made in terms of methodology, the 
conclusions were drawn that were very easily refuted, the recommenda-
tions were given for the fight against corruption that are hard or impos-
sible to implement. 
Instead of the analysis and systematic approach to corruption, the 
corruption hysteria was spread, the corruption was detected in each 
and every place and it was always political corruption, and the cases of 
corruption were referred to in the language used by the tabloids with 
largest circulation in the country. Simply, the Council has managed to 
bring the level of the debate on corruption to the lowest possible level 
and, by presenting the whole host of unverified positions and insults, to 
render it practically meaningless. What the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 
in their parliamentary activities managed to do in terms of depriving 
the Serbian parliamentarianism of sense, the Council managed to do in 
the context of depriving of sense the debate on corruption. And by 
spreading the corruption hysteria and unverified accusations, the 
Council managed to make the accusations for corruption become a 
powerful weapon in the electoral campaign. That is why the largest 
opposition party, SRS, builds their electoral promises on the rhetoric 
such as “When we come to power, we shall finally settle the issue of cor-
ruption!” There can be no doubt that the activities of the Council and 
some of its members were misused and exploited for the purposes of 
everyday politics, i.e. in the fights between different political parties. 
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Surely, any public activity can be misused. However, a strong impres-
sion remains that, with its operating method, the Council had made it 
possible for the level of misuse to become very high.  
By its doings, the Anti-corruption Council has largely discredited the 
fight against corruption in Serbia. Bearing in mind that we can soon 
expect that a new institution will be set up to replace the Council, this 
battle, regrettably, will not start from ground zero. After many years of 
the Council’s activity, any new anti-corruption institution will first have 
to resurface from quite great depths. 
Conclusion
The greatest progress Serbia made was on the plane of indirect anti-
corruption policies. The institutional reform (reform of the economic 
system) and reform of the government, primarily economic policies, 
has started to produce results, particularly by decreasing, and in some 
areas eliminating, the benefits from corruption. Much lesser progress 
was made in respect of direct anti-corruption policies, primarily due to 
the fact that fighting corruption has not been at the top of the Serbian 
governments’ list of priorities. The adoption or ratification of interna-
tional conventions and other documents is primarily the result of the 
activities of the international community and to a much lesser extent of 
the autochthonous desire to create, through such ratifications, the envi-
ronment more conducive to the battle against corruption. Finally, the 
activities of the Anti-corruption Council did not produce good results 
and have much discredited any anti-corruption efforts.
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Appendix: Legal system in operation – case studies
ThE “SUITCASE” SCANdAL
The “Suitcase” scandal broke out on 11 January 2006. The Vice-
Governor of the National Bank of Serbia, Dejan Simić, was arrested in 
his home on suspicion that he had taken a bribe of EUR 100,000 to 
restore the operating license to a bank. Arrested together with him was 
Vladan Zagrađanim, SPS marketing director and member of that par-
ty’s Managing Board. The then president of the Managing Board and 
now President of SPS, Ivica Dačić, had a narrow escape from the inter-
vention of the Ministry of Interior. He had been in Simić’s apartment 
before the police came. Simić and Zagrađanin were released from deten-
tion on 30 March and the investigation proceedings against them con-
tinued. 
Ivica Dačić, the representative of Israeli TBI group, Vladimir Čizelj, 
and the NBS Governor, Radovan Jelašić were all interviewed in the 
course of investigation. Sekula Pjevčević, businessman, who said that 
the NBS leaders had requested two million euros from the shareholders 
of the bank whose operating license was revoked, to restore that license, 
was also interviewed. Simić and Zagrađanin were arrested based on the 
information which the prosecutor had received from Pjevčević. What is 
particularly interesting in this case is that the suitcase with the money, 
owned by Pjevčević, was returned to this businessman although it was 
supposed to be the main piece of evidence in the proceedings against 
the former vice-governor.
The charges against Simić and Zagrađanin were brought in June 
2006. Thereby, the former vice-governor was indicted for receiving a 
bribe, and the SPS official for mediating in bribery. However, in October 
2006 the non-trial panel of the criminal division of the District Court in 
Belgrade returned the indictment to the prosecutor’s office explaining 
that it was necessary to have the inconsistencies in the description of the 
criminal offence committed remedied. It was only four months after 
that, in March 2007, that the District Public Prosecutor’s Office returned 
the amended indictment by which Simić is charged with receiving the 
bribe of EUR 100,000 and Zagrađanin as an accomplice in bribery. With 
this the indictment became effective and the proceedings were resumed. 
According to some unofficial sources, the District Court had in those 
four months sent to the prosecutors a number of letters requesting that 
the indictment be returned but the prosecutors used the absence of legal 
obligation to do so within a specific period of time.
In April 2007, the District Court reject as ungrounded Simić and 
Zagrađanin’s plea, so that now scheduling of the main hearing may be 
expected.
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ThE “BULLET-PROOF VEST” SCANdAL
The “Bullet-Proof Vest” scandal was launched towards the end of 
August 2005. It was disclosed by Mlađan Dinkić, the Minister of Finance. 
Based on the information obtained from the budget inspection, he 
accused the then Minister of Defence, Prvoslav Davinić, who came from 
the ranks of his political party, of concluding a prejudicial five-year 
contract on the procurement of military equipment worth EUR 300 
million, with “Proizvodnja Mile Dragić” company. At the same time, 
Dinkić accused Dragić of corruption with the aim of gaining the “inflat-
ed” contracts.
Shortly after that, on 19 September, Mile Dragić was arrested under 
the accusation that he was bribing colonel Vučković, deputy head of the 
SM Army General-Staff Development Administration, and Vučković 
was suspected of receiving the bribe and, in return, enabling Dragić to 
conclude contracts worth EUR 175 million and lay foundations for a 
five-year arrangement worth 300 million euros. It involved the pro-
curement of 69,000 helmets, more than 60,000 bullet-proof vests, and 
500 pilot jackets. On the other hand, major-general Milutin Kokanović 
Deputy Minister of Defence for material resources, was indicted for the 
abuse of office. 
The investigation also included former minister Davinić, for alleg-
edly requesting the conclusion of such contract, and captain Igor 
Mihajlović, for concluding prejudicial contract and disclosure of confi-
dential military documents. Dragić, Vučković and Kokanović were in 
detention for one month and the rest were detained for a few days. 
There were some speculations during this scandal that Svetozar Marović, 
then president of SM, and his son Miloš were also involved, as well as 
the Chief of Staff, General Dragan Paskaš, who in November 2005 gave 
the deposition about the disputed procurement of equipment. However, 
the investigation of these persons was not initiated.
The initiating of this scandal resulted first in the suspension and then 
annulment of the contract which the SM Council of Ministers approved 
on 22 August 2005, and the Minister of Defence resigned. At the same 
time, in October 2005, the Ministry of Finance Budget Inspection filed 
criminal charges against five persons, whose names were not disclosed 
under the explanation that this case should not be made personal.
In response, Dragić filed criminal charges against the investigative 
judge and the prosecutor of the Military Division of the District Court 
because they were conducting the proceedings in before the military 
and not the regular court. The court determined that there are not legal 
grounds to initiate criminal proceedings and thus the defendant 
appealed with the Supreme Court of Serbia, where the case is still pend-
ing. Therefore, the “bullet-proof vest” scandal has not yet made it fur-
ther than the investigation.
In the meantime, the Ministry of Defence signed further three con-
tracts with “Proizvodnja Mile Dragić” company in August 2006 
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explaining that this company was entitled to participating in public 
tenders since no final and enforceable decision was rendered against it.
CUSTOMS CORRUPTION 
In two major police interventions, of 28 November and 22 December 
2006, 17 and 15 persons, respectively, were arrested – mostly customs 
officers, but among them there were also owners of some companies 
and a number of exclusive shops. Interestingly, the arrested also includ-
ed the Customs Administrations coordinators for fight against of smug-
gling. 
What both groups had in common was that they were presenting the 
goods with false documents as if they were in transit through Serbia 
when, in real fact, they were unloaded in illegal warehouses and smug-
gled to fictitious companies and individuals without paying duties. The 
goods were mostly smuggled in trucks and trailer trucks which trans-
ported between 15 and 30 tons of the cargo. Whilst the first group 
smuggled to Serbia, mostly technical and textile goods from Turkey, 
Bulgaria, B&H, and Macedonia, the second groups forged the docu-
ments and falsely presented that trucks had left Serbia and went to 
Republika Srpska. 
The indictment against the “customs mafia” was filed on 28 May 
2007 by the special prosecutor for organised crime. It lists 28 persons 
who are accused of corruptive practices in the customs, receiving bribes, 
and abuse of office, as well as smuggling. According to the indictment, 
the goal of this criminal group was to have “certain beneficiaries of the 
alleged imports” avoid customs clearance, namely to enable them to 
smuggle excisable goods and oil products. The goods concerned were 
primarily high value commercial goods from China, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
and Macedonia. The goods was imported in Serbia in this manner in 
several hundred trailer trucks, so it is estimated that the damage to the 
state was several dozen million euros in taxes and customs duties. 
Especially interesting is the operating method of this group involving 
fictitious importation of the goods into the territory of Kosovo. Namely, 
after passing the administrative crossing points, the goods would return 
to Serbia through illegal channels and the alleged importer of the goods 
in Kosovo was entitled to the tax refund. In this way, the damage to the 
state included the unpaid tax and customs duty, as well as the tax 
refund.
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V  Media and Corruption
ThEORETICAL INVESTIgATION OF ThE RELATIONShIP BETWEEN 
ThE MEdIA ANd CORRUPTION
The analysis of the relationship between the media and corruption, 
namely involvement of the media in Serbia in fighting corruption 
should start with the review of previous theoretical investigations of the 
relationship between the media and corruption, namely main findings 
of such investigations. The main question in this regard is whether the 
free and independent media have any influence on corruption or not 
and, if yes, how strong is such influence. In other words, the question is 
whether the restrictions of media activity in a particular country, such 
as restriction of the freedom of entry and imposition of restrictions in 
respect of the activities of media companies, or restrictions of the con-
tents and type of media reports, are factors of corruption? From the 
perspective of the battle against corruption, this question may be refor-
mulated so as to read: can the media “liberation” policy, namely remov-
al of the above restrictions, contribute to the battle against corruption 
to any significant extent? 
The authors of one of the most important theoretical work on this 
subject matter, who gave their article the title “A Free Press is Bad News 
for Corruption”, obviously believe that this is exactly so.1 The authors 
presume that independent media are, in their opinion, the most effec-
tive mechanism for uncovering corruption and other violations of the 
law, or the rules. Accordingly, their theoretical hypothesis is that the 
countries with free media may expect a lower level of corruption. The 
theoretical explanation for this hypothesis is the following: according to 
the classification they have made, media reports on corruption fall 
under the external barriers to corruption, and such reports lead towards 
greater probability that the corruption will be uncovered which, accord-
ing to the classical Becker’s model of criminal conduct, results in great-
er anticipated value of the punishment (negative utility) for corruption 
and, therefore, reduces the incentive for corruptive practices. As seen 
by the authors, the effectiveness of this barrier, unlike internal barriers, 
1 Brunetti, A. and Weder, B. (2003) “A Free Press is a Bad News for Corruption”, 
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, pp 1801-1824 
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lies in the fact that it is much harder to buy off the journalists interested 
in the subject of corruption than the public servants who are not 
involved in corruption but are able to report it, which brings down the 
internal barrier to corruption. 
Namely, considering that successful press reporting on corrup-
tion, particularly uncovering corruptive practices (assuming reports 
are truthful), brings the popularity and recognition to the reporter 
him/herself as well as the media company, thus increasing their cur-
rent and expected revenue, so a lot can be lost by discontinuing the 
uncovering of corruptive practices. Therefore the amount of bribe 
aimed at discontinuing the corruption reports would be much high-
er than in the case of insiders who wish to whistle blow on corrup-
tion. The possibility of free entry into the media activity, leads to the 
establishment of new media companies, and therefore to new inves-
tigative journalists who, on principle, have an incentive to report on 
corruption. And if there is freedom of reporting, that is, there are no 
restrictions as to the media, such incentives will lead to increased 
reporting on corruption, and thus, to the likelihood of its uncover-
ing. On the basis of that a theoretical hypothesis is made: more free-
dom of the media, less corruption. 
The empirical research, or testing of this hypothesis in the above 
paper showed that there is a statistically significant link between the 
freedom of the media and corruption, considering that the assessment 
of the parameters of the freedom of the media is statistically signifi-
cant and negative – the lesser the freedom the greater the corruption. 
However, the absolute assessment values of parameters are quite low. 
In other words, a relatively big change in the freedom of the media 
will not result in a big change in the spread of corruption, even if 
account is taken of different ranges of indicators of these two phe-
nomena. Changes in corruption indicators and media freedom indi-
cators show that the above findings are quite robust – statistical sig-
nificance was lost in just a small number of cases but small absolute 
values of parameter assessments are still in place, which means that 
the correlation is not intensive. 
Such a relationship between the restricted media freedom and the 
media as a corruption factor, namely the introduction of media free-
dom as a remedy against corruption, prevails in some other contempo-
rary theoretical papers, regardless of whether they address the relation-
ship between the media and corruption,2 or, more generally, the rela-
tionship between the media and government policies.3 However, this 
optimism is not shared by all contemporary authors since the formu-
2 Stapenhurst, R. (2000) “The Media’s Role in in Curbing Corruption”, Washington, 
World Bank Institut
3 Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2001) “Political Agency, Government, Responsiveness 
and the role of the Media”, European Economic Review, Vol. 45, pp. 629-640 and 
Stromberg, D. (2001) “Mass Media and Public Policy” European Economic Review, 
Vol.45, pp. 652-663
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lated models have revealed the restrictions which may stand in the way 
of the beneficial effects of free media with regard to the suppression of 
corruption, namely, the restrictions that may be in place with regard to 
the use of free media as the means for fighting corruption.4 
The first restriction that may appear is the collusion between the 
media and the government. If the media expose corruption among the 
government’s ranks, the government may corrupt the media, namely 
collusion may be created between the media and the government. The 
reliability or sustainability of such collusion should be studied from the 
point of view of incentives for all parties not to thwart the agreement, 
and, as the cartel theory demonstrated, this incentive is the credibility 
of the punishment that may be meted out to those not living up to what 
was agreed. To the extent in which the corrupted government cannot 
unreservedly trust the bribed media or journalist, the media may con-
stitute a barrier to corruption.5 
The other restriction refers to the situation in which the corrupted 
government publicly reacts to the true allegations of the media or 
journalists. If the Government assesses that such a reaction may miti-
gate the damage caused by the media allegations, and that such miti-
gated damage is less than the benefit arising from corruption, then 
free media are not much of an obstacle – the government will con-
tinue with its corruptive practices. A situation like this is probable 
when the media in some country have a bad reputation, namely their 
reports have a low level of credibility. If, for instance, a newspaper 
with a low reputation publishes a truthful report on corruptive prac-
tices of the government, the government could relatively easily miti-
gate or eliminate the damage incurred. 
Finally, the theoretically most interesting is the situation when the 
media may, aiming to increase their circulation/ratings, that is, to 
increase their revenues on this basis, start false reports on the corrup-
tion in the government – although the corruption is not present, the 
media publish sensationalist reports on its existencee. The media can 
do this if the government has no means of effectively responding to 
such fallacious accusations, namely to credibly deny false accusations. 
In such circumstances, the incentives emerge for the government to 
start with corruptive practices. In the situation when they cannot fend 
off the (false) accusations, that is, when their reputation is already 
marred, the government will find it alluring to gain any benefit from 
the situation in which everybody consider them corrupted. All the 
above findings of this theoretical model demonstrate that the correla-
tion between media freedom and corruption is far more complex than 
what it seemed to be at first sight.
4 Vaidya, S. (2005) “Corruption in the Media`s Gaze”, European Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol.21, pp 667-687
5 Certainly, besides corrupting, one should take into account the possibility of 
journalist intimidation as the alternative or complementary measure taken by the 
government. 
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This is particularly true if those findings are supplemented by the 
findings relating to the possibility to have powerful interest groups with 
a decisive influence on the media, their contents, and their reports.6 
These reports are associated with the private media – strong interest 
groups or powerful individuals own the media, sometimes directly, but 
not even the domination of the state ownership, as it turns out,7 does 
away with this problem, considering that media freedom is diminished 
in such a case, the influence of the government grows, and political 
freedoms diminish. Finally, it was noted that also in the case of private 
media and their competition on the market, even when the corruption 
is virtually non-existent in a society, the tendency towards biased 
reporting still exists.8 When all this is taken into account, there evapo-
rates the rosy picture of the media freedom suppressing the corruption. 
This, however, does not mean that media repression is not a factor of 
corruption – only that mere discontinuation of such repression, namely 
establishment and enhancement of media freedom, will not as such 
lead to any radical downturn of corruption in a country.     
MEdIA ON CORRUPTION IN SERBIA, 2003-2005
As needed for the analysis of media reporting on corruption in Serbia 
after the year 2000, the focus was shifted to the printed media and more 
than 3,000 articles on the subject of corruption, published in the period 
from 2003 to 2005, were collected. Electronic media were excluded 
from the analysis since it was not possible to obtain appropriate docu-
mentation, i.e. recordings of the electronic media programs. Also, in 
the case of printed media, it was not possible to obtain the press clip-
pings pertaining to the period before the year 2003. The analysed arti-
cles were published in all weekly and daily newspapers in Serbia in the 
above period. Out of these 3,000 articles, a sample was created compris-
ing 1037 articles (one third). The sample collected like this was analysed 
in such a manner that each published article was assessed and, based on 
a specific criteria, classified into the appropriate group. 
The first indicator is whether the article is signed by a full name or 
only initialled, or whether it is transmitted news or an interview. The 
next indicator concerns the type of the article. Namely, all articles are 
classified into the following groups:
1. generally about corruption
2. a specific case of political corruption – “scandals”
3. a specific case of administrative corruption
6 Corneo, G. (2006) “Media Capture in a Democracy: The Role of Wealth Concen-
tration”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, pp. 37-58
7 Djankov et al (2003) “Who owns the Media?”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 
46, pp. 342-381,
8 Baron, D.P. (2006) “Presidential Media Bias”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, 
pp. 1-36 
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4. generally about corruption in a specific sector; for instance, in the 
judiciary, customs, health care, education, and similar
5. generally about political corruption
Also analysed was the length of the article. By this criterion, the arti-
cles were classified solely to two groups: is it a short or long article? 
Besides the length of article, in order to assess the importance which the 
medium or the editor attaches to the topic of corruption, we also analy-
sed the page on which the article about corruption was published: as 
“page one”, “page two or three” and “other”.
Moreover, the articles were grouped as follows:
1. positive (value neutral) analysis of corruption, which only involves 
the studying of the facts and causal links; 
2. normative analysis – assessment of the event, that is, value analysis 
of identified corruption.
FINdINgS OF ThE ANALYSIS OF PRESS ABOUT CORRUPTION IN 
SERBIA 
The first thing that catches the eye is the strongly growing number of 
articles covering the issue of corruption over time:
While in the beginning of 2003 the average monthly number of such 
articles was below 50, by the end of 2005 it grew to over 150.
The table below gives an overview of the number of articles in the 
sample covering the subject of corruption by the year.
Particularly noticeable is the rise in the number of articles from the 
beginning of 2005 and this trend is followed by all largest daily newspa-
pers in Serbia. 
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Figure 5.1  Monthly frequency of articles about corruption
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Table 5.1 
Newspapers 2003 2004 2005 Total
Blic 39 30 105 174
Da nas 37 36 91 164
Glas jav no sti 34 28 103 165
Ku rir 4 18 77 99
Po li ti ka 32 33 86 151
Ve čer nje no vo sti 19 19 70 108
Other daily newspapers 26 43 36 105
Weeklies 9 12 50 71
Total 200 219 618 1037
The correlation of the monthly number of articles between all news-
papers is relatively high and statistically significant. 
The question is how to interpret these findings. One of possible inter-
pretations is that it is only the case of reprinting of news, i.e. that one 
newspaper reports something and then other papers follow suit. Based on 
the available data we can neither refute nor confirm a hypothesis like this. 
The other, maybe more realistic interpretation is that the noted correla-
tion is false and that all newspapers write in correlation with real events 
Figure 5.2.  Monthly frequency of articles about corruption in daily newspapers
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on which the reports are made (real life corruption), namely, that the 
newspapers absolutely autonomously write about the same things, and 
that the frequency of articles is imposed by the reality. Considering that 
there are no data about the frequency of corruption in real life, this is yet 
another interpretation that cannot be empirically verified. 
Table  5.2
 Dan as Kur ir Politika Več er nje 
novosti
Glas 
javnosti
Blic 0.69 0.76 0.62  0.76 0.62
Danas 0.63 0.67 0.57 0.66
Kurir 0.75 0.66 0.68
Pol it ik a 0.49 0.65
Večernje n ovo sti   0.66
It has been noted that the newspapers, although they relatively often 
write about corruption, attach relatively low importance to this issue, 
considering that only 0.7% of the articles appeared on page one, about 
14.5% pages two and three, and that a large majority of articles, almost 
85%, were published on a page after the third. All in all, out of approx. 
4000 first pages published in the period 2003-2005, only about twenty 
carried the article about corruption published on page one.
The next thing we have tested concerns the signing of articles, name-
ly identification of the person who is publicly presenting the facts and 
judgment about corruption. We expected that the share of unsigned 
articles would be much greater in tabloids than in serious papers, “long 
form” newspapers. Although we have confirmed this hypothesis to 
Figure 5.3.  Page where the articles about corruption are published
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some extent (the share of the articles signed by full name and surname 
or only by initials was 72% in “Politika” and more than 85% in “Večernje 
novosti”, and, above all, only 61% in “Kurir”), these elements do not 
suffice to draw a conclusion since many unsigned article are simply the 
transmitted news from some other newspapers. Hence, there are indi-
cations that “less serious” papers publish more articles of anonymous 
authors but we cannot confirm this hypothesis based on the available 
data. Also, as it was expected, the share of the articles signed by the full 
name and surname was largest in the weeklies. 
Also, the practice of (non-)signing articles did not change to any 
significant extent in the period 2003 – 2005. There was a slight increase 
in the share of articles signed by the full name and surname and a 
slight decrease in the share of interviews and the articles which were 
only initialled.
Ta ble 5.3.  Signing of articles
Author
Share
2003 2004 2005  Total
Signed 28% 32% 33% 32%
Initialled 40% 36% 34% 35%
Unsigned 27% 29% 31% 30%
Intervew 6% 4% 2% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Figure 5.4. Signing of articles
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Also interesting is the issue of the length of the articles covering cor-
ruption. The Table below shows that there have been some changes in 
the article structure in these three years to the effect that the share of 
longer articles increased. 
Ta ble 5.4. Lenght of the articles
 2003 2004 2005
Papers Short Long Short Long Short Long
Blic 69% 31% 67% 33% 49% 51%
Da nas 51% 49% 47% 53% 52% 48%
Glas jav no sti 71% 29% 61% 39% 66% 34%
Ku rir 25% 75% 83% 17% 57% 43%
Po li ti ka 56% 44% 30% 70% 42% 58%
Ve čer nje no vo sti 53% 47% 74% 26% 40% 60%
Other daily newspapers 13% 88% 55% 45% 37% 63%
Weeklies 47% 53% 23% 77% 8% 93%
Total 55% 45% 54% 46% 48% 52%
Ta be la 5.5. Topics of articles
Papers
About 
corruption 
in general
“Scandals” Spe ci fic 
cases
generally 
about 
corruption 
in a specific 
section
generally 
about 
political 
corruption 
Blic 28% 3% 42% 12% 14%
Da nas 30% 0% 43% 8% 19%
Glas jav no sti 15% 1% 53% 8% 22%
Ku rir 15% 5% 43% 8% 28%
Po li ti ka 29% 1% 39% 9% 21%
Ve čer nje no vo sti 19% 1% 56% 9% 15%
Other daily 34% 1% 38% 10% 17%
Weeklies 35% 3% 34% 8% 19%
Ukup no 26% 2% 44% 9% 19%
The topics dealt with by the articles on corruption were classified in 
the following groups: general articles on corruption (classified in this 
group are the articles about the institutions dealing with corruption, 
for instance, the Anti-Corruption Council), articles dealing with spe-
cific cases of political corruption, the so-called scandals, articles deal-
ing with specific cases of administrative corruption, articles dealing 
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with corruption in general in a specific sector, such as in health care 
or judiciary, and articles dealing with political corruption but not the 
specific cases thereof.
It may be noted that scandals are relatively small in number. There 
are two possible explanations of such results. The first explanation is 
that there indeed were a small number of the articles about scandals 
but that, because of their significance, these articles are conspicuous 
and that is why it seems to everybody that they were greater in num-
ber. The second, probably more realistic and more accurate explana-
tion is that many articles about scandals remained outside the articles 
analysed by us because such articles may have been earlier (by pre-
liminary selection of articles) classified in the articles on politics and 
not corruption. 
Considering that there was relatively much reporting about specific, 
concrete cases of corruption, namely corruptive practices (44%), we 
considered it useful to see with which segments of public life these cases 
were associated. The table below shows an overview of the findings.
Ta ble 5.6. In sti tu tions
Sec tor 2003 2004 2005 Total
Customs 1% 4% 0% 1%
In spections 1% 2% 1% 2%
Local government 1% 1% 1% 1%
Po li ce 31% 16% 7% 13%
Judiciary 8% 46% 36% 33%
Business 9% 0% 0% 2%
Education 8% 17% 7% 9%
Health care 41% 13% 48% 40%
As may be seen in the Table, the papers have mostly written about 
the specific, concrete cases of corruption in health care, judiciary, police, 
and education (95% of articles in all). It is interesting that the customs 
was ranked “low” – although the results of empirical research suggest 
that customs service is among those most vulnerable to corruption, the 
printed media have only a small number of reports about it. 
Almost 10% of the articles deal with corruption in a particular sector, 
at a general level. The distribution of articles is shown in the table below.
A certain difference may be noted in respect of the specific cases. For 
instance, 17% of the articles deal with corruption at a local level. 
However, not a single specific case of corruption at the local level was 
“processed” in the papers, probably because there were relatively few 
cases like that. On the other hand, even though there were relatively 
numerous specific cases of corruption in the police (13%), only 4% of 
the articles addressing the corruption in a specific sector dealt with the 
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issue of police corruption. In the case of the judiciary, health care and 
education, the numbers were almost identical in the two tables. It is 
noticeable that, again, there were only a small number of articles about 
corruption in the customs. 
Ta ble 5.7.  Sectors
Type of article
Share
2003 2004 2005 Total
Health care 30% 15% 41% 34%
Education 20% 5% 11% 10%
Po li ce 10% 15% 0% 4%
Judiciary 10% 50% 29% 31%
Customs 0% 0% 5% 3%
Lo cal government and politicians 30% 15% 15% 17%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
We have also analysed the extent to which an article relies on facts. 
Thus, we have classified the articles into two groups – those that fully 
rely on facts and those with some elements of speculation.
Ta b le 5.8.  Pro file of articles
Facts 2003 2004 2005 Total
Relies exclusively on facts 78% 81% 94% 88%
There are some speculations 22% 19% 6% 12%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
We have considered the articles in which there was some specula-
tion but the paper has truthfully conveyed somebody’s quote to be the 
articles that rely on facts since the papers solely transmitted what 
somebody had said. Apparently, the journalists in Serbia only reluc-
tantly resort to speculation. They rather hold on to the facts, regard-
less of the extent to which these facts are verified. Also, they are will-
ing to accept somebody else’s speculation but not the accountability 
for their own. 
The largest number of articles deals only with the positive analysis of 
events, answering the questions: who, when, where. However, this anal-
ysis does not go to any greater depth either, the causes are not investi-
gated, or they are addressed only perfunctorily. A smaller number of 
articles, only about 20%, address the questions of why and how the cor-
ruption arises or what are its consequences.
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Ta b le 5.9. 
2003 2004 2005
Po si tiv e ana lysis 79% 74% 83%
Nor ma tive ana lysis 21% 26% 17%
Total 100% 100% 100%
A general assessment may be that the quality of the articles with a 
normative component is very low. In most cases, those are emotionally 
charged (sometimes even hysterical) accusatory articles which do not 
communicate real causes and consequences of corruption but are 
reduced to moral finger pointing and unjustified generalisations.
Generally, the printed media’s level of reporting about corruption is 
quite low in Serbia. These reports are dominated by the sensationalism 
and presence of analytical-investigational journalism is very small. Even 
though corruption has doubtlessly imposed itself as one of the most 
important topics for the media in Serbia, the manner in which it is done 
does not give much reason for optimism.
201
VI  Corruption in Serbia 2001-2006: 
 Analysis and Evaluation of the Effects 
 of Change
The empirical analysis of the spread and intensity of corruption in 
Serbia showed that it is reduced, namely, that the phenomenon has 
subsided. Corruption in Serbia is lesser in 2006 than in was in 2001. 
The findings of the analysis of attitudes, namely public perception, 
could not produce any distinctive conclusion in this respect, consider-
ing that it was not possible to examine whether such change is statisti-
cally significant or not. In other words, no conclusion about the exis-
tence or the direction of the change (of perception) of the spread and 
intensity of corruption in Serbia can be made based on the analysis of 
public perception and attitudes. 
In contrast, the analysis of perception and experience of business 
people showed that there has been a statistically significant reduction in 
the spread and intensity of corruption in Serbia. In this regard, the con-
clusion is the same regardless of the specific indicator of corruption 
used: indicator of corruption spread (answer to the question how com-
mon is it for a company to make irregular payments in order to have 
some things done), offers of corruption (answer to the question how 
often have public servants directly asked for money, a gift, or a favour), 
corruption intensity (answer to the question what percent of total rev-
enue is set aside for “informal payments”), as well as general impression 
about the change in corruption level (answer to the question in com-
parison with the period of three years ago the informal payment situa-
tion is…). The spread of the corruption aimed at exercising one’s rights 
(corruption in the form of extortion) has been particularly reduced, 
whereas in some cases, in the opinion of businessmen, the spread of the 
corruption aimed at breaking the law or influencing the content of leg-
islation has increased.   
How to interpret these changes? What are the factors that caused 
these changes? Useful for answering this question is the classic Becker’ 
model of criminal behaviour which says that incentives for corruption 
lie in the difference between the expected utility from corruption as a 
criminal offence and the expected punishment for the criminal offence 
(threatened punishment and probability that such punishment will be 
meted out in that particular case). The greater (the positive) difference 
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between these two values, the greater the incentives for the growth of 
corruption. According to the findings of our empirical research, it could 
be said that the (positive) difference between these two values has nar-
rowed in Serbia. What has happened? Was it of critical importance that 
the expected benefits from corruption decreased, or that the value of 
the expected penalty for such criminal offence increased?    
The expected benefits from corruption lie in the possibility to obtain 
rent by corrupting public servants or politicians, and such possibility 
depends on specific public policies, that is, government intervention, 
such as protectionism (protection of domestic manufacturers), regula-
tion (such as regulation of new entries to an industry), etc. All surveys 
conducted thus far have unambiguously shown that the increased level of 
government intervention, namely increased level of government interfer-
ence with economic developments, inevitably leads to the increase of rent 
and, thus, to the increase of expected benefits from corruption.  
Considering that indirect policies of the fight against corruption sub-
stantially influence the formation of rent, i.e. the possibility to obtain a 
part of such rent through corruption, it is clear that such policies produce 
changes, i.e. decrease of the expected benefits from corruption. What 
policies of this kind have been implemented in Serbia since 2001? 
These include foreign trade reform, oriented towards liberalisation 
and deregulation, which means lowering of custom tariffs, elimination 
of quantitative restrictions, and facilitation of cross border trade in 
goods. The reform of public finance resulted, on the revenue side, in 
the introduction of value added tax, simplification of tax rates, and 
strengthening of tax administration, while on the expenditure side, it 
led to the establishment of treasury system and centralised public 
expenditure management. These two changes then caused considerable 
narrowing of the space for corruption, namely diminishing of the incen-
tives to customs and tax payers to resort to corruption to evade cus-
toms/tax burden, and thus appropriation of rent.  
The area of public procurement, one of the most vulnerable areas in 
terms of corruption, is governed by the law which is a combination of 
some good and some not-so-good solutions. However, the very fact 
that a modern law was enacted in this area shows that there was a turn-
around compared to the time before 2001, when public procurement 
was virtually legally unregulated and dominated by business people 
close to the then regime.  
Very little has been done with regard to subsidies, the transfers which 
always provide fertile ground for corruption. Namely, subsidies as a 
form of public expenditure are still deemed to be desirable in Serbia, 
both on the ideological plane (“the government should help people”), 
and in terms of political practice (“those who get the subsidies will vote 
for me in the next election”). In such circumstances subsidies are cer-
tain to continue being a source of corruption in Serbia. 
Even though it is customary that privatisation in Serbia is named as one 
of the greatest sources of corruption, the assessment has demonstrated 
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that the current model of privatisation (the one implemented since 
2001) is more robust than the alternative models. The reason for this is 
relatively high transparency of the privatisation process which estab-
lishes concentrated majority ownership over the privatised company’s 
equity. Namely, it turned out that more susceptible to corruption are 
the procedures of taking over the companies privatised under the previ-
ous legislation, the model which resulted in internal allocation and high 
dispersion of shares. It also came to light that the takeover process was 
relatively poorly regulated and that it created incentives for corruptive 
practices. It is, therefore, no wonder that the largest scandals (“Knjaz 
Miloš”, etc), which are mistakenly associated with the privatisation 
model of 2001, are actually connected with the takeover of companies 
privatised pursuant to the legislation in force before 2001.   
Bankruptcy legislation could be a significant source of corruption per 
se, particularly the poorly formulated bankruptcy legislation that was 
adopted in Serbia already in 1989 and applied until recently. This legisla-
tion, effectively, protected the debtor and not the creditor, the bankrupt-
cy procedure could last practically indefinitely, and almost all bankruptcy 
scandals in Serbia are associated with the application of this law. One of 
the greatest problems not only of the indirect anti-corruption policies but 
of the overall legal reform was delayed adoption of new bankruptcy legis-
lation and then, also, delays in its implementation.  
Finally, changes in the legislation governing the issue of company 
registration, i.e. registration of ownership, have greatly diminished the 
administrative barriers to entry of new companies and, accordingly, 
increased competition, that is, reduced the rent and thus, the space for 
corruption. All surveys conducted worldwide showed that there is a link 
between the barriers to entry and corruption – the higher the barriers to 
entry, the greater the spread and intensity of corruption. Lowering the 
barriers to entry is good not only from the perspective of economic effi-
ciency and growth, but it also has beneficial effects on the fight against 
corruption. 
It is obvious that mixed results have been produced at the level of 
indirect anti-corruption policies: in some areas considerable progress 
has been made, some areas saw stagnation or even slight backward 
trends. However, one may say that a moderate progress was recorded. 
Whether that progress was of critical importance for the above men-
tioned brining down of the spread and level of corruption in Serbia or 
not, is the question which can be answered only after studying the 
Government’s direct anti-corruption policies.
Direct anti-corruption policies are those that, primarily, lead to the 
increase of expected value of the punishment for the criminal act of 
corruption, or other forms of corruptive violation of the law. The Law 
on Financing of Political Parties is doubtlessly a very important compo-
nent of these policies, considering that it regulates a very sensitive area. 
The Law is consistent but very restrictive, so, practically, there exists a 
taciturn agreement between all political parties that this Law is not to 
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be too strictly implemented. The Law on Prevention of Conflict of 
Interests in Discharge of Public Office predominantly comprises good 
provisions, although it has many imprecise and, sometimes, contradic-
tory formulations. However, the greatest problem of this Law is its 
penal provisions, since they are too lenient, reducing the expected value 
of the punishment, that is, the cost expected by the potential offender. 
The national judicial reform strategy is a document which, on princi-
ple, should ensure the improvement of judicial operations, increase of 
the probability of conviction for all criminal offences and, consequently, 
increase of the expected probability of punishment. In this respect, a well 
developed and implemented strategy of this kind would drastically raise 
the cost of corruption and thus reduce the incentives for the involvement 
in corruptive practices for any interested persons. Even though the strat-
egy was assessed as a document that can offer certain results, it is obvious 
that so far there has been no political will for its implementation, i.e. for 
overall judicial reform. It is clear that in its two terms of office (2001-2003 
and 2004-2007), the Ministry of Justice was more engaged in the public 
debate with judiciary officials and refused any responsibility for what was 
happening or, rather, not happening, in the judiciary, while the highest 
judicial officials were mostly preoccupied with themselves and, accord-
ingly, almost all attempts of critical review of their practices were labelled 
as attacks on the independence of the judiciary. In other words, the prac-
tices of the competent bodies have so far given little reason for optimism 
in this area, although one should always remain hopeful that improve-
ments in this area are possible.  
The anti-corruption strategy should be one of the key documents of 
a transition country. Namely, transition is the time when both the con-
stitutional framework of a country and the value system of its popula-
tion change. In such times of change, it is reasonable to expect that the 
spread of corruption cannot be prevented by regular public policies, or 
regular measures, and that is why the anti-corruption strategy is need-
ed. The issue with the anti-corruption strategy adopted by the National 
Assembly, however, is not that it was adopted but rather the manner in 
which it was adopted, and its contents. The main reason for the adop-
tion of the strategy was strong international pressure, primarily from 
international organisations (Council of Europe, OSCE, etc), and not 
the autochthonous political will of the ruling, or largest political parties 
in Serbia. Simply put, for the leading domestic political forces a strategy 
like this, as such, was not a priority – it was only the international pres-
sure that caused its development and adoption. As regards its contents, 
as already mentioned, the positions expressed are mostly general, often 
quite muddled, and sometimes contradictory. Therefore, the question 
is to what extent such text of the strategy can be used as the platform for 
fighting the corruption in an effective manner. It seems that the 
authors sought to strictly formally satisfy the often contradictory 
demands put forward by the representatives of international institu-
tions, rather than to create a clear and consistent document. Finally, 
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the strategy completely fails to address the public policies, namely, 
indirect fight against corruption (liberalisation and deregulation of the 
country’s economic environment), but deals exclusively with direct 
measures, primarily enforcement measures of the government.  
The Law on Prevention of Money Laundering should serve to reduce 
the expected utility from corruption, considering that, generally speak-
ing, it precludes the legalisation of the proceeds of corruption. Although 
there was some debate with regard to the content of the law, namely, 
individual legal provisions, it is beyond doubt that its implementation 
is a much bigger problem. Its past implementation did not constitute a 
significant barrier to corruption. The same findings may be applied to 
the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Interest. Generally 
speaking, such a law should provide for greater transparency of public 
sector in a country. However, the problem of its implementation 
remains and, with it, the problem of its effects. 
The comparative analysis of direct and indirect government anti-cor-
ruption policies unambiguously shows that direct government policies 
for combating corruption are far behind the indirect ones. Namely, rela-
tively small steps forward with regard to direct policies cannot by them-
selves explain the statistically significant decrease in the spread of corrup-
tion and of the new corruption in Serbia. Indirect anti-corruption poli-
cies prevail, and there is no doubt that they have had a dominant impact 
on bringing down the spread and level of corruption in Serbia.  
The very fact that these are indirect anti-corruption policies leads to 
a conclusion that the motives for their application are not or need not 
be related to the fight against corruption. For example, the liberalisa-
tion of foreign trade may be motivated by the (sincere) desire to inte-
grate domestic economy into global economic flows, international 
community’s requirements in this respect, or the pressure of domestic 
stakeholders who find that such liberalisation suits their needs – and 
none of these is related to the fight against corruption. It is another 
matter that a by-product of the foreign trade liberalisation is the reduc-
tion of incentives for corruption and, accordingly, lowering of its level. 
Moreover, the privatisation, that is, the selection of the privatisation 
model and its implementation are motivated by the factors that have 
nothing to do with battling corruption – creation of good ownership 
structure in terms of corporate management, or maximisation of the 
privatisation proceeds. Due to this, the progress of a country in the area 
of indirect anti-corruption policies is not necessarily related to the com-
mitment of such country’s government to fight corruption.1   
On the other hand, the area of direct policies clearly shows that there 
is a lack of political will – the battle against corruption is not at the top 
of the government’s political priorities. There are several reasons for 
1 Of course, one should not rule out that a part of the government’s motives relating 
to indirect policies may be the fight against corruption, but simply, such motives 
are never decisive in the case of indirect anti-corruption policies. 
206 Corruption in Serbia Five Years Later
this. First, Serbian governments are coalition governments, which 
means comprised of a number of different parties. Internal stability of 
those governments depends on a kind of balance achieved within the 
coalition, and corruption very often plays an important role in the 
achievement of such balance – the prime minister of such a govern-
ment has no incentive whatsoever to reveal corruption scandals of his 
coalition partners, since it is the unrevealed rather than revealed scan-
dals of this kind that are powerful weapons for political blackmailing of 
the partners and maintenance of the balance (of fear). Even if this 
mechanism is not in place, coalition governments are inherently unsta-
ble and therefore do not have solid foundations for a strong fight against 
corruption. Finally, corruption ranks very high on the list of topics in 
the inter-party or pre-electoral rhetoric. Opposition parties fiercely 
and, most often, without valid arguments, attack the government for 
corruption and promise, without much credibility, that as soon as they 
come to power, their first step will be to eliminate corruption. In such 
circumstances, the exposure of corruptive practices within the govern-
ment or public administration could be a double edged sword. Although, 
on the one hand, it demonstrates that the government is fighting cor-
ruption, on the other, it demonstrates that the corruption exists, which 
gives weight and credibility to the opposition parties’ rhetoric.    
In addition to the lack of political will and commitment of the gov-
ernment to fight corruption directly, some conceptual dilemmas 
regarding the most suitable institutional solutions have also been unre-
solved for a very long time. After many years of wandering, it seems that 
the government’s future anti-corruption concept is now beginning to 
crystallise. While a new, specialised body – the Agency – should address 
the issue of political corruption, the “classic” corruption, the one which 
involves public servants, should be addressed by the regular mecha-
nisms of the legal system, that is, regular bodies: the police and the judi-
ciary (prosecutors and judges). However, it remains unclear how long it 
will take for such an organisational arrangement to become effective, to 
start producing results. That will depend on the political will, i.e. on the 
commitment to implement direct anti-corruption policies. However, 
even if the political will or is created, that is, if the commitment is made 
to implement these measures, it will take time to put all that in motion. 
Namely, two efficient services are needed for the implementation of 
this strategy: the police and the judiciary. Previous research showed that 
it is the judiciary that creates a bottleneck. Some time will be needed for 
the judiciary reform to take effect. Even if we presume that things will 
get better in this respect (they can hardly be worse than during the 
terms of office of former ministers of justice, in 2001-2003 and 2004-
2007), it will take time to feel the effects of these changes.      
Taking into consideration all the above restrictions with regard to 
direct anti-corruption policies, it is highly likely that indirect anti-cor-
ruption policies in Serbia will prevail over the direct ones for yet some 
time to come. The reasons for this belief should not be sought solely in 
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the weaknesses or restrictions relating to direct anti-corruption poli-
cies, but also in the strength of the motives on which indirect policies 
are founded. These motives are many and different, which adds to the 
strength and sustainability of the indirect anti-corruption policies in 
Serbia. First, there is no doubt that present government in Serbia is 
eager to integrate the country into Europe, in the first phase through 
the stabilisation and association process, and, at a later stage, by acces-
sion to, i.e. membership in the European Union. This process unavoid-
ably leads to the adjustment of public policies and institutional arrange-
ments to bring them to the level of (European) market economies. In 
addition, a part of the accession is the full liberalisation of economic 
flows with the EU member countries, which in effect means full liber-
alisation of the largest part of Serbian foreign-trade flows. Second, it is 
obvious that there exists a strong desire to build the environment for 
the attraction of foreign direct investments, which would promote eco-
nomic growth and increase employment, i.e. reduce unemployment, by 
reforming the economic system towards the establishment of a true 
market economy. Third, even though Serbia was repeatedly imposed 
conditions, which was a mechanism for its integration in the interna-
tional community, in the last several years these conditions primarily 
focused on the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and similar politi-
cal undertakings and to a much lesser degree were these conditions 
connected with institutional reforms and government, primarily eco-
nomic policies, and imposed by international financial institutions. 
After the above cooperation is ensured, it is to be expected that the con-
ditions imposed by the international community will primarily be 
focused on government or economic policies and, in particular, the 
institutional reform. This means that pressure may be expected in the 
direction of greater liberalisation and deregulation, key elements of 
indirect anti-corruption policies. Clearly, there are strong and different 
motives for deregulation and liberalisation, which is good if we take 
into account that Serbia has numerous and powerful interest groups 
opposing such government policies.   
The intensification and acceleration of liberalisation and deregulation, 
that is, the increase of economic freedoms, will not only strengthen indi-
rect anti-corruption policies but will also reduce the need for existence of 
special anti-corruption institutions and special measures. With this the 
things return to regular mechanisms, to the procedures in the legal sys-
tem which treat corruption as any other criminal offence. Naturally, we 
have yet to see whether in future Serbia will be able to rely on all those 
above described government motives for further liberalisation and dereg-
ulation or whether the interest groups striving to maintain the closed, 
regulated, and government-managed economy will prevail. 
Serbia has certainly made progress, i.e. produced results in the fight 
against corruption after the year 2000. Government policies have 
changed and the government, after all, demonstrated a certain degree 
of commitment to fight corruption (unlike the government before 
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October 2000 which demonstrated a high degree of determination to 
maintain and promote corruption), and these changes have inevitably 
yielded results in respect of reducing the spread and intensity of cor-
ruption in Serbia. On the other hand, relatively little has been done in 
terms of direct government anti-corruption policies, primarily due to 
the lack of political will, which was largely the result of weak, sometimes 
even minority coalition governments ruling in Serbia since October 
2000. 
What is the future of the fight against corruption in Serbia? If the 
country is ruled by the political forces whose political interest lies in 
association with Europe and further integration of our country into the 
world, then direct and, particularly, indirect anti-corruption policies 
will have to be implemented automatically. If, on the other hand, it is 
ruled by those political forces which do not see their political interest in 
Serbia’s association with Europe, or are indifferent to this issue, then it 
will remain uncertain what will happen with the corruption in Serbia.  
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VI  Updating of Anti-corruption Strategy 
  from 2001
INTROdUCTION
In line with the analytical character of this study, in the last chapter of 
this study we shall attempt to assess 
• to what extent the anti-corruption strategy that we proposed in 
the book from 2001 withstood the test of time and presented a 
valid strategy to the government at the time, 
• in what way that strategy should be amended and possibly comple-
mented by new elements so that it would remain up-to-date. 
These two questions do not present merely an ex post analysis of the 
ideas presented five or more years ago, which can be interesting, but 
not particularly useful, but also a substantive comparison of the cor-
ruption mechanisms active in the course of the previous years with the 
measures undertaken by the government (if any), with an assessment of 
their efficiency. Moreover, at the end we shall state what, in our opin-
ion, should be done further with regard to the fight against corruption. 
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEgY FROM 2001
It is worth reminding of the key elements of the strategy the CLDS team 
suggested five, almost six years ago.
Three key factors of the proposed strategy were as follows:
• reduction of the government role in the economic and social life, 
reducing the area in which corruption may arise,
• introduction of accountability of the government bodies and insti-
tutions, increasing the information level and facilitating corrup-
tion identification and
• impact on the motivation system of civil servants, providing incen-
tives to them to observe the rules and disincentives to engage in 
corrupt practices.
The following were mentioned as the most important areas of the 
fight against corruption:
• political sphere, where we advocated the provision of full competi-
tion and stressed the importance of regulation of party financing 
and conflict of interest,
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• judicial sphere, where we pointed out the necessity of this system’s 
reform, based on the change of judges, ensuring the judiciary’s 
independence and new principles of judge election,
• fiscal sphere, where we suggested a complete reform – from bud-
get procedures, methods of operation of the tax and customs 
administration to, most importantly, the establishment of a com-
petitive public procurement system,
• public administration reform, where we proposed changes in all 
areas: composition change, depoliticization and professionaliza-
tion, qualification improvement, permanent training, wage 
increase, integration of ethic principles of conduct, work transpar-
ency, etc.; we particularly pointed out the necessity of these chang-
es in the police and health care.
We also proposed the formation of three independent institutions which 
could be very useful in the fight against corruption. Those are as follows:
• anti-corruption agency, which would lead the fight against cor-
ruption,
• main supervision, which would perform financial supervision 
(audit) of the operation of government bodies and
• ombudsman, who would protect the rights of citizens from the 
government arbitrariness.
The most important precondition of successful fight against corrup-
tion was deemed to be the existence of political will at the highest level 
for the government to tackle seriously this social disease.
When the proposed strategy presented by CLDS is observed from 
this time distance, it can be concluded that it was a concept well suited 
to the circumstances in Serbia at the time, i.e. difficult corruption heri-
tage from the previous regime and the need to build completely new 
institutions not only for the purposes of the fight against corruption, 
but also transition from socialism into a liberal-democratic society. 
This concept certainly shared the basic construction blocks with the 
whole class of proposed strategies for transition countries and com-
pletely fitted into the modern trends at the time. In its essence lay the 
construction of proper mechanisms for good administration of the state 
in the post-transition period as a better method of combating corrup-
tion than repressive campaigns.
The governments of Serbia have, as already stated, been, to a greater or 
lesser extent active in combating corruption during the past years, with 
the basic characteristics along the lines proposed by CLDS in its strategy. 
POLITICAL WILL
The first condition for successful fight against corruption has been firm 
political will at the highest level to combat this negative phenomenon. 
If there is none, corruption is likely to flourish despite any proclaimed 
strategy or policy. 
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In the developed part of the world such special political will is not 
particularly necessary, since government law enforcement institutions 
(police, prosecutor’s office, judiciary, etc.) operate at a decent level and 
essentially ensure continuous fight against corruption. 
In the countries with less mature and reliable government adminis-
tration, including the judicial branch, government bodies are not cer-
tain to perform their work in the necessary manner in regular proce-
dure, without constant prodding by the highest political level. It may be 
deterred in this both by its own weaknesses (bad legislation, lack of 
qualifications, corruption, etc.) and by negative signals coming from 
the political sphere, such as the protection of participants in corrupt 
practices with ties to the officials. For that reason, for successful fight 
against corruption in these countries it is crucial to have political sup-
port for the police, investigative and judicial bodies coming from the 
highest level of enlightened government.
Still, this support is not usually easy to ensure. The first cause of its 
lack can be the corruption of the highest authorities themselves, so any 
expectation of encouragement from their part would be an illusion.
Other causes will be sought in political processes. Namely, the most 
powerful weapon of the authorities in combating corruption can be its 
desire to serve public interest, i.e. to increase general welfare. Such 
moral authorities, authorities committed to general good, will certainly 
take the fight against corruption as one of its highest priorities, starting 
from the correct assessment that it is impossible to do good deeds with 
diseased government administration and that it first needs to be cured 
by combating inflation. 
Such idealistic government can frequently be found in older politics 
textbooks, but it is, unfortunately, uncommon in modern democracies, 
in particular the young ones. In real life most common are the authori-
ties for which morals are not the cornerstones of their activities, but the 
correct realization of own interest. And the interest of each politician 
and political group is winning of and staying in power, so they approach 
any problem from the aspect of effects of possible measures and actions 
on their (party) political rating. For the party which is in power it is a 
difficult decision to start a decisive fight against corruption if that would 
bring it negative overall effects. It is possible, for example, for this fight 
to bring to the ruling party costs in relation to its own members and 
civil servants and, even more importantly, to part of the business com-
munity, without special positive effects on the party rating. The latter is 
a common occurrence in a society in which voters do not set great store 
by combating corruption, probably based on the feeling that it is not a 
very important phenomenon or on the basis of assessment that it is an 
incurable disease. 
Another important element is worth mentioning: there are situations 
in which both the government and the opposition can only pretend to 
be committed to combating corruption. For the opposition that is quite 
clear, as it does not really have to demonstrate anything, but only to 
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advocate a certain nice strategy and claim that it would implement it if 
it came into power. However, the ruling party can simulate fighting 
corruption if large-scale corruption is predominant in the country, so 
the electorate is unable to assess on the basis of their own experience 
what the situation is like in the country regarding corruption and what 
all its consequences are. In other words, citizens observe small-scale 
corruption more easily at lower government levels, since they and those 
around them encounter it, whereas the instances of large-scale corrup-
tion often remain illusive, which is why they do not pay particular 
attention to it.
What is it like in Serbia? Here the government is mostly composed, at 
least according to anecdotal evidence, of different individuals and 
groups. There are honorable people honestly advocating the fight 
against corruption, but there are also those who, as heads of interest 
syndicates, use for themselves and their people opportunities that arise. 
That is how it was during the Đinđić’s and Živković’s government, and 
that is how it was during the first Kostunica’s government. Such a con-
stellation implies a combination of feigned and real fight against cor-
ruption, probably with the slowing down of the latter and the calcula-
tion of moves to be undertaken in order to increase general benefits, 
but with the minimization of damage for the parties and associates. We 
are obviously not claiming here that corruption presents the base of the 
government policy and that prime ministers were involved in it, but 
only that corruption had an impact on certain moves of the govern-
ment, or a lack of certain moves, and that there are people in the 
Government who are not unacquainted with it. 
The opposition Serbian Radical Party, on the other hand, uses accu-
sations of corruption of the ruling parties as its main domestic-policy 
weapon. Its arguments are usually unconvincing, but they strike a 
responsive cord in certain population strata and contribute to the sig-
nificant popularity of this party. 
More importantly, we believe that it is obvious that a serious fight 
against corruption in Serbia (and further) depends on the highest politi-
cal decision, i.e. that the regular government bodies, such as the police 
and prosecutor’s office, do not always conduct it as part of their regular 
work, but rather as frequent extraordinary campaigns when they get 
instructions from the highest political level. This is best demonstrated by 
a series of arrests of various groups during the spring of 2007 (all the so-
called mafias). Namely, in all of these previous 5-6 years there was no 
similar campaign and now many are concentrated in a short period of 
several months. Since the current Minister of the Interior has been hold-
ing that position for over three years, it is clear that this series of arrests 
does not present a consequence of a replacement of an inactive minister 
with an active one. Something has obviously changed in political circum-
stances – in the meantime elections were held and the composition of the 
ruling coalition partially changed – removing previously existing political 
barriers or providing impetus to the fight against corruption. 
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If, therefore, the enforcement system in Serbia (still) does not work 
by itself, exclusively by the book and without impetus from the high 
political circles, then for successful fight against corruption the exis-
tence of political will for combating corruption in the ruling circles is of 
the greatest importance. 
Political will in the government should not be exclusively directed 
towards individual actions or campaigns, but even more towards the 
construction of stable, compliant institutions as higher and long-lasting 
barriers to corruption.
ChANgE OF FOCUS
The first question is whether Serbia needs special fight against corrup-
tion, with special policies, instructions and actions. Corruption exists 
in many countries of the world, in fact in all of them, but many of them 
have not adopted an anti-corruption strategy, set up special institutions 
or launched special campaigns, nor are they thinking along those lines. 
It is clear that in the developed countries there is belief that such a spe-
cial activity is not necessary for them and that it would not bring them 
benefits. What is that about?
The developed countries rely on regular anti-corruption mechanisms 
and believe that a special strategy, with major institutional changes, is 
not necessary. Naturally, in those countries as well there is corruption, 
sometimes even assuming large proportions, judging by the value of 
transactions and the political level at which it occurs, but the regular 
activity of the enforcement and judicial system is also impressive and 
provides good results. Let us look at the latest example from the US 
from 2007: Congressman William Jefferson appears to have mediated 
in transactions between American companies and some African coun-
tries, in exchange for commission, but he was followed, a police sting 
operation was mounted, money was found in his freezer and finally he 
was taken to the competent court. The government administration did 
its work as it would do in any other, less attractive case, so the 
Congressman was not saved by his political position, nor did his party 
try to save him and conceal his wrongdoing.1 
Unfortunately, the situation in Serbia cannot be compared with that 
in the developed countries. Regular institutions operate properly over 
there, in regular procedure, and manage to keep the level of corruption 
at a low level, whereas in Serbia the police, judicial and similar bodies 
all too often wait for a sign from politicians to get involved, which was 
already dealt with. Apart from that, their abilities are not always at the 
required level either. It is clear that the building of these institutions in 
1 An interesting aspect of this case is that the voters from Louisiana elected the 
accused Jefferson congressman after the scandal came out, which means that they 
did not pay much attention to the allegations of his corrupt activities. 
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Serbia has not been completed yet, i.e. that they require further con-
tinuous and thorough improvement both in the direction of indepen-
dence from politics and of capacity building.
On the other hand, during the past 5-6 years Serbia has, to a large 
extent, built institutions that did not exist in 2000 and adopted modern 
anti-corruption legislation. In other words, Serbia is not at the begin-
ning of the anti-corruption road; instead, it has gone quite far down 
that road. Therefore, the strategy that was suitable for 2001 no longer 
fits the current circumstances and it is certainly necessary to move the 
focus of action from those first anti-corruption steps to the following, 
i.e. it is necessary to move from the earlier to later stages.
Let us take a closer look of the changes introduced. Economic legisla-
tion has been changed to a large extent in comparison with the system 
in force in the 1990s. Foreign trade and foreign exchange legislation has 
been liberalized, prices and payment operations have been liberalized, 
the sale of foreign currency and oil-derived products has been legalized, 
the tax system has been improved significantly, etc. Numerous restric-
tions have thus been abolished, i.e. licenses which enabled civil servants 
and their bosses to engage in corrupt practices. The area on which gov-
ernment factors decide has in such a way been significantly reduced, 
thereby reducing corruption as well.
Then, legislation has been adopted in different areas, which should 
make corruption more difficult or facilitate the fight against it. As said 
previously, the laws on conflict of interest, party financing, public pro-
curement, civil servants, state auditing institution, ombudsman have 
been adopted, then the anti-corruption strategy and its action plan have 
been adopted, the criminal code has been amended. This has basically 
created a legal basis for wide anti-corruption activity. 
Finally, numerous institutions in the area of fight against corruption 
have been established: Organized Crime Directorate (UPBOK), Public 
Procurement Agency, Conflict of Interest Prevention Board, Ombudsman, 
Anti-Money Laundering Agency, etc. Internal control departments have 
been reinforced in many government institutions. Among the planned 
institutions, the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Agency and State 
Auditing Institution is under preparation. 
Some individual, but important measures have been introduced and 
should reduce corruption. In the past years civil servants’ wages have 
been increased, in particular in local authorities and for top civil ser-
vants in republic ministries (e.g. assistant ministers and department 
heads),2 which to a certain extent reduces their motivation to engage in 
illicit activities. Furthermore, the transparency of government authori-
ties’ operation has been expanded significantly, both through the sub-
mission of statutory interim reports on their operation and through 
2 Interestingly, assistant ministers in the Government of Serbia now (June 2007) 
have higher salaries than the ministers themselves. 
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much more frequent communication of the leading government and 
local officials with the media. 
Thus, the fight against corruption in Serbia has completed the initial 
stages and moved on to the next stages. Those first stages were essen-
tially characterized by the reform of legislation, both economic and the 
one dealing directly with corruption and related phenomena and orga-
nization of necessary institutions. This part of work has mostly been 
completed, although this assessment does not mean that everything is 
done and done in the best manner. There is a need for significant 
improvement of some areas of economic legislation that stimulate cor-
ruption. For example, in construction (obtaining a construction per-
mit) procedures should be greatly simplified, thus eliminating a hotbed 
of corruption at the local level. The financial system is overregulated, 
which was probably necessary in the first years of transition, while the 
system was unstable and immature, but now it should be gradually lib-
eralized, eliminating the risk of corruption related to operating licenses 
of banks, insurance companies, etc. 
It is also necessary to complete institution building, specifically in 
two directions. The first is the founding of the missing, but planned 
institutions, such as the state auditing institution and the Anti-
corruption Agency.
The statutory deadline for the formation of the State Auditing 
Institution (SAI) expired in May 2006 and it has not been established 
yet. One of the causes was the modest wage of the head of the institu-
tion in comparison with the wages in the private sector, which was later 
rectified. The process of nomination of the SAI Council members is 
under way, so it is to be hoped that the foundation and initiation of 
operations will be successfully completed by the end of 2007 or the 
beginning of 2008. 
The Anti-corruption Agency is provided for by the Anti-corruption 
Strategy and a draft law on its foundation, competences and procedures 
already exists. Such agencies earned international fame after the suc-
cessful example from Hong Kong, but that success was rarely repeated 
elsewhere. Namely, the basic question relates to the agency’s character, 
i.e. whether its competencies include the investigative function. The 
agency from Hong Kong did have such a function, which is why it 
achieved good results, whereas in other countries agencies have no 
investigative competences, so success has eluded them. The Serbian 
draft law on the agency does not provide for those investigative compe-
tences, but only those that relate to coordination, initiative, opinion, 
supervision, etc. Therefore, the question is whether such an agency is 
necessary and whether another expensive administrative body would 
be created3, not yielding the necessary results. With this we are not 
advocating the foundation of an agency with investigative competences, 
3 The Agency is to employ 150 staff.
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but raising the issue whether there is any need for such an agency as is 
provided by the draft law.
Behind the question whether such an agency should be formed lies 
another more important question, namely whether in the fight against 
corruption we should rely on regular institutions whose task is a gen-
eral fight against crime, including corruption, or rely to a greater extent 
on specialized anti-corruption bodies. It is our opinion that the first 
option is better, for at least three reasons:
• the first is the belief that regular bodies, such as the police, prose-
cutor’s office and courts, have greater chances of successfully com-
bating corruption because of much larger resources, larger compe-
tences and longer crime-fighting tradition,
• the second is the belief that the abuse of smaller, specialized orga-
nizations is more likely than of large, regular ones, with the abuse 
referring both to the retarding of its operation, as well as to active 
abuse in the sense of facilitating corruption for the benefit of those 
with influence over them,
• the third is the fact that specialized anti-corruption institutions 
have not proved themselves so far, i.e. they have not given any vis-
ible contribution to the reduction of corruption in Serbia.
Recommendation in favor of regular bodies does not imply a sugges-
tion that the existing bodies should be abolished, but only a proposal to 
set up such a configuration of competences in which the classic bodies 
will play the lead part, while the specialized bodies will participate in 
the fight against corruption within their specific competencies.
The second direction of activities is the improvement of operation of 
the existing institutions, since their operation is frequently unsatisfac-
tory. This refers to all three basic law enforcement segments: the police, 
prosecutor’s office and the judiciary. The first and the second still exces-
sively rely on political instructions in anti-corruption activities, instead 
of performing their regular conscientiously. The third is fairly protected 
from reforms winds by the judiciary’s independence, so a sufficient 
change in the judge composition was not possible during the past years. 
However, none of them is irreparably infected by the corruption virus, 
despite the fact that small-scale corruption is fairly common, with large-
scale, political corruption appearing as well. Therefore, there is real 
chance of putting those three institutions on more solid foundations, in 
particular since we believe that in the top government there is inclina-
tion towards such steps. 
Certainly, raising the operation of the institutions in charge of fighting 
crime to a higher level is not the only direction of administration improve-
ment in Serbia. Other institutions, i.e. ministries, agencies, etc. should be 
significantly improved both because of the fight against corruption, and 
because of the reasons of general efficiency and raising the quality of ser-
vices provided to users. Still, priority in the fight against corruption 
should be given to those institutions that directly deal with it.
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gROUPS OF MEASURES
Let us briefly review some measures we consider important in the 
implementation of the stated change of focus in combating corruption.4 
It is worth mentioning before that in all three institutions (the police, 
public prosecutor’s office and the judiciary) it is necessary to introduce 
measures that should (a) reduce corruption in the institution itself and 
(b) increase efficiency of the given institution in combating corruption 
in other segments of the society.
Regarding the judiciary, the major groups of measures would be the 
following. First, the setting of valid criteria for the election of judges 
and their consistent implementation accompanied by maximum pub-
licity, since the election of judges became additionally important 
because of the failure to change the existing composition of judges at 
least partially through a form of lustration or removing weak and cor-
rupt judges. 
Second, it is necessary to expand significantly the insight of both the 
professional and ordinary public into the work of courts, in several ways: 
by widening the publicity of procedural activities (e.g. when deciding on 
interlocutory relief); preparing valid judicial statistics, since the existing 
are disastrous; publicizing decisions, together with explanations, so that 
anyone can monitor the work not only of courts, but also of individual 
judges; enabling the monitoring of procedural activities over the internet 
and similar. Increased transparency would increase the probability of 
identification of unusual decisions and cause certain judges to refrain 
from corruption. 
Third, it is necessary to ensure regular submission of reports by all 
participants in the judiciary (judges and prosecutors), in order to per-
form mandatory analyses of the work of individuals and institutions, 
with mandatory periodic assessment of individuals. This measure, as 
many others, is primarily aimed at increasing the efficiency of opera-
tion, but is also very useful in combating corruption.
Fourth, implementation of classic anti-corruption measures: involve-
ment of judges in the conflict-of-interest prevention program; provi-
sion of adequate wages and working conditions; subjecting judges and 
prosecutors to disciplinary proceedings etc.
Fifth, participants from the judiciary need to have continuous train-
ing, not only in the area of legislative changes, but also case manage-
ment, ethical standards, corruption technologies and similar.
Sixth, it is necessary to put in place an operational protection pro-
gram for witnesses who are willing to testify in court on corruption, as 
well as provide protection from revenge to the staff who report corrup-
tion in their institution.
4  See Corruption in the judiciary, CLDS, Belgrade, 2004; Evaluation Report of the 
Republic of Serbia, GRECO, Strasbourg, 23 June 2006
218 Corruption in Serbia Five Years Later
Regarding the prosecutor’s office, it is necessary to improve significantly 
its operation, as it is today, due to the lack of autonomy in its operation, 
essentially part of the government administration. Therefore, the election 
of prosecutors should be subject to clear criteria and made public, in 
order to increase or even gain confidence of the citizens in prosecutors 
and their work. Moreover, the fluctuation of prosecutors and their depu-
ties should be decreased by performance-related compensation and their 
term of office extended, so that it would not be easy to change the prose-
cutorial staff in the course of political changes. Then, the role of the pros-
ecutor’s office in the pretrial, investigative proceedings should be 
increased, including the formal change of competence and the prosecu-
tor’s office trained for that. Finally, a special anti-corruption department 
should be established within the prosecutor’s offices.
Regarding the police, several groups of measures will be mentioned. 
The first refers to the strengthening of the anti-corruption police seg-
ment. This can be achieved easily by increasing the number of the police 
engaged in anti-corruption activities and their permanent professional 
and ethical training, as well as by strengthening material resources at 
the disposal of this police segment.
The second group of measures refers to the impact on policemen’s 
motivation, both by incentivizing positive motivation and by disincen-
tivizing negative motivation. Among positive incentives there are wage 
increases and occasional performance-related bonuses, but also pro-
motions based merit rather than political criteria or nepotism. More 
generally, this service, as well as the entire government administration, 
should be based on the principle of merit in service as the basis for pro-
motion, compensation and reputation building at work and outside it, 
and thus for good operation as well. 
On the side of negative incentives the basic measures certainly involve 
the strengthening of internal control in the police and external supervi-
sion over the police, in order to increase the probability of discovery of 
corrupt acts performed by policemen. Apart from that, it is necessary 
finally to do away with the remnants of belief among the policemen that 
a mate should be protected even if he has done something wrong, for 
example participated in small-scale (or even large-scale) corruption (for 
example, extortion against street vendors etc.). That spirit of unity of 
people in the service should have its direction changed: from uncritical 
support even when someone is guilty (“I am protecting him because he 
will also protect me tomorrow”) to the protection of the citizens and law 
(“I am removing rotten apples from the service; we are not criminals”).
An important element of the concept is the idea of police depoliti-
cization, which is extremely desirable, but not easily achievable, 
because it mostly depends on the highest police ranks, which is pre-
cisely the one politicizing subordinate police structures. The goal is 
depoliticized, professional police, resting on the mechanism of merit 
at work as the basis of position and promotion of the policemen. The 
Serbian police will certainly move towards that goal as well, because 
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of the public pressure and maturing of the political scene. The ques-
tion is only at what speed.
Apart from these measures directed at the strengthening of regular 
anti-corruption mechanisms, it is necessary and beneficial to undertake 
measures from the standard anti-corruption arsenal. 
Expansion of transparency, i.e. making the operation of all govern-
ment bodies and individuals as transparent and public as possible, 
through the presence of the media, publication of reports on the opera-
tion of government and other bodies and similar;
Expansion of accountability, i.e. ensuring accountability and respon-
sibility of everyone in the government administration, from the gov-
ernments and ministers and other government bodies, parties and 
political leaders, to each civil servant;
Further reduction of discretionary decision-making, i.e. continuing 
deregulation of economic and other regulations, wherever possible, in 
order to reduce the discretionary rights of individuals from the govern-
ment administration and narrow down the field of corruption;
Continued government administration reform, i.e. improvement of 
work process and procedures, change of part of the personnel, dissemi-
nation of ethical standards, permanent education and similar; 
Further support to investigative activity, i.e. encouraging permanent 
investigative and professional work on corruption-related issues, semi-
nars, conferences, publications and similar; special role of empirical 
determination of progress in the fight against corruption through peri-
odic public opinion surveys and other methodologies.
Further raising of awareness on the detrimental effects of corruption 
both among the population and politicians, through regular media 
activities and special campaigns, through the support to organizations 
seriously dealing with the research of corruption phenomenon, through 
field activities and promotional material and similar.

